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ABSTRACT
EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING:
A CASE STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION OF THE
COMMUNITY COLLEGE SYSTEM IN THE COMMONWEALTH
OF MASSACHUSETTS
1957-1962
SEPTEMBER 1994
JAMES H. MULLEN,

JR.,

M.S.,
Ed.D.,

B.S.,

COLLEGE OF THE HOLY CROSS

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by:

Professor William C. Wolf,

Jr.

Politics plays an inevitable and integral role in the
development of policy concerning higher education at the
state level.

Governors are fundamental to the political

process of statewide higher education policymaking.

This

study examines the role which two governors played in the
early development of community colleges in Massachusetts
between 1957 and 1962.
The purpose of this study is essentially two-fold.
First,

it seeks to tell a political story about two

governors of different personalities, parties,
priorities.

and policy

Focusing on the common historical theme of

community college development,

this story presents how the

contexts of their times influenced the strategies and
decisions of Foster Furcolo
(1961-1962)

and how,

(1957-1960)

in turn,

and John Volpe

these two men shaped the

period in which they lived.
The second purpose of this study is to analyze
specifically how Furcolo and Volpe influenced the critical
vi

early years of community college development in
Massachusetts.

Furcolo held a passionate policy commitment

to community colleges and his passion is largely
responsible for their gestation and birth.
personally committed,

Volpe was less

yet his administration witnessed a

marked increase in funding and pace of campus planning.
Analysis of this irony holds a number of significant
lessons concerning gubernatorial responsibilities for
policy formulation,

legislative leadership,

and public

opinion leadership.
This dissertation utilizes a case study research modus
operandi.

It includes a literature review which focuses on

works related to politics and policy-making in higher
education,

as well as the American governorship and the

range of gubernatorial power.
The results of this study offer insights into how
governors use the powers of their office to shape the
policies of their eras and beyond.

It also provides a view

of how two different governors engaged the specific policy
issue of community college development within the context
of other demands and policy concerns of their
administrations.

Finally,

it offers tightly defined

lessons for the relationship between governors and higher
education in contemporary times.
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CHAPTER

I

GOALS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Statement of the Problem
Politics and political institutions play an
inevitable role in shaping the community college mission in
Massachusetts as well as in other states.
legislators,

Governors,

regulatory boards and county and local

officials provide the enabling legislation for such
institutions,

establish the ground rules under which

community colleges operate and set the budget
authorizations that fund college programs.

Moreover,

the

community college commitment to comprehensiveness,
affordability and open access make such institutions a
logical vehicle for public officials who seek a guick and
visible response to issues ranging from labor force
training to developmental education.

Finally,

by

definition community colleges are intimately tied to local
needs.

Such intimacy weds community colleges to state,

county and local political processes.
While much has been written concerning the history of
community colleges

(Bogue,

Cohen,

Wattenbarger,

1994)

1989;

Witt,

1950;

Monroe,

1972;

Witt,

Gollattscheck,

&

1988;

Suppiger,

and an important body of work is developing related

to issues of class and economic development at two-year
colleges
1965;

(Clark,

Zwerling,

1960;
1976;

Blocker,

Plummer,

Brint & Karabel,

1

& Richardson,

1989),

comparatively

little research exists concerning the role of politics and
political institutions in shaping the community college
mission.

Most such research is reported in chapters of

general texts

(Tillery,

Brint & Karabel,
(Asquino,

1976;

1989),
Bartley,

unpublished papers
articles

(Katsimas,

et al.,

1985;

Cohen & Drawer,

1989;

in portions of dissertations
1985;

(Lustberg,

Whitaker,
1979)

1989)

and in

or in occasional

1993).

The work of scholars such as Fabian and Lustberg
emphasizes the legislative perspective,

focusing on how the

Legislature has historically influenced the mission of
community colleges in Massachusetts.

Conversely,

the role

of the governor in defining that mission has received
minimal scholarly attention.
A small but growing body of literature examines the
policy relationship of governors and higher education.
However,

while the writings of such authors as Goodall,

Lederle,

Eulau and Quinley each provide useful insights

into executive branch policymaking vis-a-vis public higher
education,

their analyses emphasize the actions of specific

governors toward statewide higher education systems or
toward large and unwieldy research universities.

Almost no

specific attention is paid to the policymaking goals and
influence of governors concerning community colleges.
Moreover,

while this growing body of literature offers

useful analyses of systems in states such as Wisconsin and
California,

it does not relate specifically to the

2

situation in Massachusetts,

a case study which is in many

ways unique.
The absence of scholarship pertaining to the central
policymaking role of the executive branch in Massachusetts
is unfortunate.
legislator”

Bartley has called the governor "the chief

(interview,

11/26/90),

for it is the executive

branch which sets the policy agenda for government in
Massachusetts.

The governor's annual budget requests to

the Legislature establish the basic parameters for policy
debate, while constitutional powers such as the veto
provide gubernatorial leverage over legislative action.
Executive branch appointments to cabinet and sub-cabinet
posts provide the leadership for key departments and
program initiatives.

Moreover,

the governor personally

commands extensive media attention and can utilize this
visibility to focus the policy debate on issues of
importance to him or her.
Since the 1960s,

public higher education in

Massachusetts has expanded greatly in size and has earned a
more prominent position in the policy debate on Beacon
Hill.

From fifteen institutions

colleges,

(UMass,

ten state

the Massachusetts Maritime Academy,

technical institutes)

in 1957,

three

public higher education had

grown to twenty-nine institutions by 1990 with a total
budget of some $700 million.
The public community college system in the
Commonwealth had grown since 1960 into fifteen institutions

3

by 1990 with a total annual budget of over $120 million.
More than 100,000 community college students attended
classes during the day and evening in the Fall of 1990.
This growth has occurred within a context that is
unique in three important ways.

First, public higher

education co-exists with Massachusetts' unmatched array of
private colleges and universities.

This reality has

historically affected the priority given public higher
education by political decision-makers in the Commonwealth.
Moreover,

the funding mechanism for community colleges in

Massachusetts is unlike that in most of the rest of the
nation.

State dollars fund higher education, with no

contribution from either local or county government.
Finally,

evening educational progrcuns receive no state

support and must be self-supporting.
As is the case across the country,

the Commonwealth's

community colleges are committed to comprehensiveness and
to open access as they struggle to balance diverse mandates
which include career progreans,

transfer curricula,

developmental coursework and contract training.

With

attrition rates at some institutions exceeding fifty
percent and vocational programs dominating an increasing
portion of community college curricula,

however,

a number

of scholars such as Zwerling and Karabel have asked whether
the community college commitment to open access offers
little more than false promises to the lower socioeconomic
classes of American society.

4

It is important to build on the current scholarship
concerning the factors which influence the mission of the
Commonwealth's public two-year colleges.

A full

excunination of the community college mission in
Massachusetts should entail consideration of the role
played by political institutions and personalities,
including the Commonwealth's chief executive.

The present

study has sought to contribute to this effort by examining
how two gubernatorial administrations influenced
development of the Massachusetts community college system
between 1957 and 1962.
The period 1957-1962 provides a useful case history of
gubernatorial influence upon the Commonwealth's community
colleges.

First,

development.
governors,

it encompasses their birth and early

Second,

it provides a window on two

Foster Furcolo and John Volpe, who belonged to

different parties,

possessed very different personalities,

held different priorities,
dynamics,
legacies.

faced different political

encountered different crises and left different
Both,

however,

affected the early formation of

Massachusetts community colleges in a positive manner.
Finally,

in examining the period 1957-1962,

concentrates on a manageable case history.

this study

A great danger

in historical research is to grasp too grand a topic,

only

to lose focus and become mired in volumes of disconnected
data.

This study analyzes a tightly defined period of

5

gubernatorial activity,

thus forming a solid foundation for

future research of subsequent administrations.
The clearest and most direct impact of the executive
branch on community colleges came at the time of their
authorization by the Legislature in 1958.
than any other individual,

Perhaps more

Governor Foster Furcolo is

responsible for the birth of the community college in
Massachusetts.

Proposals for two-year colleges had been

presented to the Legislature periodically since a 1922
study by George Zook recommended inclusion of junior
colleges in a general expansion of the Commonwealth's
public higher education system.

It was Furcolo,

however,

influenced by community college programs in other states
(particularly Florida)

and seeking to provide comprehensive

institutions that would "allow students to pursue whatever
type of educational program they needed"

(Furcolo,

interview 1988), who was the first Massachusetts governor
to make community colleges a cornerstone of his legislative
progrcim.

His personal commitment and stewardship,

combined

with that of key supporters in the Commonwealth's House and
Senate, was the most critical factor in the 1958 passage of
legislation (Chapter 605 of the General Laws of 1958)
authorizing the development of community colleges in
Massachusetts.
The nearly two-year period between Furcolo's first
formal call for a community college system in his 1957
inaugural address and the passage of Chapter 605 offers a
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number of important insights into both early evolution of
the community college mission in Massachusetts and the
policymaking and legislative processes in the Commonwealth.
It also provides a clear example of how the steady support
of a chief executive can combine with the goals and
ambitions of individual legislators to drive major policy
development.

It is no coincidence that the first two

community colleges in Massachusetts were established in
Pittsfield and Hyannis,

home respectively to Representative

Thomas Wojtkowski and Senator George Stone,

two key

supporters of Furcolo's initiative.
Although scholars such as Lustberg have described
Furcolo's leadership in developing support for community
colleges in Massachusetts,

the case offers fertile ground

for analysis as both a study in policy development and as
the critical first phase of executive branch influence over
the evolving community college mission in Massachusetts.
The role of subsequent administrations has received
even less historical analysis,

despite important

developments related to the mission of public higher
education in general and community colleges in particular.
For example.

Governor Volpe's role in the historical

development of community colleges has been essentially
unexplored.

His first administration (1960-62) provides a

particularly informative contrast to the Furcolo era.
Whereas his predecessor held community colleges as a
personal priority, Volpe's fundamental policy focus lay
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elsewhere,

particularly in capital projects and political

reform.

Despite Volpe's relative lack of attention,

however,

the Massachusetts community college system

continued to expand,

thanks largely to support from key

legislators and a strong governing board and the governor's
willingness to endorse continuation of his predecessor's
two-year college program.
This study sets the two administrations in the
historical and political context of their times.

It

examines the personalities of Furcolo and Volpe as well as
the priorities and predispositions each brought to office.
Finally,

and most significantly,

it analyzes their relative

influence over the development of community colleges and
their mission in Massachusetts during the critical era of
1957-62.
While scholars have examined the history of community
colleges in Massachusetts and explored the roles of
legislators,

statewide education officials,

private

businesses and individual college presidents in shaping
institutional mission,

almost no research has incorporated

a detailed analysis of the role played by the
Commonwealth's governors.

Although the personal interest

of individual governors has varied from the very direct
role played by Furcolo to Volpe's less focused attention,
every governor has played some part in influencing the
mission of community colleges in Massachusetts.
very least,

At the

they have approved the opening of such
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institutions,

set budget authorizations for them and

appointed college trustees as well as other key officials
who have directly influenced the community college mission.

Purpose of the Study
The present study addresses the role of the
Massachusetts governor in shaping the early development and
mission of community colleges in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts.

Specifically,

it examines how the actions

and inactions of the governor and key executive agencies
influenced the evolving mission of the commonwealth's
community colleges between 1957 and 1962.
The primary research questions which guided this study
are:
1.

What role,

if any,

did the executive branch play

in shaping the mission of community colleges in
Massachusetts during the period in question?
2.

How was that role shaped by the individual
priorities of the governor in question and the
historical context in which that governor served
the commonwealth?

3.

Who were the other key political actors who
influenced development of community colleges and
their mission in Massachusetts?

4.

What is an appropriate policy role for the
governor in shaping the mission of community
colleges in the commonwealth?
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Meaning of the Terms
For the purpose of this study,
college,
branch,

primary sources,
fiscal year,

the terms community

secondary sources,

legislature,

executive

and political institution

have been defined.
Community College - While several definitions exist in
the literature,

the two most appropriate for use in the

study are found in Cohen and Brawer's The American
Community College and in Deyo's 1967 examination of the
Massachusetts Community college system. Access to Quality
Community College Opportunity - The former defines a
community college as "any institution accredited to award
the Associate in Arts or the Associate in Science as its
highest degree

(p.

4).

Deyo recognizes the comprehensive

aspect of these institutions when he writes,
college, by definition,

is a growing,

"the community

changing institution

responding in its program and services to the changing
needs of the region and of society"

(p.

3).

Executive Branch - For purposes of this study,

the

executive branch will be considered to include the
governor,

his or her immediate staff as well as all staff

and agencies which report to the governor or to a member of
his or her staff.
Fiscal Year - The fiscal year in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts runs from July 1 of a year through June 30 of
the following year.

For example.

encompass the period July 1,

Fiscal Year 1960 would

1959 through June 30,
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1960.

Legislature - The Massachusetts Legislature is
bicameral with a House of Representatives and a Senate.
Political Institution - This study considered any
institution whose chief executive officer or board is
elected or appointed by elected officials to be a political
institution.
Primary Source - Travers defines a primary source as
"one which has had some direct physical relationship to the
events that are being reconstructed"

(1969, p.

383).

This

study considered as primary sources those individuals
directly involved in development of the Massachusetts
community college mission,

documents written by these

individuals and newspaper articles written by direct
observers of the evolving community colleges.
Secondary Sources - Travers

(1969, p.

383) defines

secondary sources as "those that do not bear a direct
physical relationship to the event that is the subject of
study."

This study considered as secondary sources

individuals who have examined the Massachusetts political
scene and/or the evolution of community colleges in the
Commonwealth but who were not directly related to that
scene or that evolution,

as well as writings by scholars

who have studied the American community college movement.
The same consideration was given to other sources not
directly related to the evolution of Massachusetts
community colleges or to the political institutions that
have influenced that evolution since 1956.
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significance of the Study
Significant research exists pertaining to the
historical evolution of community colleges at the national
level,

as does literature which analyzes the economic and

social effects of such institutions.

Included aunong these

studies are important examinations of the role of community
colleges within the Massachusetts higher education system.
As noted earlier,

however,

the role of key state and

local political institutions in shaping the mission of
Massachusetts community colleges has received relatively
limited scholarly attention, while the influence of
individual governors has been the subject of almost no
focused research.

The theoretical significance of this

study lies in its emphasis upon the relative role played by
the executive branch in the early development and mission
of community colleges in the Commonwealth.
Furthermore,

the present study provides a case study

of policy development within the Massachusetts state
political structure.

From this study,

useful lessons have

emerged as to how policy priorities evolve (or fail to
evolve) within Massachusetts state government and how the
executive branch interacts with other key institutions of
government such as the Legislature.
This study is also significant in that its results may
provide a foundation for recommendations as to what role is
appropriate for the executive branch in influencing the
mission of community colleges in Massachusetts.
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Such

recommendations should provide salient data to those who
will advise the current administration as well as future
governors concerning the process of educational policy
development in Massachusetts.

Delimitations of the Study
There are five specific limitations to this study.
First,

its scope is restricted to Massachusetts.

While

community colleges in Massachusetts share many
characteristics

(e.g.,

commitment to open access)

similar institutions in other states,
differences in history,

size,

with

there are important

governance and financing

between Massachusetts community colleges and those in other
parts of the country.

In particular,

community colleges in

Massachusetts operate within a state characterized by
exceptional private institutions,

a fact which has

historically influenced resource allocation to public
higher education.

Moreover,

governance and funding at

community colleges in the commonwealth have been dominated
by the state and
governing body,

(until

1980),

by an appointed statewide

the Massachusetts Board of Regional

Community Colleges.

Conversely,

in many other states

county and local governments play a central role in
governance and funding while local boards of trustees are
elected.

Appropriations to community colleges in

Massachusetts flow solely from the state
for county and local governments)
only day programs.
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(again,

no role

and state dollars support

The second major limitation of this study is its focus
on community colleges.

While examining the executive

branch's role in shaping the community college mission will
provide useful insights into governance at the state level,
it is important not to assume that all observations are
fully generalizable to other inter-governmental
relationships or to other parts of the higher education
system.
The third significant limitation of this study is its
focus on a circumscribed period of six years.

While

failure to so constrain this research effort would lead to
diffusion and unwieldiness, it is important to remember
that the late 1950s and the early 1960s were in many ways a
unique era in the histories of Massachusetts and the United
States.

Thus, any extrapolation or generalization of this

study's results must be carefully circumscribed.
The fourth limitation of the study is its reliance on
primary resources and, most specifically, on interviews
with key figures in the development of public higher
education policy in Massachusetts during the past three
decades.

The limitation of source materials creates a

research constraint best summarized by John Whitaker (1989)
who faced a similar dilemma in completing his doctoral
research:
Ultimately a study can never completely reveal
the motivation of participants in an event no
matter how complete the record.
It cannot
completely recreate, for purpose of analysis, the
total context within which a series of events
took place some twenty years in the past.
It can
14

never fully document the genesis of a new idea or
change of attitude among a group of decision
makers.
This study was limited by the necessity
to work largely with the written and printed
record and limited as well by the all too human
tendency of participants to forget, to embellish
or to misconstrue events in which they played a
significant role.
(p. 32)
The final limitation grows from the personal
involvement of the author in the Commonwealth's community
college system.

Although an earnest effort at impartiality

has been made, it is impossible for the author to approach
this study without a set of predispositions concerning the
role of the community colleges in Massachusetts higher
education.
This study looked to the evolution of community
colleges in Massachusetts as an historical case which could
contribute to the literature concerning educational
policymaking at the executive level of state government.
Before making broad extrapolations, however, the reader
should keep in mind that the study focuses on a single
state that has a rather unique higher education pedigree
and on a community college system whose development has
been influenced by that pedigree.

15

CHAPTER

I I

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Policy and Politics in Higher Education:
Overview of the Field
Since 1958 and the publication of Moos and Rourke's
comprehensive study. The Campus and the State, a growing
literature has developed concerning policy and politics in
higher education.

Much of this scholarship has been

completed since 1970 and, as Hartmark and Hines have
demonstrated, it has often been descriptive in nature, has
generally focused on the state level and has consisted
primarily of case studies (Hines & Hartmark,

1980, p. 5).

The field of policy and politics in higher education
at the state level incorporates a range of topics and
subtopics related to the content (policy) and the process
(politics) of decision making (Hines & Hartmark,
7).

1980, p.

In their work. Politics of Higher Education (1980),

Hines and Hartmark write that "state governments influence
higher education largely through three mechanisms: planning
and coordination, budgetary appropriations and the
allocation of resources among institutions and sectors, and
administrative regulation and control"
scope of influence,

(p. 21).

Given this

scholars have examined questions

related to statewide coordination, institutional governance
and mission, budget and finance and academic freedom.
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In a separate article, Hines and Hartmark argue that a
taxonomy of higher education exists in which five levels
(purposes, values and norms, programs, management, and
resources) comprise the policy domain and in which
political interactions occur in three loci (institutional,
extramural, and governmental)
9).

(Hines & Hartmark,

1980, p.

The present study operates primarily at the

intersection of purposes (policy) and government (politics)
as it traces the gubernatorial role in shaping the
community college identity in Massachusetts.
While research specifically related to the
gubernatorial role in the development of individual
community college systems is rare, this study draws from
and contributes to a diverse literature whose common thread
is the gubernatorial role in policymaking.
First, the present study depends on a body of
literature which describes the relationship between state
governments and public higher education.

The foundation of

much of this literature is The Campus and the State in
which Moos and Rourke (1959) present an extensive analysis
of the relationship between university systems and state
governments.

Subsequent authors, including Hartmark,

Hines, Goodall, Eulau, Greer and Glenny have made
significant contributions to the scholarship concerning
state governments and public higher education.

In doing

so, each has also offered useful, if somewhat generic
insights into the role governors play in the relationship
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between the state and its public institutions of higher
learning.
The present study also relies on a second related body
of literature which focuses on the American governorship as
a political institution.

This literature examines the

governor's office through the lens of political science and
is primarily concerned with the mechanics of how
gubernatorial power is exercised in relation to that of the
other key political actors.

Leslie Lipson's 1949 study,

The American Governor: From Figurehead to Leader, is among
the first such examinations of the governorship and has
been followed by the works of Ransone, Sabato, Beyle and
Osborne, among others.
The existing literature concerning the evolution of
community colleges in the United States offers surprisingly
little substantive discussion of the role played by
governors in shaping the identity of such institutions in
individual states.

Even Brint and Karabel's The Diverted

Dream, a case history of community college growth in
Massachusetts, is relatively silent on the gubernatorial
impact on the Commonwealth's fifteen-college system,
emphasizing instead the role of campus presidents and the
statewide governing board in creating institutional
missions.
Williams,

While others such as Lederle (in Beyle &
1972) have at least acknowledged the role of

governors in shaping the two-year college mission in their
states, it is interesting that in most important recent
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works concerning the American community college, the
gubernatorial role is almost ignored.

Perhaps the most

useful history of the community college movement is
provided by Witt, Wattenbarger et al. in their 1994 work,
Americans Community Colleges: The First Century.

Although

the text does not focus on the gubernatorial role, it
offers a most helpful sense for the context in which
community colleges developed nationwide.
A limited body of literature exists which relates
specifically to either the Massachusetts governorship or to
the overall relationship between the state and public
higher education in the Commonwealth.

In the former group,

Malian and Blackwood's study of Foster Furcolo's
legislative battle over issues such as the sales tax (in
Westin,

1962) and Osborne's analysis of Michael Dukakis'

two incarnations as governor (1985) are particularly
helpful.

In addition, the governor's role as legislative

leader includes useful insights into both the Furcolo
administration and the Massachusetts Legislature of the
late 1950s.

Brint and Karabel contribute to the

understanding of state government's relationship to
community colleges as do Bartley (1988) and Asquino (1976)
in their respective studies of campus strategic planning
and systemwide budgeting.

Examinations by Stafford (1980)

and Murphy (1974) of higher education reorganization
efforts in Massachusetts during the 1960s and 1970s provide
data concerning the more general relationship of state
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government to public higher education during a watershed
era for the system.

Katsinas (1993) has provided a most

useful analysis of George Wallace's role in the founding of
Alabama's two-year college system.
Thus, the goal of the present study is to bridge
several bodies of literature.

Building from foundations in

both the political science study of the governorship and in
higher education and the field of policy and politics, it
seeks to provide an historical case study that will fill a
void in the contemporary literature concerning both
community colleges and the modern office of governor.
State Government and Public Higher Education
Gubernatorial influence over public higher education
is rooted both in the formal and informal powers of the
office and in the individual governor's hierarchy of
interests and needs.

Executive influence is also a

function of the primary responsibility which state
governments (particularly Massachusetts) have assumed
vis-a-vis public higher education.
Adler and Lane (Politics. Budgeting and Policy,

1985)

have argued persuasively that higher education has evolved
into a unique policy area in most states:
To begin with, we see education as a policy area
of increasing state activity.
In the American
federal system, we know that most governmental
activities are carried out jointly by the various
levels of government.
At the same time, some
policy fields are dominated by state government.
Higher education is a good example of an area
which is primarily a state responsibility and in
which state government is becoming increasingly
active.
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Not only is there a trend toward greater
state policymaking activity in higher education,
but we also feel that higher education's
emergence as a unique policy area is an important
related phenomenon.
Higher education, as
distinct from all of education or education and
welfare, or education and labor, is increasingly
developing its own identifiable policymaking
system in the American states.
(p. 68)
Kerr (State Government,

1985) makes a similar

argument, pointing to a "New States Period" in higher
education:
. . . we are once again entering a state period
in higher education.
This has been the standard
situation for higher education since the founding
of our republic, except for the land-grant period
from 1860 to 1890 and the recent period from 1955
to 1985.
The states, by and large, have taken
good care of higher education; otherwise we would
not have the best system of higher education in
the world.
Perhaps I should say that we are entering a
state-private period of higher education when,
once again, the major initiatives will come from
state and private sources.
(p. 47)
As state responsibility for higher education has
increased, so too have public demands for accountability in
public college and university systems.

Issues of

accountability manifest themselves most clearly in the
ongoing debate concerning the appropriate level of
statewide coordination over public higher education.

A

significant body of literature exists which demonstrates
the increasing level of control exercised by state
government over public colleges and universities.

While a

comprehensive analysis of statewide coordination lies
beyond the scope of this study, coordination and
accountability are of importance to individual governors at
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specific moments in their terms.

As this study

demonstrates, establishing the mechanism of statewide
coordination as well as appointing those who will guide
that mechanism is a fundamental source of gubernatorial
influence over the Commonwealth's community colleges.
Thus, it is important to have some understanding of the
literature concerning statewide coordination of public
higher education.
Hartmark and Hines (1980) provide a useful
bibliographic overview of major works related to statewide
coordination, beginning with Glenny's pathbreaking 1959
study. Autonomy of Public Colleges.

In doing so, Hartmark

and Hines emphasize two recurrent themes in the literature:
first, that coordinating boards operate in a critical and
tenuous position between state government and individual
institutions and that new forms of accountability are
necessary to address "the increased complexity,
interdependence, and scale of higher education"

(p.

18).

Concerning the latter point, Hartmark and Hines join
Balderston in arguing that:
Numerous demands for more specific and detailed
information have affected accountability.
These
demands have been a function of a number of
factors: the increasing size and complexity of
higher education; increased competition for
public funds; problems with inflation;
productivity and enrollment, which have reduced
institutional flexibility; a perceived decline in
the value of the college degree; and the
recurrent problems in supply of trained manpower.
(p. 19)
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In his comprehensive work, Statewide Coordination of
Higher Education (1971),

Berdahl makes several important

points which remain constant in the discussion of
coordination.

Two are particularly salient to the present

study.

that true coordination does not exist in an

First,

ideal form.

Instead,

governor's office,

government entities such as the

budget office or legislature generally

intervene to make decisions in something of an ad hoc
manner.
Second,

Berdahl makes an important distinction between

procedural autonomy (how institutions pursue their goals)
and substantive autonomy (what goals the institutions are
pursuing and how those goals relate to overall systemic
needs and resources).

Berdahl emphasizes the latter,

arguing that it is in the area of substantive autonomy that
the state has the most significant and delicate role to
play.
In addition to those scholars noted above,

a range of

authors have written extensively on issues related to
statewide coordination of higher education.
(1975),

Greer (1976),

Moos and

Rourke

(1959), Millet

and Newman

(1973)

have each made significant contributions.

Beyond

individual prescriptions and matrices concerning the
appropriate structures for coordination,

one common theme

throughout the literature is the steadily increased level
of control by individual states over their public colleges
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and universities.

As the Carnegie Commission on Higher

Education has written:
External authorities are exercising more and more
authority over higher education, and
institutional independence has been declining.
The greatest shift of power in recent years has
taken place not inside the campus but in the
transfer of authority from the campus to outside
agencies. (1973, quoted in Hartmark & Hines,
1980, p. 18)
While acknowledging the increasing scope of state
influence over public higher education,

it is important to

also remember that state systems of colleges and
universities remain important bases of autonomous political
power in Massachusetts and elsewhere.

Zusman (Hines,

1988)

has argued persuasively that public higher education is not
wholly subordinate to state government but rather that
government and higher education exist as
— each partially dependent on the other.

'semihierarchies'
Zusman's primary

measure of the relative level of interdependence is the
autonomy of a state's university system in the areas of
academic decisionmaking and institutional governance.

In

other words, while the interrelationship between state
government and public higher education is fundamental and
multifaceted,

the "balance of power" in the relationship —

while generally shifting toward the state on issues such as
coordination — ultimately depends on the political
dynamic,

on economic realities and on historical trends in

an individual state at a given moment in time.
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The American Governorship - Formal and Informal Powers
It is fair to say that as states have established
their primary relationship to public higher education,

the

American governorship has expanded its formal and informal
bases of power.

The manner in which Foster Furcolo and

John Volpe utilized (or failed to utilize) these formal and
informal powers is fundamental to the purposes of this
study.
Larry Sabato

(1983) described the evolution of

America's governors from comparably low visibility and
limited accomplishment while Beyle and Muchmore
expanded on the same point,

(1983) have

arguing that a shift in the

focus of policymaking has shifted from the federal to the
state level.
Neustadt

(1960)

reminds us that government consists of

separate institutions sharing power.

In the policymaking

process concerning public higher education,

it is now

increasingly the governor who wields the greatest potential
power, both in terms of formal constitutional authority and
in terms of informal powers of political persuasion.
A number of authors have pointed to the fundamental
role which American governors can play regarding public
higher education.

Moos and Rourke (1959) describe the

central importance of the governor in relations between the
Ccunpus and state government.
Capitol and the Campus,

In its 1971 report.

The

the Carnegie Commission on Higher

Education argues that the governor's potential influence
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over public higher education exceeds all other factors
affecting a state's colleges and universities.

Herzik

(1985) writes that ’’while the bulk of state funding and
policy initiatives in education are directed toward the
primary and secondary levels,

gubernatorial influence is

probably greatest in the area of higher education”
And Clark Kerr,
education,

(p.

65).

the eminence grise of public higher

emphasizes that "within most states,

the

governor has now become the most important single person in
higher education"

(1985,

p.

47).

Kerr goes so far as to

refer to the governor as chief academic officer (p.

49).

Adler and Lane (1970) point to three main
gubernatorial roles in the governance of higher education
— as chief executive,
opinion leader (p.

as chief budget officer and as chief

70).

The first two of these roles relate primarily to the
formal powers of governorship; those powers which come
directly from the state constitution or from legislative
statute.

For example,

as chief executive,

the governor

often appoints members of both statewide coordinating
boards and local governing authorities.
she files,

supports,

In addition,

he or

opposes or vetoes legislation which

directly or indirectly affects the state's public higher
education system.

And finally,

the governor is often at

minimum an arbiter and at maximum the determinative force
in establishing statewide master plans for higher
education.

In some situations,
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the governor may even

become a direct influence over the master plans of
individual institutions.
The governor, as chief budget officer in his or her
state, generally recommends and ultimately approves the
budgetary package for public higher education as well as
for all other major statewide appropriations.

In

actuality, moreover, the governor's power within the
budgetary process extends beyond simple dollars and cents.
For the accomplished political leader, working in close
collaboration with a strong budgetary/fiscal adviser, the
governor's budgetary authority brings with it the power to
set the tone and agenda for the policy debate.
written (1976),

Lederle has

"It is not through the organizational

hierarchy by itself, but rather through the executive
budget process, that the governor makes his impact and
gives significant leadership on major issues of higher
education policy"

(p. 46).

Sabato (1983) argues that the executive and budgetary
authority of most American governors has significantly
expanded since mid-century and that 'the governor now works
in a political and structural environment less inhibiting
than ever before"

(p.

88).

Specifically, Sabato argues:

In the executive sphere, governors have done
quite well, not only in successfully
orchestrating constitutional revisions and
reorganizations but also in consolidating and
fortifying their control of administration.
The executive budget is a formidable and
almost universal gubernatorial lever.
Lesser
planning and management tools also have been
strengthened and are at the governor's disposal.
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The governorship as an office draws a better
salary and is more adequately staffed now than in
the past.
(p. 88)
Kerr (1985)

shares the belief that governors have

expanded their formal executive authority since
mid-century,

particularly in their relationship to public

higher education:
Governors have mechanisms they did not have in
1955.
They have bigger staffs and they have
better staffs.
There has also been the
development of state coordinating mechanisms that
permit governors to become involved, not Ccunpus
by campus, which would frequently be impossible,
but through coordination where it is possible to
have an impact.
(p. 48)
Hines

(1988)

expands the discussion of formal

gubernatorial powers,

offering a matrix by which to compare

the strength of America's governors vis-a-vis higher
education.

This matrix assigns values to the relative

powers held by the nation's governors in five critical
areas

(tenure potential,

powers,

appointive powers, budgetary

organizational powers,

veto powers).

The total

value across these five areas provides an index as to the
strength of each governor's formal authority (p.

24).

Hines summarizes:
One measure of gubernatorial influence is the
extent of formal powers over a number of specific
areas.
Budgetary power is the best known of the
formal powers, dealing with whether or not the
governor shares budgetary powers with a civil
servant or a person appointed by someone other
than the governor, with the legislature, with
someone popularly elected, or with others.
Another area involves how long the governor may
serve and whether the governor can serve for more
than a single term.
A third area is the power of
appointment, involving the state bureaucracy and
agency personnel, including the higher education
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As

agency and those who serve on governing boards,
coordinating boards, and councils.
Governors
have organizational powers regarding creating and
abolishing offices, conferring organization
status, and providing access to key personnel.
Veto power pertains to override by a majority of
legislators present, by a majority of the entire
legislative membership, or by a simple majority.
(p. 23).
Despite the expanded array of gubernatorial powers,

a

number of scholars have pointed to significant restraints
which continue to limit most governors' capacities to shape
policy in their states.
that "in most states,

For example,

Goodall has claimed

the institutions of higher education

are prime examples of institutions which spend large
amounts of state funds but operate fairly independently of
the governor”

(1987,

Lederle (1976)
purse strings,

p.

41).

claims that beyond the power of the

governors have surprisingly few direct means

by which to fundamentally alter policy at colleges or
universities.

For example he points out that governors

generally have little influence over faculty and staff
hiring and goes so far as to argue that "it has been the
rare governor who has used his power to make board
appointments with the objective of profoundly changing
educational policy"

(p.

45).

In his study of educational reform in South Carolina,
Kearney (Journal of State Government.

1987) points out that

despite the growth in formal gubernatorial power across the
United States since the 1950s, most governors continue to
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face significant limitations on their constitutional
strength:
In spite of a recent wave of executive branch
reforms, America's governors suffer serious
institutional weaknesses compared to the
president of the United States and to chief
executives in the private sector.
Governors are
not, as a political observer put it,"masters of
their own houses."
Such a constrained institutional environment
can make it difficult to promote significant
policy changes.
(p. 150)
Thus even the most constitutionally powerful governor
must look beyond formal authority to the potentially
substantial range of informal power at her or his disposal.
The potency of such power depends on the relative political
skills of individual chief executives,

on the social,

economic and political environment surrounding a specific
issue at a particular moment in history and on the
importance that a governor attaches to a given topic. As
Moos and Rourke
law,

(1959)

summarize,

"beyond and above the

the high political position of the governor enables

him to wedge himself deeply into the affairs of higher
education"

(p.

eloquently,

255).

Lipson (1939) writes even more

"true leadership which inspires the willing

confidence of men cannot be crystallized into
constitutional grants of power.
anew"

(p.

Each governor must earn it

268).

Perhaps the greatest of a governor's informal powers
is her or his capacity to influence public opinion — the
governor as chief opinion leader.
emphasize that,

Adler and Lane

(1985)

particularly during times of fiscal
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constraint,

the informal power to move public opinion is

vital to the governor:
Since the governor holds office through election
by the entire state, the governor is the voice of
the people of a state.
It is he who provides
public opinion leadership in matters relating to
higher education.
This role of chief opinion
leader is particularly important in relations
with higher education boards and with a variety
of citizen and educational groups and
organizations.
(p. 70)
A number of scholars have examined the importance of
public opinion leadership to the success of a gubernatorial
administration.

This research has indicated that in

setting the tone and agenda of debate,
as much as substance,

style often matters

symbols play a critical role in

communicating to key constituencies,

and a significant

amount of executive attention and staff time is often
allocated to public opinion leadership.
Beyle and Muchmore

(1983) utilize survey data

collected from governors and other public officials to
demonstrate the different approaches that individual
governors take toward public opinion leadership:
Governors approach their public role with
differing perspectives.
Some fulfill the role as
one of many and carry it out to the best of their
ability.
They do not seek to expand on the role
or encourage contacts but are responsive to
constituents and to the media.
This is often a
most necessary view of the role due to the sheer
volume of public activity facing the governor.
Other governors undertake a more aggressive and
activist role, seeking out and stimulating public
contacts.
(p. 54).
Kearney's study of educational reform in South
Carolina (1987) demonstrates the enormous range of informal
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power available to an astute governor, even in a state
whose constitution mandates weak executive authority.
Kearney's research describes how Richard Riley utilized the
informal powers available to a constitutionally weak
executive branch in achieving a massive restructuring of
South Carolina's educational infrastructure.

As Kearney

points out, much of Riley's informal power emanated from
personal characteristics — his capacity as a politician,
the depth of his commitment to educational reform as a
policy issue and the strength of his interpersonal skills:
Clearly, Riley's remarkable achievement during
his eight years in office (1978-1986) were not
the result of the formal powers alone. ... He
also skillfully used the informal powers of the
office, which are widely recognized but less
written about by political scientists.
These
informal powers include such factors as access to
the mass media, political party influence,
patronage, pork barrel, prestige of the office
and the popularity of the governor.
Additional
informal powers encompass personal charac¬
teristics such as interpersonal skills,
bargaining ability, education, experience,
energy, and ambition.
The informal powers are
just as important as the formal ones and, unlike
the formal powers, all except patronage and pork
barrel depend on the person — not the office.
An outstanding individual can exercise strong
leadership in a weak governor state as Riley's
success with the South Carolina's Education
Improvement Act (EIA) illustrates, (p. 75)
In the exercise of both formal and informal
gubernatorial power, a number of authors have correctly
emphasized the central role played by the legislative
branch.

Arguing that the legislative role is "the role

around which others revolve," Beyle and Dalton write (1983,
in Beyle & Muchmore) that
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a governor who fails to develop a positive
relationship with the legislature may find his
executive budget, his programs and policies, and
his key appointments tied up in legislative
committees or mired in petty controversies.
Ultimately, the public most often measures the
success or the failure of an administration by
its real or perceived record of legislative
achievement.
(p. xx)
As Jewell

(Beyle & Williams,

1972)

has argued:

A governor is judged today largely on the success
of his legislative programs.
Unless his
administration has been plagued by unusually
serious scandals, the administrative success or
failures of a governor are neither visible nor
interesting to a voter.
The gubernatorial
candidate's platform is composed largely of
legislative promises — whether he offers more
money for education, the enactment of a merit
system, or the lowering of taxes.
To the extent
that issues determine elections, a governor is
judged by the legislative promises he has kept or
broken, and this often means that he is judged by
his success or failure as a legislative leader.
(p. 124)
A governor's formal relationship to the legislature
depends on the relative constitutional powers assigned to
the executive and the legislative branches.
significant,

however,

No less

are the informal aspects of the

institutional relationship — e-g-f

the governor's personal

history and interactions with legislative leaders,

the

distribution of party membership in each house of the
legislature and the public's comparative opinion of the two
branches.
Sabato's

(1983)

analysis of the executive-legislative

relationship indicates that as gubernatorial power has
increased since the

1950s,

so too has the legislature

increased its scope of informal and formal power.
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This

expansion of legislative influence is due in good measure
to a series of reapportionment decisions
Baker vs.

(particularly

Carr in 1962 which affirmed "one-person one-vote"

and required that each legislator in a state represent
approximately the same number of people)
expanded professional

as well as

legislative staffs and improved

compensation packages which often attracted a more
substantive,

policy-oriented brand of legislator

(p.

78).

As legislative sophistication and power has increased,
the pressure has grown on governors to spend extensive time
and energy nurturing relationships with key legislators.
Much of a governor's success in developing these
relationships depends on both the partisan distribution in
the legislature and on the personalities and goals of those
who hold legislative positions of leadership.
(Beyle & Williams,

1972)

Jewell

summarizes:

No factor is more important in determining a
governor's legislative success than his
relationship with the legislative leaders of his
party.
When that party is in the majority, those
leaders — and particularly the House Speakers —
have broad powers to appoint committees, assign
bills to committees, and guide deliberations on
the floor. Moreover, these are the governor's
spokesmen and representatives in the legislature.
If they are ineffective or uncooperative, the
governor is seriously handicapped.
(p. 133)
A number of case studies exist which artfully
demonstrate how specific governors have utilized various
forms of influence to achieve specific policy goals.
Rosenbaum's analysis of university reorganization in
Wisconsin during the governorship of Patrick Lucey and
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Wood's study of the University of California during the
gubernatorial administration of Ronald Reagan are
particularly informative

(Beyle & Williams,

1972).

Each

provides important insights into policy confrontations
between critical hierarchies — two strong-willed and
popular governors clashing with two of the nation's most
influential university systems.

Each study demonstrates

the potential and limits of gubernatorial powers and
Rosenbaum,

in particular,

traces the institutional

importance of the legislative branch in any such
confrontation.
The present study contributes to existing literature
concerning the American governorship by offering insights
as to how two Massachusetts governors from different
political parties and with different policy priorities
utilized the various powers of their office during the
period 1957-62 and,

in doing so,

how they influenced

development of the Commonwealth's community college system.
For excimple,

Foster Furcolo

(1957-60)

was willing to use

the full range of his formal and informal powers to create
a community college system but was ultimately constrained
by his tendency to be,
party organization,

in Jewell's words,

"aloof from the

ill at ease with politicians,

and

unskilled and uncertain in bargaining sessions with
legislators"

(Beyle & Williams,

1972,

p.

133).

Republican businessman who succeeded Furcolo,
expansion of the community college system,
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John Volpe,
witnessed

due less to his

overarching vision concerning two-year colleges than to his
instinctive faith in such institutions;
to endorse legislative initiative;

to his willingness

to the entrepreneurial

spirit of the Massachusetts Board of Regional Community
Colleges;

and to the momentum which carried over from

Furcolo's administration.
This study analyzes early community college
development in Massachusetts through the prism of
gubernatorial use of power and,

in doing so,

provides a

contribution to the literature concerning the American
governorship and to that concerning the mission of
community colleges in Massachusetts.
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CHAPTER

III

DESIGN AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY

Overview
An historical case study research modus operandi is
utilized to address the policy role of two Massachusetts
governors in shaping the community college mission during
the period 1957-1962.

Specifically,

the study examines the

goals and objectives of each governor vis-a-vis the
developing community college system and how these goals and
objectives fit into his overall policy priorities and
practical political needs.

It briefly reviews the

political history of the period in question and fits the
gubernatorial role in shaping community college development
into the context of that history.
The case study identifies the role of each governor
during the critical early years of community college
development in Massachusetts.

Moreover,

it provides

general insights into how each governor perceived the
mission of two-year colleges and examines the relative
policy and political importance that each placed on
community college development.

Further,

it summarizes the

relative impact that each governor had on the evolution of
the community college mission.
findings,

Finally,

based on its

the study draws several conclusions concerning

the appropriate role of a governor in shaping the community
college identity.

In doing so,
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this study hopes to

contribute to the growing body of literature which explores
the relationship between state government and public higher
education.
Theoretical Framework
This study seeks to weave and analyze together two
intimately connected stories.
The first story presents the development of
Massachusetts community colleges as one element of a larger
political whole.

It focuses on where community colleges

fit amid gubernatorial and legislative priorities,

how

individual governors of different temperaments and
political persuasions sought to implement their agendas,
and how other issues and players influenced the outcome of
gubernatorial efforts.
Governors are individuals who bring their own
priorities,
office.

interests,

In attempting to make history,

shaped by it.
creation,

and life experiences to their
they,

in turn,

are

While their legacy is partly their own

it also belongs to people and forces beyond

direct gubernatorial control.
The second story focuses on the evolving mission of
community colleges in Massachusetts during the period in
question.

While one cannot discuss mission without

considering politics,

one must equally recognize that other

factors beyond politics shaped the community college
identity.

To understand adequately the role played by

governors in shaping two-year colleges in the Commonwealth,
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it is important to understand the substance of what
community colleges were expected to do during the period
between 1957 and 1962, and then to describe the factors
beyond statewide politics that shaped these expectations.
Only then can the gubernatorial role be considered in
something approximating full context.
The political story is in many ways the most
interesting and enjoyable to tell, in that it focuses on
the human side of policy development and implementation.
It is also a story which compels us to draw on the
theoretical constructs of both political science and
sociology.
One fundamental piece of this political story involves
issues of executive power.

As chief executive of the

Commonwealth, the governor holds an array of direct and
indirect powers.

It is his or her understanding of these

powers, willingness to use them and sophistication in doing
so that combines with no small amount of luck to help
determine the success or failure of a gubernatorial
initiative.
The master political historian Richard E. Neustadt has
contributed greatly to the study of political power at the
executive level and his brilliant use of historical case
studies has profoundly influenced the approach taken in
this study.

Neustadt, particularly in Presidential Power

and Alliance Politics, eloquently analyzes the potential
and the limits of executive power at the federal and
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international levels.

As noted earlier, Sabato and Osborne

have utilized similar case studies at the state level.
Governors do not act in isolation, however.

They are

but one actor, albeit a central one, on the political
stage.

While the significant policy issues of any given

time are often a product of gubernatorial emphasis or
initiative, other forces also influence the evolution of
public policy.
Thus, while an historical reconstruction of the
political saga surrounding community colleges between 1957
and 1962 is interesting and necessary, it is not sufficient
to meet the goals of this study.

Nor is it enough to

simply elaborate on the formal and informal powers
available to the governor of Massachusetts, although this,
too, is a necessary part of the total story.

To

satisfactorily describe the role that individual governors
played in shaping community colleges and their mission, we
must also look through a sociological lens.

Only then can

we analyze satisfactorily how and why governors used (or
failed to use) their available powers to influence the
community college identity and how their influence fits in
with that of other players in the evolution of two-year
colleges and their mission.
Brint and Karabel, in their 1989 work. The Diverted
Dream, utilize an institutional model based on the
sociological study of organizations to argue that
Massachusetts community college administrators moved toward
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a vocational emphasis in the 1960s out of perceived
organizational self-interest.

Their work builds from the

earlier work of Lustberg, who examined the evolution of the
Massachusetts community college system utilizing a
sociological perspective.
As sociologists, the above authors have sought to
understand the social and political forces that drove
community college expansion in Massachusetts.

In doing so,

they have grappled with the reality that policymaking
involves competing interests battling on a playing field
whose contours change over time.
The theoretical framework of this study is heavily
influenced both by Lustberg and by Brint and Karabel.

It

has sought to view the policymaking field from the
perspective of the governor's office.

It has examined

gubernatorial influence upon the community college identity
in Massachusetts by seeking to place the governor's role
within a broader context that includes other key actors
(educators,

legislators, business and labor, etc.).

It is also impossible to analyze community college
development in isolation from other significant policy
issues of the period in question.

As in a chemical

reaction, the various compounds that comprise the mix
combine and interact to influence the outcome.

So, too, do

other issues of the day influence the attention or strength
that a governor can bring to matters such as community
college growth or mission.

Thus, this study must
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continually refer back to the context of the period it
describes.
Only by incorporating the broad array of actors and
issues that compete on the policy stage can one draw
conclusions as to the actual role played by Governors
Furcolo and Volpe in shaping the early evolution of
community colleges and their mission in Massachusetts.
Study Design
This study is a case history rooted in theoretical
constructs of qualitative inquiry.

Like much historical

research, it seeks to reconstruct past events and to draw
inferences from them.

In order to

represent faithfully

the past and avoid careless inferences, this study includes
a research design which ensures appropriate validation both
of source materials and of the conclusions drawn from those
materials.
Specific study methods which frcime this research
include review of Massachusetts public records, analysis of
relevant news media, an examination of appropriate archival
materials, as well as interviews with elected officials,
college administrators and appointed leaders within the
government of the Commonwealth.
In order to provide an analytical framework around
which to construct this case study, the researcher utilized
a modified '’Timeline” summary similar to that employed by
Whittaker in his 1987 analysis of the process leading to
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establishment of the Boston campus of the University of
Massachusetts.
By building an incrementally more comprehensive
timeline that includes general political, economic and
social data from the period, the researcher was able to
develop a clear perspective as to how the mission of
community colleges fit into the overall policy situation
faced by each governor.

In Whittaker's words, the

researcher developed "a more complete picture of exactly
what occurred during key points in the process"
As Whittaker emphasizes,

(p. 29).

(p. 29) this methodological

approach is inherently "evolutionary in nature" and
"militates against a precise definition of a course of
action during the research and information gathering
phase."

As Timeline data expands and is augmented by

information and insights gleaned from interviews and
various other primary sources,

"materials tend to build on

themselves often suggesting new directions and sources"
(Whittaker, p. 30).

Thus, as this study progressed, new

data at times required that the researcher's methodology be
flexible enough to respond to avenues not previously
apparent.
For purposes of analysis, the Timeline for this study
was divided into six segments, each corresponding to a
specific year in the life of a gubernatorial
administration.

In order to build a useful historical

framework, the researcher then added to each segment
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general political, economic and social data from the
period,

(e.g., economic conditions, fiscal situation,

legislative composition, size and nature of public higher
education, demographics of the Commonwealth).

For example,

during the first year of Foster Furcolo's administration
(1957), critical economic data would relate to the fiscal
difficulties of the state, while the governor's initial
battle to enact a sales tax would constitute a critical
political consideration.
The researcher then added more specific information
concerning major events or decisions relevant to public
higher education and community colleges, including action
or inaction by individual governors.

For example, during

the administration of Foster Furcolo key events vis-a-vis
higher education would include the Audit of State Needs,
passage of the legislation establishing community colleges
and the decision to open the first such institutions in
Pittsfield and Hyannis.
By building an incrementally more comprehensive
timeline that includes general political, economic and
social data from that period, the researcher was able to
develop a clear perspective as to how the evolving mission
of community colleges fit into the overall policy situation
faced by each governor.

In Whittaker's words, the

researcher develops "a more complete picture of exactly
what occurred during key points in the process"
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(p. 29).

with this framework in place, the researcher was able
to revisit major source documents to create a more
definitive analysis of the role of individual governors at
key moments in the development of community colleges in
Massachusetts.

It was only at this point that the

researcher wrote an initial draft of the proposed case
history.
Research Questions
A number of research questions provided the early
emphasis and direction for the research.

General questions

concerning the time period included:
o

What was the general economic and fiscal
condition of the commonwealth at the time of each
governor's election to office?

o

How did this economic/fiscal situation evolve
during each governor's term in office?

o

What was the general status of public higher
education in Massachusetts at the time of each
governor's election to office?

o

How did the general state of public higher
education change during each governor's term of
office?

o

What was the overall political climate of
Massachusetts at the time of each governor's
election and during his term in office?
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o

Who were the key political figures who influenced
the formation of higher education policy during
the period?

o

How was the political climate reflected in
composition of the legislature and in key
gubernatorial appointments?

o

How did the political climate influence the
debate concerning public higher education in the
Commonwealth?

Questions Concerning Gubernatorial Priorities:
o

What is the relevant personal history which
helped to shape the political philosophy and
priorities of each governor?

o

What were the major policy priorities which each
governor brought to executive office?

o

How did the policy priorities of each governor
shift during his term?

o

If they did shift, Why?

Where did public higher education fit as a policy
priority of each governor?

What were his chief

concerns (governance, mission,

finance,

programs)?
o

Did the governor in question have specific policy
goals related to community colleges in
Massachusetts?

o

How did the governor perceive the community
college mission/identity?
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o

Where did these goals "fit" in the hierarchy of
the governor's priorities?

o

Did the governor's goals or perceptions
concerning community colleges change during his
term?

o

What were the major constraints and which limited
or aided the governor in achieving his goals
vis-a-vis the community college system?

o

Who were his chief allies/foes in pursuing these
goals?

o

How successful was the governor in achieving his
policy goals concerning the mission/identity of
Massachusetts community colleges?

Questions Concerning Applications of the Study:
o

What conclusions does the analysis permit
concerning the policymaking style of each
governor?

o

What conclusions can be drawn concerning the
policymaking role of each governor vis-a-vis the
development of community college mission/
identity?

o

How does that role correspond to the relationship
in general literature (Eulau, Heinz, etc.)
between governors and public higher education?

o

What recommendations can be made concerning an
appropriate role for the governor in shaping the
community college mission in Massachusetts?
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Sources of Information
Sources for this study include formal documents of
Massachusetts state government, correspondence, memoranda,
and reports as well as planning documents, legislation and
other relevant archival material.
Formal archival documents of the Massachusetts state
government proved particularly useful to this study.
Specifically, annual budget messages, requests and
authorizations informed the research in question as did the
records of annual legislative sessions and policy planning
reports of the period.

This material is maintained at the

state legislative library in the statehouse, at the state
archives at Columbia Point and in the records of the
Massachusetts Higher Education Coordinating Council
(formally the Board of Regents of Higher Education).
The study also relied heavily on a thorough review of
relevant media coverage of the timeframe in question.
Particular attention was given to a comprehensive analysis
of the major Boston newspapers, the Boston Globe and the
Boston Herald Traveler during the period 1958-1969.

These

two newspapers provided the chronological foundation upon
which the study's ’’Timeline” analysis was constructed.
Concomitant with preparation of a first draft of the
present study, a series of interviews were conducted with
key individuals who participated in Massachusetts state
government during the period in question and who, in almost
every case, played a significant role in shaping the
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mission of community colleges in the Commonwealth.

While

the schedules or health of some individuals required that
several interviews occur earlier in the process, wherever
possible,

they were scheduled after the preliminary work on

the Timeline and drafts were complete.

These interviews

constituted the final layer of this historical analysis and
provided the personal recollection of those who helped make
the history which this study interprets.

The opportunity

to speak directly with policymakers or observers who were
closely linked to the significant historical event or to a
train of such events provides the chance to develop
insights not offered by the secondary accounts of more
distant analysis.
Documents
legislation,

(e.g., memoranda, policy analysis,

reports,

budget proposals and authorizations)

originating in the executive branch,

in the legislature,

state and local governing boards and, where obtainable,

in
in

the offices of college officials provided another important
source of primary data.

Such documents proved most useful

in considering the role played by the executive branch in
shaping the community college mission during the period in
question and in developing possible extrapolations
concerning the policymaking relationships between the
executive branch and other institutions of Massachusetts
politics.
Newspaper and magazine articles of the period were
also reviewed to gain a sensitivity to key issues at
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important moments in the history of Massachusetts community
colleges.

These accounts provided a lens through which

community college development could be seen within the
context of other events and issues of the times.
addition,

In

such accounts allowed data accumulated from

interviews and primary documents to be considered in light
of news accounts from the period.
Other secondary source materials were also utilized in
this study.

Although little secondary material exists

concerning the executive branch's historical influence over
the evolving community colleges mission in Massachusetts,

a

significant body of literature has developed concerning the
growth of community colleges nationwide.

A comprehensive

review of this literature provided data as to how the
evolution of community colleges in Massachusetts compares
with that of similar institutions across the United States.
Literature from the evolving field of politics and
policy in higher education provided another important
cornerstone for this study.

Of particular utility was a

body of work focusing on the relationship between state
government and public higher education.
Several works which focus on the development of
educational policy in Massachusetts were reviewed as part
of this study.

These secondary accounts consist primarily

of articles in various journals, portions of dissertations
or theses or unpublished works found in the archives of
graduate and undergraduate programs.
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Finally,

literature which examines the American

governorship offered an important body of secondary source
material.

Such studies proved relevant to analysis of the

relationships between the executive branch and other
political institutions,

to an examination of how the

executive branch interacts with and influences public
higher education and to a discussion of the most
appropriate role for the executive branch in shaping the
future mission of community colleges in Massachusetts.
Interviews
This study incorporates interviews with fourteen
individuals who either directly influenced the development
of community colleges in Massachusetts or were close
observers of public higher education and gubernatorial
policymaking during the period 1957-1962.

Appendix A

provides a complete list of those individuals who were
interviewed as part of this project.
Wherever possible interviews were conducted
face-to-face,

avoiding the use of questionnaires.

majority of interviews were structured in format,
in some limited circumstances,
employed.

The
although

an unstructured format was

While specific questions varied according to the

role of the interviewee,

each interview was organized

around the primary research questions that guide this
study.

Finally,

interviews were conducted and their

results utilized with full recognition of the limitations
of interviewing as a research tool.
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The opportunity to speak directly with policymakers or
observers who were closely linked to a significant
historical event or to a train of such events provides the
chance to develop insights not offered by the secondary
accounts of more distant analysts.
points out

(p.

Moreover,

as Travers

133), personal interviews offer at least

three advantages over questionnaires:

a higher percentage

of respondents; the capacity to answer questions related to
the purpose of the interview and to build confidence in the
researcher on the part of the interviewee; and the
opportunity to conduct an interview at an appropriate speed
to garner dependable data.
There are,

however,

several important limitations to

the interview as a research technique.

Travers describes

several such limitations that are extremely important to
the project at hand

(p.

131).

The first is connected to

the inherent complexity of the interviewer/interviewee
relationship; one in which the behavior of the interviewer
can profoundly influence the responses of the individual
being interviewed,

as can differences in the environment or

setting from one interview to the next.

In addition,

there

may be differences between those interviewed as to their
willingness to reveal information.
A final limitation of the interview was particularly
relevant to this study.

It was best summarized by Rosen

(as quoted by Whittaker who faced similar hurdles in his
study of the University of Massachusetts at Boston):
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The value of the interviews is less for details—
memories of events that occurred almost twenty
years have faded—than for interpretation.
Obviously, people differ in their interpretation
of events, but it is impossible to cross-check
interpretation and then reach an independent
judgment as to the reasonable one.
(p. 30)
Given the warning, the present study relies on
interviews less for the details surrounding specific
decisions or policies than for composite sketches of
overall policy emphasis and insights into the general
forces and personalities that helped to shape the history
of a particular moment.
Limitations and Exclusions
It is important to emphasize that this study
functioned within carefully defined parameters.

It focused

on the policy impact of two administrations between
1957-1962 on the development of community colleges in
Massachusetts.

It did not seek to provide a comprehensive

history of each governor's term in office nor did it
analyze in comprehensive detail every policy issue related
to public higher education in the Commonwealth during the
years in question.
This study looked to the evolution of community
colleges in Massachusetts as an historical case which could
contribute to the literature concerning educational
policymaking at the executive level of state government.
Before making any extrapolations, however, the reader
should keep very much in mind that the study focuses on a
single state with a rather unique higher education
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pedigree, on a community college system whose evolution was
influenced by that pedigree and on a specific time period
which cannot in every instance be applied directly to
contemporary affairs.
Interpretation of Information
The present study includes an historical narrative
which chronicles the influence the two Massachusetts
governors on the development of community colleges and
their mission in the Commonwealth between the inauguration
of Foster Furcolo in January,

1957 and the defeat of John

Volpe in the election of 1962.

This narrative, in concert

with a final chapter presenting the study's findings and
conclusions, addresses the research questions outlined
earlier in this chapter.
Chapter IV provides a comprehensive presentation of
the major historical data relevant to this study.

The

chapter opens with a brief summary of pre-1958 efforts
(e.g., the Zook Report of 1922) to establish
state-supported junior or community colleges in the
commonwealth.

This summary provides a context for analysis

of the period 1958-1969.
Following this overview. Chapter V focuses on
Furcolo's two terms as governor between 1957 and 1960.
Chapter VI describes events of the Volpe administration
between 1960-62.

Chapter VII briefly summarizes

development of the Massachusetts Board of Regional
Community Colleges during the period 1957-62, with special
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attention paid to its early decisions concerning campus
locations and mission focus.
These chapters do not seek to provide a thorough
history of each governorship or even to present every
detail of educational policymaking during the six-year span
in question.

The careful construction of this study's

timeline analysis permitted the researcher to focus both on
events which were critical to the evolving identity of
community colleges and on the governors' role in shaping
those events.
It is also important to emphasize that Chapters V
through VII rely heavily on primary records, newspaper
accounts and on interviews with those who observed or
influenced events during the time period in question.
Thus, in interpreting the data from these chapters, one
must always remember that no history is perfect, no
appraisal of past events can claim to be complete and no
human memory should be considered either a perfect source
of historical data or beyond the natural tendency to
remember events as they should have happened rather than as
they actually occurred.
Chapter VIII includes the conclusions and implications
of this historical study.

It analyzes the relative

influence of each governor in shaping the community college
identity in Massachusetts, analyzes the political context
and the strategic foundations from which this influence
emanated and offers recommendations as to an appropriate
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policymaking role for Massachusetts governors in the years
to come.
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CHAPTER

I V

THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY COLLEGE
MOVEMENT:
1900-1957

Witt, Wattenbarger,

et.

al

(1994, p.l) have described

the American community college movement as "the most
important higher education innovation of the twentieth
century."

From its origins at the turn of the century as a

means of providing access to rapidly increasing numbers of
high school graduates while preserving university elitism,
the community college movement in the United States had
grown by 1990 to include some 1200 institutions which
enrolled approximately 45% of the nation's college students
(Witt, Wattenbarger,

et al., p.

262).

This chapter presents a brief overview of two -year
college growth in the United States during the first half
of the century.

It seeks to provide a background against

which to examine the early development of community
colleges in Massachusetts.
This chapter also describes the condition of
Massachusetts public higher education on the eve of Foster
Furcolo's inauguration as Governor of the Commonwealth in
1957.

It offers a foundation upon which to tell the

political stories of the governorships of Foster Furcolo
and John Volpe and to analyze the evolution of a community
college system in Massachusetts.

Long blessed with the

nation's most respected concentration of private colleges
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and universities, Massachusetts has historically struggled
to develop a strong system of public institutions.

To

understand the gestation, birth and early development of
community colleges in the Commonwealth,

one must understand

the context of Massachusetts public higher education in the
late 1950s.
Community and Junior Colleges in America.

1900-1957

Community colleges were an accepted feature of
educational systems across much of the United States by
1957.

Born as junior colleges at the turn of the century,

community colleges satisfied the seemingly conflictive
goals of expanding higher educational oppoAtunities to the
growing number of graduates from public high schools and
the desire of elite universities to focus their missions on
advanced scholarship.

As Blocker and his colleagues have

summarized (1965):
The two-year college might be considered an
historical accident growing out of the struggle
between conservative thought and liberal thought
. . . [Conservative thinkers envisioned] the
highly specialized education of an intellectual
elite . . .
Liberal thinking insisted that public
education be expanded to provide equal
opportunities for all.
(p. 32)
A primary thrust behind the development of America's
first community colleges was the nation's late eighteenth
century expansion of public primary and secondary
education.

The 1874 Kalamazoo court decision, which

authorized local governments to fund secondary education,
led to a rapid increase in the numbers of students
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attending public high schools.

Between 1874 and 1904,

high

school enrollments nationwide increased by some 600 percent
(Witt et al.,

1994, p.

2).

This burgeoning public high

school expansion led to a concomitant increase in the
numbers of students seeking admission to higher education.
And with this increased demand for access to postsecondary
learning came a dilemma for existing American universities
who sought to maintain themselves as bastions for study by
the most gifted and elite students.
The notion of junior colleges, based on the much
admired German gymnasiums,

provided a unique common ground

for those committed to university elitism and those who
were equally dedicated to the populist ideal that access to
higher education was a right deserved by all.

The junior

college would serve as a semi-permeable membrane through
which the most talented would pass on to university
training, while the less gifted would complete two years of
college work leading to a dignified and productive place in
the increasingly industrial economy of the United States.
While private two-year colleges had existed in states
such as Illinois, Massachusetts and Georgia since the
mid-nineteenth century,

the roots of the national junior

college movement lie in Illinois, where William Rainey
Harper implemented the first true junior college program.
The founding president of the University of Chicago, Harper
was influenced by the arguments of other university
presidents such as Michigan's Henry Tappan and Minnesota's
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William Watts Folwell,

who pressed for a mechanism to

"guard the entrance of universities"
al.,

1994,

p.

8)

(quoted in Witt et

from the mass of high school graduates.

Harper sought to create Chicago as a laboratory of
reform in higher education,

believing that such reforms

would "revolutionize university study in our country"
(Quoted in Witt et al.,
1892,

1994,

p.

13).

Specifically,

in

Harper divided the four-year undergraduate curriculum

into two distinct colleges,
Colleges.

By 1894,

the Academic and University

he had renamed the Academic segment as

the Junior College.
Harper saw his efforts as the first step toward
establishment of a national network of

junior institutions

which would be linked to university programs.

In 1902,

thanks largely to momentum created by Harper,

the first

such
18).

junior college opened in Joliet,
By the early 1900s,

Illinois

(Witt,

p.

ironically after the premature

death of Harper at forty-nine,

junior college movements

were evolving in other parts of the country.
Most prominent among these early systems was
California,

where the state legislature approved a

state-supported junior college system in 1921.
legislature's mandate the system was to

Under the

"provide courses of

instruction designed to prepare for higher institutions of
learning;

courses of instruction designed to prepare

persons for agricultural,
homemaking,

industrial,

and other vocations;
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commercial,

and such courses of

instruction as may be deemed necessary to provide for the
civic and liberal education of the citizens of the
community”

(House 1700,

By 1929,
private

1923,

pp.

259).

eighteen states had at least nine public or

junior colleges within their individual borders,

with the heaviest concentration of publicly-supported
institutions found in California,
Missouri

(Brint & Karabel,

p.

31).

Illinois,

Michigan and

Two-thirds of the

community colleges in the United States on the eve of the
Depression were secular and the vast majority were liberal
arts institutions that emphasized transfer curricula
& Karabel,
In the

p.

31).

1920s,

new vocational

(Brint

however,

arguments had increased for a

focus in junior college education.

authors such as Koos,

Bells,

Respected

and Campbell argued that

beyond the transfer function lie the need for expanded
terminal programs in the
Karabel,

p.

38).

"semiprofessions"

(Brint &

This argument would gain increasing

support during the Depression and the years following World
War II.
Today,

while most community colleges offer both the

transfer and vocational tracks,

the appropriate balance

between the two remains a fundamental issue of debate on
campuses across the country.

This debate will arise

periodically during this study's analysis of community
college growth in Massachusetts.
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During the Depression and again in the 1950s,
community colleges experienced massive enrollment growth.
Between 1929 and 1939,

junior colleges offered affordable

access for the increasing numbers of high school graduates
who confronted a devastated job market.

Enrollment at

two-year institutions rose during this period from less
than 56,000 nationwide to approximately 150,000
Karabel,

p.

(Brint &

53).

The postwar years of the
extraordinary growth,

1950s witnessed even more

fueled by the G.I.

expanding American economy.

bill and an

Between 1950 and 1960,

two-year college enrollments grew from 562,475 to 660,216
(American Association of Community Colleges).
A major factor encouraging the rapid expansion of
two-year institutions during the years after World War II
was the work of the so-called Truman Commission which
sought to articulate a national education strategy for Cold
War America.

The Commission's final report.

Education for American Democracy,
comprehensive,
that

tuition-free

Higher

proposed development of

"community colleges"

and argued

"the democratic community cannot tolerate a society

based upon education for the well-to-do alone.

If college

opportunities are restricted to those in higher income
brackets,

the way is open to the creation and perpetuation

of a class society which has no place in the American way
of life"

(Monroe,

p.

14).
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In 1957,

on the eve of Sputnik,

President Eisenhower's

Committee on Education Beyond High School would
rearticulate the basic recommendation of the Truman
Commission:
Communities or groups of neighboring communities
faced with an impending shortage of higher
education capacity will do well to consider new
two-year community colleges as part of the
solution.
Experience in a number of areas has
demonstrated that with carefully planned
facilities and programs, community colleges can
be highly effective in affording readily
available opportunities for education beyond high
school. (Monroe, p. 15)
The growth in community college enrollments witnessed
during the 1950s was but prelude to the explosion which
would occur during the

1960s.

As Eaton has written,

this

growth resulted largely from the historical intersection of
public policy and demographic reality:
Several factors combined to produce a national
public-policy commitment to higher education
between 1960 and 1970.
These included the
baby-boomers beginning to go to college, a
growing economy, the liberal-populist political
tradition of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson,
and the civil rights movement.
Growth,
opportunity and the perception of a "right to
education" dominated the literature and the
thinking of these years.
(Eaton, Colleges of
Choice, p. 12)
In absolute numbers,
the

community college growth during

1960s was by any standard remarkable.

four such institutions existed in 1963,

Seven hundred and

1141 in 1973;

914,494 students attended community colleges in 1963 while
3,100,951 did so ten years later

(Eaton,

p.

12).

Although the 1970s and 1980s would not match the
unparalleled growth of the 1960s,
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community college

expansion continued inexorably toward record heights.
1990,

By

community college enrollment totaled 5,851,953, with

over fifty percent of all college freshmen attending one of
the some 1,300 community,

technical or junior colleges in

the United States.
Massachusetts Before 1957
On the eve of Foster Furcolo's first inauguration as
governor, Massachusetts public higher education consisted
of fifteen institutions which suffered in comparison to the
commonwealth's elite private institutions and which the
1958 Audit on the Commission of State Needs would describe
as "neglected”

(p.

34).

The flagship of the public system in 1957 was the
University of Massachusetts.
located in Amherst,

A land grant institution

the University was,

Senator Kevin Harrington (D-Salem),

in the words of

a leading voice on

educational issues in the legislature,

a "sleepy

institution which had yet to earn any real reputation"
(interview, August 18,

1993).

The University, which

retained a focus on agricultural programming,

had seen its

enrollment grow from 1,002 in 1945 to 4,740 in 1957
Report, p.
trustees,

34).

(Audit

University governance rested in a board of

dependant on the General Court for budgetary

allocations.
Ten state teachers colleges were spread across the
commonwealth,
century.

legacies to the normal schools of the 19th

Described by Harrington as a "polyglot," with a
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generally "confused" purpose,

the state

colleges had also

faced rapidly increased enrollments during the post-war
era.

In 1945,

the ten institutions enjoyed a total

enrollment of 2,131; by 1957,
tripled to 6,700

that figure had essentially

(Audit Report, p.

Board of Education,

38).

The Commonwealth's

under the leadership of Education

Commissioner Owen Kiernan,

held governance responsibility

for the state colleges.
The Lowell Technological Institute,

founded as a

institution in 1895 to prepare technicians for the textile
and related industries,

stood as arguably the most

respected of Massachusetts' public institutions in 1957.
Harrington remembers the Institute as "first rate" and as
"having in its narrow field a reputation probably better
than the University of Massachusetts"
18,

1993).

Between 1945 and 1957,

(Interview, August

day enrollment at the

Institute had grown from 290 to 1,087; while evening
numbers had increased from 581 to 2,600 during the same
period (Audit Report, p.

39).

The Institute was governed

by a separate board of trustees.
Bradford-Durfee Technical Institute
River)

(located in Fall

and New Bedford Institute of Technology (in New

Bedford) were,

like Lowell Technological Institute,

each

originally founded as two-year colleges devoted to the
textile industry.

In the years after Furcolo's election

these institutes would become enmeshed in a protracted
debates concerning their merger as well as the educational
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and economic needs of Southeastern Massachusetts.
these debates were percolating,

In 1957,

as the institutes stood as

the most troubled public higher education institutions in
the Commonwealth; this despite enrollments having grown
from 120 to 274 students at Bradford-Durfee since 1945 and
from 62 to 406 at New Bedford.

The Board of Education held

responsibility for governance of the institutes.
The Massachusetts Maritime Academy at Buzzard's Bay on
Cape Cod was founded in 1891 as a training academy for
cadets in the American Merchant Marine.

Its specialized

curriculum, which qualified students to apply for
commissions to the Naval Reserve,

had sustained a

relatively steady enrollment of nearly 200 students during
the post-war period (Audit Commission,

p.

38).

The Academy

was governed by a separate board of trustees.
Although not part of the state system,

city junior

colleges had existed in Holyoke and Newton since 1946.
Supported by state funds

(up to $100 per student under the

provisions of Chapter 756 of the Acts of 1957),

the junior

colleges offered both terminal and transfer programs and
were governed by the local school committees in each city.
The Massachusetts Board of Education which retained
governance responsibility for the state colleges as well as
Bradford-Durfee and New Bedford Technical Institute,
focused primarily on elementary and secondary education and
left its higher education institutions with a good deal of
autonomy.

Governed by a nine-member board,
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the Department

of Education was led by Commissioner Owen Kiernan.

A

veteran of bureaucratic battles who jealously guarded his
domain and power base, Kiernan would oppose development of
community colleges outside the Board of Education's control
and,

in doing so,

earn the enmity of Furcolo and his staff.

Massachusetts higher education in 1957,

then,

consisted of fifteen institutions whose missions and
governance mechanisms were varied and in some cases murky.
Generally discounted in terms of reputation,

they faced

increasing enrollment projections without facilities,
funding or firm support egual to the task.

Murphy has

described this situation, which she labels "the
Massachusetts Lag":
Before 1950 public higher education in
Massachusetts had received little or no
attention.
Threats of closing one or more state
colleges were common occurrences.
The reasons
why were many.
Campus buildings had reached a
state of total disrepair, public education
institutions were looked upon as a last resort
for young people seeking higher education,
enrollments were dropping, and the programs were
extremely limited, (p. 6)
In 1950, Massachusetts public higher education served
less than ten thousand students,

approximately ten percent

of the Commonwealth's total postsecondary enrollments.
1959,

In

public enrollment was only 14 percent of the total,

even though 58 percent of college students nationally
attended public institutions

(Progress Report,

p.

19).

until the 1980s would the Commonwealth's public
institutions achieve enrollment parity with the private
sector (Brint & Karabel,

The Diverted Dream, p.
67

143).

Not

A fundamential reason for the historical struggle of
Massachusetts public higher education to develop
credibility lies in the unmatched array of private
institutions in the Commonwealth.

Whereas in California

educational opportunity is often defined as access to
Berkeley or in Michigan to the University of Michigan or
Michigan State,

opportunity in Massachusetts has

historically been seen as access to Harvard,

Boston College

or any of the other prestigious private institutions in the
Commonwealth.

Lustberg and other sociologists have pointed

out how this perception lessens the public's inclination to
support public colleges and universities.
Of profound importance politically is the fact that
most members of the General Court have historically
graduated from private colleges.

Unlike states with strong

public higher education traditions, Massachusetts has a
legislature whose members historically lack a personal
attachment to the public colleges and universities.
the majority of Massachusetts legislators,

For

their

educational roots and personal ties to postsecondary
learning lie in the private sector,

leaving little urgency

driving investment in a large public system.
The Junior College Movement in Massachusetts;

1900-1957

During the first half of the twentieth century,

the

General Court witnessed at least a half dozen serious
attempts to inaugurate a two-year college system.
case,

In each

the arguments in favor of such an initiative were
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similar to those heard around the nation:

access for

increasing numbers of secondary school graduates and
opportunities for vocational training beyond high school.
Each of these efforts,

however,

failed and in their

failures can be seen the roots of Foster Furcolo's battle
in 1957-1960.
The most well-known and analytically comprehensive of
the failed efforts on behalf of two-year colleges occurred
in 1923-1924.

Charged by the legislature in 1922 to review

technical and higher education in the Commonwealth,

"The

Commission For An Investigation Relative to Opportunities
and Methods for Technical and Higher Education in the
Commonwealth" provided a detailed history of the junior
colleges movement nationally as well as a powerful argument
for public junior colleges in Massachusetts.
The author of the Commission report was George Zook,
then higher education specialist in the U.S.
Education,

and in the years to come.

Department of

President of the

University of Akron and President of the American Council
on Education.
movement,

Zook strongly supported the junior college

believing particularly in the vocational role of

such institutions.

Brint and Karabel have summarized his

views:
Zook had a clear vision of the proper role of the
junior college.
It was to "draw off" substantial
numbers of students who might be headed for
existing colleges, to serve as a sieve for the
minority that was capable of transferring to a
four-year institution, and to provide terminal
vocational training for the remainder, (p. 69)
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Using extensive survey and comparative data,
Commission” report recommended creation
community colleges

"the Zook

of up to twelve

(in cities and towns with assessed

valuation of $10 million and an average of 500 students in
four-year courses at local high schools) under the
management control of local school committees.

The report

endorsed local responsibility for provision and maintenance
of college buildings, with the Commonwealth reimbursing
ninety percent of local expenditures for teachers and
administrators

(excluding school superintendents).

Junior

colleges would be tuition-free, with students paying only
the necessary costs of learning and laboratory materials
(House 1700, p.

261).

Like other pre-1957 attempts at creating a junior
college system,

the Zook Commission recommendations fell

prey to private college influence and conservative
opposition to increased government spending.

Each of these

obstacles would confront Furcolo and his successors to
varying degrees and each is evident in the minority report
offered by Zook Commission member (and Boston College
president) Reverend Willieun Devlin;
If sufficient appropriation be made, the State
university extension, in conjunction with other
existing institutions could cunply provide in a
very practical way for all students seeking
merely further training along particular lines
after the completion of high school.
As regards
a college or university course in a strict sense,
the report makes it clear that neither tuition
rates nor the present number of applicants in
freshman classes in the large number of colleges
already established are an obstacle to the
obtainment of a college education for students
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properly qualified.
It has also been shown in
the report of the Commission that present
entrance requirements in Massachusetts colleges
are not so severe as to debar applicants who have
been well-fitted for college work.
Finally, the
great increase of tax appropriations required for
this department of higher education at a time
when very large appropriations are demanded, not
only for the betterment of present conditions in
our secondary schools, but also for their
necessary expansion in the immediate future,
seems to render inopportune the recommendation of
a state system of junior colleges.
(p. 926)
In the more than thirty years between the Zook
Commission report and the first inauguration of Foster
Furcolo,

at least four major two-year college bills were

introduced to the Massachusetts House of Representatives.
For example,
post-war era,

in 1943,

as the Commonwealth looked toward the

the Special Commission Relative to the

Establishment and Operation of Junior Colleges
1943)

(H 1335 of

called for a system of two-year colleges "offering

instruction on a level and to a degree of thoroughness
distinctly above that of the secondary school and on a
level below that of
specialization"
In 1948,

(p.

advanced senior college
6).

the Special Commission Established to

Investigate and Study Certain Problems of Education in the
Commonwealth (H2050 of 1948)

urged "that the establishment

and development of community colleges be encouraged"

(p.

7)

and argued that "the impact of new economic and social
forces,

together with the modern attitude toward government

as a powerful instrument for social betterment,
the area of state action in public education"
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has widened

(p.

10).

This report resulted in successful passage of legislation
authorizing the Massachusetts Department of Education, upon
request of local school committees, to maintain junior
colleges.

Interestingly, by 1957 only Holyoke, Newton, and

Quincy had applied for and received any state assistance
for institutions in their respective communities (Progress
Report, p. 21).
The next major attempt at creating a community college
system came in 1956-57 with the work of the Special
Commission Relative to the Operation of Junior Colleges in
the Commonwealth (H2850 of 1957).

Completing its work

during the final days of the 1956 gubernatorial campaign,
the Commission was guided by two key community college
advocates who would subsequently play a major role in the
successful 1958 effort to finally pass community college
legislation: Senator Edward Stone (Chair of the Commission
and powerful Republican from Hyannis) and Representative
Thomas Wojtowski (Vice Chair of the Commission, Democrat
from Pittsfield and former teacher).
Although House 2850, which proposed the study of a
community college system under the aegis of the University
of Massachusetts, failed to generate tangible progress, it
did serve as an opportunity for Stone and Wojtowski to
develop a comfortable working relationship and to begin
building a core of legislative support for community
colleges.

The missing ingredient was a governor who had
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the conviction and the mandate to serve as catalyst,
governor arrived in 1957.
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That

CHAPTER
FOSTER FURCOLO:

V

1957-1960

Between 1957 and 1962, two governors of different
parties, backgrounds, personalities and agendas provided
executive leadership to the nation's most historic
governing body. The General Court of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. The chronicle of their stewardship embraces
an extraordinary period in the history of the United States
and the world.
It was a period that bequeathed Ike and JFK, the
Missile Gap and the Cuban Missile Crisis, the New Frontier
and a growing conflict in a place called Vietnam.
In Massachusetts, the six years between Foster
Furcolo's first inaugural address and John Volpe's loss to
Endicott Peabody provide a time capsule of historic change.
From the fiscal mess of 1957, to election of its favorite
son to the Presidency in 1960, to accusations of corruption
in state government in 1961, Massachusetts witnessed the
pain and promise of change in a major industrial state.
This chapter focuses on the period 1957-1960 and the
governorship of Foster Furcolo.

It views Furcolo and his

time through the prism of the struggle for legislation to
establish community colleges in Massachusetts.

Through

this prism one sees not only debate concerning an issue of
fundamental importance to higher education in the
Commonwealth but also the rich tapestry of personal
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idiosyncracies and policy interactions that comprise
politics in Massachusetts,

Most of all,

one witnesses the

opportunities and pitfalls awaiting a complex individual
committed to use the full range of gubernatorial powers to
alter the higher education landscape in the Bay State.
The Governor-Elect
The roots of Furcolo's commitment to educational
reform extended to well before his election to the
Massachusetts Governorship in November 1956.
45-years-old at the time of his election,

Although only

the Democrat had

already built a successful political career and a solid
progressive record on issues such as education.
Defeated in 1943 for the post of Springfield District
Attorney and narrowly beaten in a 1946 congressional race
by a six-term incumbent,

Furcolo broke through in 1948 with

a 10,000 vote victory over that same Republican.
young Congressman,

As a

Furcolo guickly earned both a post on

the powerful Appropriations Committee and a reputation as
one of the rising stars of the Massachusetts Democratic
Party (a position which encouraged no small amount of
tension between Furcolo and another rising star.
Congressman John F. Kennedy).
In 1949,

Furcolo introduced legislation to create a

higher education loan program;

legislation which reflected

his deep commitment to college access.
during an interview with Lustberg,
commitment

(1977, p.

113):
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In the 1970s,

he gave voice to this

It has always bothered me that some students
couldn't go to college just because they couldn't
afford it. ... I saw friends of mine who were
even more qualified than me that couldn't go.
In 1952,

Furcolo attained statewide constitutional

office when outgoing Governor Paul Dever,
the vacant post of state Treasurer.

appointed him to

With this appointment,

Furcolo set his sights on a long-shot Senate race against
Republican stalwart,

Leverett Saltonstall.

Furcolo entered the 1954 race burdened by his widening
rift with Kennedy (who had won a Senate seat in 1952)

and

facing a wealthy incumbent blessed with personal wealth and
a reservoir of good will from the Massachusetts electorate.
Despite the fact that Kennedy never endorsed him (Globe,
8/10/58,

Gould Lincoln,

State Control, p.

23),

"Democrats Making Bid for Full
Furcolo ran an impressive race,

losing by a surprisingly narrow margin and reinforcing his
image as an attractive candidate who now possessed a strong
base for another statewide campaign.
In his 1956 gubernatorial run against Republican
Lieutenant Governor Sumner Whittaker,

Furcolo took

advantage of a stabilized relationship with Kennedy and a
progressive platform to win the race "hands down"
Globe.

8/10/58,

p.

23).

(Boston

His victory margin of 140,000

votes was particularly impressive given that it came in the
face of an Eisenhower landslide both nationally and in the
Bay State.
As Furcolo's victory margin grew,

other statewide

races also fell into the Democratic column.
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The posts of

Lieutenant Governor, Auditor,

and Treasurer would all

belong to Democrats by night's end, with only the office of
Attorney General in the Republican column.
In the Legislature,

the results were less decisive,

as

the House of Representatives remained heavily Democratic
(132-108)

and the traditional Republican majority in the

Senate held by the slim margin of 22-18.
Thus,
3,

as Furcolo arrived at the statehouse on January

1957 for his inauguration as Massachusetts'

60th

governor he stood as a power in Massachusetts politics and
a budding voice on the national scene.

As the first

American of Italian descent elected to the Commonwealth's
governorship and the first Western Massachusetts resident
to achieve that office in twenty-six years,

Furcolo could

reasonably expect success for his progressive agenda.
one Boston Herald columnist observed (1/1/57, W.
Mullins,

As

E.

"This is How I See It; Attractive Hopefuls Lurk in

Democratic Party Wings," p.

92):

The dawn of the new year is one of exultation for
the Democrats of Massachusetts.
For their
brethren in the Republican Party it is one of
despair.
The Democrats have been restored to
power.
Not only have the Republicans encountered
disaster at the polls, but they also have scant
prospects for salvage purposes.

On that January day,

however,

office in the House chamber,

as Furcolo took the oath of
the seeds of future difficulty

were already in place.
First,

it is important to emphasize that the

Massachusetts governorship was a far weaker office in 1956
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that it is at present.

Burdened by limited constitutional

authority and the necessity to face a re-election campaign
in only two years,

Furcolo's capacity for major policy

reform was significantly constrained.

As Furcolo's closest

advisor and future Commissioner of Administration and
Finance Charles Mahoney recalls

(Interview,

July 27,

1993):

The governorship of Massachusetts was very
different than today.
The executive branch was
probably at its weakest point in history. . . .
The Legislature was dominant.
And when we came
to power. Governor Furcolo could only appoint one
or two senior members of the executive
branch—for example. Commissioner of
Administration and Finance.
All the major agency
heads served three to seven years.
The
governor's entire appointed staff consisted of
only fourteen people.
Second,

in terms of substantive policy,

Furcolo's

progressive agenda confronted an increasing bipartisan
awareness that the Commonwealth faced severe fiscal
imbalance. Although estimates varied as to the extent of
the state's debt,

there was general agreement that it was

significant and that it was growing.

Furcolo,

himself,

had

referred to the Commonwealth's fiscal difficulties
throughout the campaign and,
had said,

on the night of his election

"It is generally agreed that whoever won a

tremendous headache"

(Feinberg,

1956).

Mahoney recalls unraveling the full extent of that
headache during the period immediately after Furcolo's
election (Interview,

July 27,

1993):

When he got elected that fall, he was very
popular.
Very soon thereafter, I'd gone through
the books and found that we were about $1 billion
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in debt.
There were all these items which by
legerdemain has not been dealt with.
To meet the Commonwealth's statutory requirement for a
balanced budget while simultaneously expanding public
investment would inevitably require new revenues. Any tax
proposal would face an uphill climb, particularly in the
Republican Senate.

A Boston Herald column the day after

Furcolo's inauguration offered a preview of the challenge
Furcolo confronted:
Massachusetts does rank high in per capita
income.
But it also is near the top, if not the
topmost, state in social welfare expenditures.
In Old Age Assistance, Aid to Dependent Children,
pensions, subsidized housing units, care for the
mentally ill, work hours of municipal employees,
and, though the tax levy is different, in
employment compensation and workman's
compensation, Massachusetts is about the most
liberal in the country.
If we have a big debt
and high taxes, that's a major reason.
Yet, so
far as Mr. Furcolo has indicated a program, he
has indicated more of the scone — more mental
health employees, more subsidized higher
education, more public welfare.
A sort of
hair-of-the-dog-that-bit-us progrcim.
(Boston
Herald Editorial, "Furcolo—Mixed Reaction"
1/4/57, p. 32)

The Political Cast
Compounding Furcolo's challenge was the cast of
political players with which the governor would share
center stage during the upcoming term.

In its passion and

historical emphasis on personality and ethnic rivalries,
Massachusetts politics often resembles sport as much as the
process of policymaking.
One of the most influential and potentially
problematical of the political players in the Legislature
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(D-South Boston),

was John Powers
leader.

the Senate minority

A veteran of Boston City Government,

the House and

the Senate, Powers had demonstrated extraordinary tenacity
in ascending to a leadership role.
As Furcolo's term began.

Powers had every apparent

reason to wish the new governor success.

A successful

Furcolo would likely earn re-election in 1958 and quite
possibly carry a Democratic majority to power in the
Senate.

Such a majority would make Powers the prohibitive

favorite to become Senate President.

A positive

relationship between the Irish politician from South Boston
and the Yale-educated governor,

however, would only survive

as long as one needed the other and perceived that the
other remained supportive on major issues in the General
Court.
Powers was in many ways among the last of a dying
breed of politicians in the lineage of legendary Boston
Mayor James Michael Curley.

The minority leader had no

core ideology and his politics relied on the pure
manipulation of power.

Mahoney recalls him as a man who

was "devoid of substantive interest" and one who was "very
parochial" in view (Interview,
For Powers,

July 27,

1993).

Furcolo was an aberration—"an outlander

who wouldn't last"

(Mahoney Interview,

July 27,

1993).

Powers had no context within which to understand a Western
Massachusetts progressive whose view of the world was broad
and cultured.

Where Powers saw the raw power of Beacon
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Hill and South Boston,

Furcolo saw Massachusetts in the

context of a changing world.
were "polar personalities”

As Mahoney has said,

(Interview,

July 27,

theirs

1993)

and

it was but a matter of time before their relationship would
be untenable.
The Speaker of the Massachusetts House of
Representatives, Michael Skerry (D-Malden),

also held a

crucial voice in the future of Furcolo's progreun.
early in the governor's term,

however,

From

it would become

clear that Furcolo and Skerry were "like oil and water"
(Costello,

interview,

6/1/92).

The governor and the

Speaker shared little in common beyond party affinity and
their relationship would deteriorate quickly.
More cimenable to the Furcolo agenda was "Iron" John
Thompson of Ludlow,

the Democratic Floor Leader.

from the early days of 1957 to the Governor,

Committed

and friend to

both Furcolo and his key education advisor Kermit Morrissey
of Brandeis

(Lustberg, p.

120), Thompson had earned his

reputation as an iron-fisted leader in the Democratically
controlled House.
The relationship between Skerry and Thompson was at
best tenuous from the beginning.

As columnist W.

E.

Mullins of the Boston Herald would write in late 1957,
Although Representative Thompson was appointed by
Speaker Skerry to serve as Democratic floor
leader, they subsequently came to a parting of
the ways on important issues. ... At the close
of the session, they were barely on speaking
terms.
(Boston Herald Traveler, October 3, 1957,
"This is How I See It:
Artesani Support Aids
Thompson for Speaker", W. E. Mullins, p. 26)
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Although neither held the formal powers vested in the
Senate President or the Speaker of the House,

two

legislators of opposing parties and very different
backgrounds would also play central roles in shaping the
governor's educational program.

Senator Edward Stone

(R-Hyannis), wealthy Cape Cod businessman and
personification of the Massachusetts Republican Brahmin,
and Representative Thomas Wojtkowski

(D- Pittsfield),

former teacher and first in his large family to attend
college, would form an unlikely alliance in support of
expanding Massachusetts higher education.
The Governor as a Politician
Those who knew Furcolo well knew him to be bright,
extremely witty,

personally honest,

public servant.

The Governor was not,

gifted administrator.

and often a visionary
however,

a naturally

His talents were more suited to the

United States Senate—his lifelong goal—a center of debate
on big ideas and big policy initiatives.

One sympathetic

observer recalls him as "a great idea man who could quickly
see the solution of a problem but not an effective
day-to-day administrator of government"
interview,

(Costello,

6/1/92).

Compounding the governor's handicaps was the fact that
he came to the office without deep relationships in the
Legislature.

He had never served in either the

Massachusetts House or Senate; had never come through the
ranks.

As such,

there was no accrued loyalty to him in an
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institution which revolves around political ties.

This was

a potentially debilitating situation for a governor who
sought to implement a progressive agenda in fiscally
constrained times.

As John Malian and George Blackwood

have written:
His background separated him from many of the
Democratic legislators; he was urbane and
well-educated, with a broad interest in national
and international issues, while many of them were
self-made men—small businessmen, lawyers or
insurance salesmen—whose education had ended
with high school or perhaps night law school.
But more essential was the interest Furcolo had
in broad and sweeping programs, combined with a
determined if not stubborn willingness to push
for an idea he believed in against the political
judgment of his own advisors.
(p. 287)
It is one of the ironies of Furcolo's governorship
that the Governor's

’’stubborn"

commitment to swim against

the tide was both the sine qua non of success in pursuit of
his community college program and the great contributing
influence to his continued defeat on the painful sales tax
issue.

The political giants of our history have all

possessed the instinct to divine when to pursue issues of
principal against all cost and when to fold one's hand or
compromise to face another day.
his fundamental integrity,

Perhaps to the credit of

such instinct for strategic

retreat was not common in Furcolo's administration.
To strengthen his personal relationships in the
Legislature would have required a concerted effort by the
governor during the early days of his administration.
Unfortunately,
him,

such an effort did not come naturally to

particularly as he dove into the policy demands of
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addressing the Commonwealth's budget difficulties while
simultaneously preparing his administration's legislative
package.
Moreover,

in the early days of his administration,

he

lacked any senior staff member who combined personal
loyalty to the governor with strong and historical ties to
the legislature.

In short,

he lacked a buffer during a

period of difficult political choices.
The Furcolo Agenda and the Audit of State Needs
Any expectations that the governor or his staff would
use the beginning of his administration as a honeymoon
period to develop alliances in the General Court were
quickly dismissed by Furcolo's inaugural address:
I am shocked!
The outgoing administration has
left bills for some one to pay.
That some one is
the public.
The inheritance left to the public
by the outgoing administration is the worst
financial mess in our history, and we need to
raise millions and millions in additional revenue
to clean it up. It is a legacy of inherited taxes
and still more inherited taxes.
(Senate No 1,
1957)
Pointing to an accumulated state debt of some $721
million,

Furcolo divided the state budgetary options into

three general categories.

To simply carry on at the same

level of services provided during the previous year
Progress Budget")
million,

("No

he offered a total dollar figure of $387

an increase of some $24 million dollars over the

previous year to account for inflation,
state debt,

interest on the

expanded compensation to state employees and a

$10 million reimbursement to cities and towns.

84

A "Slight

Progress Budget"

entailed $418 million,

while Furcolo

argued that a "Fair Progress Budget" would reguire $450
million in spending
- Furcolo.

(Boston Globe,

1/4/57,

GOP Angered by His Charge of

New Governor Calls Deficit Staggering",
p.

8).

"Must Hike Taxes

'Financial Mess:'
William J.

Lewis,

The Governor promised to attach details to those

numbers in a special message to the General Court slated
for the following week.
While the new governor's inaugural focused on the
fiscal inheritance bequeathed by the Herter administration,
it also provided useful insights into Furcolo's major
policy interests.

In the area of education,

the governor

emphasized that 25% of Massachusetts schools were
"overcrowded,

inadequate or unsafe"

"Furcolo Says State Purse Flat:

Full Text of

Speech by Bay State's New Leader" p.
education he warned that

5).

1/4/57,

Inaugural

In higher

"the number of young people of

college age is increasing"
1955,

(Boston Globe,

and emphasized that

"even in

only one out of ten applicants was accepted to begin

his freshman year at U/Mass"
State Purge Flat:

(Boston Globe,

Full text of

State's New Leader,"

1/4/57,

p.

"Furcolo Says

Inaugural Speech by Bay
5).

Furcolo's commitment to education was long-held and
deeply rooted.

This commitment grew both from his own

liberal progressive instincts and from the
which formed his inner circle of advisors.

"brain trust"
Mahoney

describes Furcolo as a veteran who shared the post war

85

belief that

"the Western world would be developed and

rebuilt through education at all
27,

1993).

And as Lustberg

levels"

(1979)

(Interview,

July

wrote shortly after

interviewing Furcolo as well as several of his closest
advisors:
Furcolo, being a "liberal from Yale", was
especially comfortable with education issues,
especially those pertaining to higher education.
He was more puzzled, Malian told me, by technical
issues in areas such as health or economics.
Furcolo surrounded himself with a "brain trust"
which was largely composed of educators, men like
Malian (a professor of Political Science at Smith
College) and Kermit Morrissey who was a Professor
of Political Science at Amherst College "when he
was drafted to organize a research team for
Governor Furcolo."
Even those who were not
professional academicians were, in Furcolo's
words, "all in favor of the idea of education."
(p. 113)
On January 14,

Furcolo returned to the House Chcuober to

offer a more detailed

"special message"

outlining the

specific legislative goals of his administration.

Serving

as a bridge between the previous week's inaugural and his
upcoming budget proposal,

the special message clearly

reaffirmed the governor's progressive instincts,

as well as

his recognition of the Commonwealth's severe budgetary
constraints.
In our complex society,

we must recognize that the

functions of the State have been greatly expanded,
there is,

therefore,

and that

an urgent requirement to establish

priorities among the prograuns and proposals which compete
for our attention

(Senate No

1,
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1957).

The centerpiece of Furcolo's special message was his
call

for "the creation of a commission to be appointed by

the Governor and the General Court to make an overall Audit
of State Needs"

(Senate No.

1,

1957,

p.

26).

Arguing that

"we should not simply guess at our needs and neither should
we use all of our revenues on one or several programs at
the expense of neglecting others"

(Senate No.

1,

1957),

Furcolo recommended that the Commission consist of ten
members — two appointed by the Senate President,
the Speaker of the House,

the Commissioner of

Administration and Finance
appointees.

(Chair),

and four gubernatorial

He further recommended that the Commission

focus its efforts on seven major areas
p.

three by

(Senate No 1,

1957,

27):
1.

Educational Needs

2.

Health

3.

Problems of the Aging

4.

Mass Transportation

5.

A revision of the tax structure

6.

The organization and operation of state
government

7.

Programs,

laws and proposals related to the

economic growth of the Commonwealth,

with due

regard to the problems of IcdDor and industry.
In establishing education as the first priority of the
proposed Audit of State Needs,
commitment to the issue,

Furcolo emphasized his

stating in the special message
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(p.

29),

"one of the areas of critical need is that of

providing adequate educational opportunities not only for
our children but for our citizens of all ages."
Concerning public higher education,

Furcolo's special

message highlighted his concern that the Commonwealth
lacked adequate facilities to cope with increasing
enrollment pressures:
There is an urgent need for an increase in our
higher educational facilities.
We must take
steps toward providing them.
Whether we may best
meet this demand by expanding the University of
Massachusetts, and/or our state teachers colleges
and technical institutes, and/or by aiding in the
establishment of regional colleges in various
sections of the Commonwealth, or by other means,
is a problem of first priority for the Audit of
State Needs on Education. Following its report, I
shall submit a report on this subject, (p. 30)
Although a detailed review of Furcolo's entire higher
education program lies beyond the scope of this study,

it

is important to note that the governor was deeply committed
to reform across the public university and college system.
He believed in a strong state university as the anchor of
that system.

And against the opposition of an entrenched

University Board of Trustees,

he would push hard during the

next four years to enhance what was still essentially an
agricultural institution in

Amherst.

Moreover,

the

governor and his staff hoped to bring the Commonwealth's
state colleges beyond their traditional role as
colleges,"

"teachers

transforming them into solid liberal arts

institutions.

He further sought to identify a new mission

for the technical institutes in Lowell and Dartmouth,
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whose

programs had suffered with the decline of Massachusetts'
textile industry.

And,

finally,

there was the still

conceptual notion of community colleges to flesh out.

His

vehicle for all of this would be the special commission.
Furcolo set April 15 as the goal for a preliminary
report by the Audit Commission, with a final report to
follow in time for legislative action in 1957

(Boston

Herald-Traveler,

GOP Charges

"State Audit Plan Stirs Row:

Move to Shift Responsibility," Edward Devin,

1/15/57,

p.

).

12

The governor's proposal for a special commission
received generally positive,

if in some cases bemused

responses from the political establishment.
Herald-Traveler.

The Boston

conservative in its editorial viewpoint,

labeled the Commission a "Super Hoover Commission"
(1/15/57,

"The Furcolo Audit," p.

12)

and called it "one

recommendation of outstanding importance"
Norman McDonald,

(1/15/57, p.

12).

Executive Director of the Massachusetts

Federation of Taxpayers Association,

suggested that Furcolo

has revealed an entirely new approach to
executive responsibility by proposing that a
great many decisions hitherto regarded as purely
legislative in character be shared by members of
the legislature, a suggestion that there be
created a Commission on the Audit of State Needs,
one half the members of which would come form the
House and Senate.
(Boston Herald-Traveler,
1/15/57, p. 1)
Furcolo agreed with the Senate President and Speaker
on a distinguished group to comprise the Commission.
doing,

so,

he both established education as the
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In

Commission's primary issue of concern and ensured that it
would ultimately issue recommendations which were
consistent with his progressive agenda.
Although Francis X.

Lang (Commission of Administration

and Finance) would serve as the commission's official
chair, Malian would act as ’’Executive Secretary” and
Mahoney would provide policy guidance to the group.

It is

not a coincidence that Furcolo's final proposal for
regional community colleges—a proposal developed by the
Commission—would resemble a recommendation first put
forward by Malian to candidate Furcolo during his
unsuccessful Senate campaign against Saltonstall
1979, p.

(Lustberg,

114).

Another gubernatorial appointment of great
significance was Seymour E. Harris,
at Harvard.

Professor of Economics

Deeply respected by the Governor,

Harris would

in 1958 become one of the most articulate voices arguing
for the importance of community colleges to Massachusetts'
economic development.

Harris would also later serve as a

founding member of the Commonwealth's Board of Regional
Community Colleges.
Third among the critical appointments to the Special
Commission was that of Senator Edward C.
of Hyannis.

Stone,

Republican

Powerful member of the Senate Ways and Means

Committee, wealthy insurance executive and member of the
Boston University Board of Trustees,

Stone had long hoped

for a community college in Hyannis to replace a state
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teachers college lost during the previous decade.
months ahead.
colleges,

In the

Stone's absolute commitment to community

his extraordinary power in the Republican Senate

and his position of influence within the private higher
education establishment would all contribute immeasurably
to the establishment of the two-year colleges in
Massachusetts.

"Without Stone," former Representative

Thomas Wojtkowski of Pittsfield has said,

"there would very

simply have been no final community college bill"
(Interview,

June 1993).

The fourth particularly significant appointment to the
Special Commission was that of J. William Belanger,
President of the Massachusetts AFL-CIO.

Although one would

expect Belanger and his union colleagues to instinctively
support Furcolo and his progressive agenda,

a rift was

growing between labor and the Democratic Governor over the
issue of introducing a sales tax to the Commonwealth.
appointing Belanger to the Special Commission,

By

Furcolo had

drawn the powerful union leader toward him on higher
education issues—a move that would ultimately help to
ameliorate potential labor opposition to the governor's
community college proposal.
The Governor's First Budget Proposal and The Sales Tax
The need to combine revenue enhancement with any
progressive budgetary package became increasingly clear as
Furcolo completed his special message concerning the Audit
of State needs and refined his budget proposal for
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presentation by the end of January.

Furcolo's budget

message included a bold proposal which he hoped would
address this reality.

It would,

in fact,

ensnare him in

controversy for the remainder of his administration.
The sales tax story is fundamental to any discussion
of Foster Furcolo's governorship.
1959)

Three times

(1957,

1958,

he would propose the measure only to see it lose in

the legislature by overwhelming margins and amid often
angry defections by members of his own party.

Over time,

the sales tax would become a political stone around the
Governor's neck as well as a compelling symbol for those
who opposed the administration or doubted its capacity.
In 1957, Massachusetts remained one of sixteen states
which did not rely on a sales tax to support its public
spending

(Globe.

"Sales Tax? Globe Finds Out What Other

States Are Doing About It", William E.
1).

Jones,

1/27/57,

p.

While some economists and an occasional legislator had

argued on behalf of such a levy as a counterbalance to the
property tax,

no governor had publicly supported the

potentially volatile measure.
The sales tax was anathema to the Democratic Party and
its core labor constituency,
intrinsically regressive.

both of which believed it

Opposition to a sales tax had

traditionally been a fixture of the party's platform and
for several members of the Democratic leadership (e.g..
Senator Powers)

such a position constituted a litmus test

of party loyalty.

As Mahoney recalls,
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"Democrats were

absolutists about the sales tax—they saw it as heresy"
(Interview,

July 27,

1993.)

While most Republicans in the legislature shared a
general disdain for taxes, the idea of a judiciously
applied sales tax as a lever to reduce property taxes
inspired at least some measure of interest.

And in the

face of fiscal crisis, many felt that a sales tax deserved
consideration before increased income levies.
It is unclear at what point Furcolo decided to cast
his lot behind a sales tax proposal. What is clear is that
by January he had determined that such a proposal was the
only hope for any progress toward his progressive agenda.
Mahoney recalls that as the final reality became clear,
Furcolo became increasingly firm in his belief that a sales
tax was the only way to preserve his agenda:
We spent a lot of time in November and December
looking at options.
He really believed that a
limited sales tax was in the economy's best
interests, particularly because it could be used
to ameliorate the very regressive property tax.
(Interview, July 27, 1993)
In his budget proposal to the legislature,

Furcolo

called for a 3% limited sales tax to finance a record state
budget of over $423 million (Boston Herald-Traveler.
Tax Chances Look Good:
Support",
of the tax,

William J.

Furcolo's Proposal Wins Wide
Lewis,

gas,

1/24/57, p.

1).

Under terms

exemptions would be provided for food,

prescription medication,
heat,

"Sales

telephone,

by the excise tax.

rent,

children's clothing,

light,

utilities and items already affected

Of $112.5 million in revenue expected
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from the tax,

Furcolo proposed that two thirds,

inillion be returned
property tax relief.

or $75

to cities and towns to underwrite
Other fees and revenue sources would

provide the remainder of the budget's $60 million in
additional spending (Boston Globe.

1/24/57, p.

1).

The governor's sales tax proposal came with almost no
warning to Democrats in the legislature. As the
Herald-Traveler would summarize on January 24

(p.

1),

Furcolo's plan "came as a stunning blow yesterday to
legislative leaders of his own Democratic Party."
later,

One year

the same newspaper would write:

When Furcolo took office in January 1957 he was
inclined to play things close to the vest.
His
inaugural address came as a surprise to party
leaders and his budget message in which he
proposed a limited 3% sales tax flabbergasted
Democrats.
(1/14/58, "Edward Devin Scene and
Heard at the State House" Governor Seeks Improved
Liaison with Legislature," p. 24)
The Democratic leadership was clearly caught off
balance by the sales tax measure and their remarks at the
time indicate no small measure of cautiously expressed
pique at both the governor's message and the process
leading to it.

Senator Powers set the tone by saying,

"The

Democratic Party has consistently and historically opposed
this type of tax imposition"

(Boston Globe.

Opinions of Sales Tax Proposal",
Initially,

1/24/57, p.

"Civic Leaders
9).

Skerry and others in the party leadership

remained relatively silent on the subject.

The

Herald-Traveler pointed out that "Skerry refuses to say
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that he is for or against
much into this”

[the sales tax]

(4/17/57, p.

By January 24,

— one can read

l).

Powers had become less cautious in

expressing his opposition to the sales tax.

Speaking to

the Massachusetts Federation of Labor Tax Forum (a union
group opposed to the sales tax),

he made his view clear:

Don't let them sell you a sales tax.
Don't let
them sell you a philosophy that makes the poor
poorer and the rich richer.
We shouldn't try to
tax people on what they spend.
The theory of
taxation is based on what you earn. (Globe,
1/25/57, "State Sales Tax Hit and Updated at
Labor Forum", p. 1)
Within hours of this speech,

the Minority leader

placed the sales tax directly on Furcolo's lap

distancing

himself and the party leadership from both the Governor and
the proposal.

He emphasized to the press that the

Democratic leadership had "urged, pleaded,
entreated,

tried to persuade,

importuned,

argued and respectfully but

firmly requested" Furcolo to move away from the sales tax.
"But," the Minority Leader summarized,
the Governor and nobody else.
it's his baby"
Tax,

If

(Globe.

"Foster Furcolo is

He made the decision and

1/26/57,

"Retailers to Support Sales

... Want Relief Assured to Cities and Towns", p.

2).
As Powers continued to raise the level of rhetoric
against the Governor of his own party,

early press reaction

to Furcolo's sales tax proposal was positive.
an editorial piece of January 24
Surprise," p.

("Governor Furcolo's

18) wrote "In the past,
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The Globe in

no governor of

Massachusetts has committed himself as forthrightly on the
subject as did the chief executive yesterday,"
Herald-Traveler,

The

no friend to Furcolo, went even further

stating that:
For a decade Massachusetts has been building up
to a financial crisis.
For a decade successive
governors have either sidestepped the issue or
met it with half-hearted recommendations.
Today,
Governor Furcolo has grasped the nettle and
boldly advanced the only solution——a sales tax.
(1/24/57, "Furcolo Meets a Crisis," p. 28)
The initial reaction to the sales tax was also
comparatively warm in the Republican ranks.
observer summarized at the time,

"oddly enough,

more favorable comments on [Furcolo's]
from Republicans,

As one
some of the

recommendations came

including Governor Herter"

(Herald-Traveler. 1/24/57, "Bitter Sales Tax Fight Due:
GOP,

Civic Units Hail Reality Aid," Edward Devin, p.

1).

It is important for purposes of this study to consider how
the sales tax influenced progress of the governor's
two-year college program.

First,

the Governor's commitment

to the sales tax both antagonized key parts of his core
constituency and influenced how several key actors viewed
other parts of the Furcolo agenda.

As Lustberg (1979) has

argued:
Furcolo alienated liberals, party Democrats,
labor and the press without ever capturing the
Republican Party to implement a sales tax . . .
in the fact of its political presence during the
time of the proposal for regional community
colleges [the sales tax issue] structured that
debate and those who lined up on either side of
the issue.
(p. 119)
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The antagonism aroused during the sales tax fight
would surface again during the debate over community
colleges,
Powers,

affecting the positions taken by key players.

for example, would remain neutral and not helpful

on the community college package.

Having taken so strong a

position in opposition to the sales tax,

the Senate

President felt constrained from supporting any major new
expenditure of funds
fundamentally,

(Lustberg,

1979,

p.

120).

But,

it was Powers' deep-seated animosity toward

Furcolo that influenced his lack of active support for a
bill that a Democratic leader would normally have worked
diligently to pass.

Given this vacuum in the Senate,

Furcolo sought allies wherever he could.
role become paramount.

Thus did Stone's

As Mahoney has stated:

We didn't have a Senate President with us.
So we
had to make due.
Where we grew up [Springfield],
it was important to work in a pluralistic
universe.
We were entirely open to this [dealing
with Stone and the Republicans].
(Interview,
July 27, 1993)
Labor would also remain vehement in its opposition to
the sales tax.

While these is no record of strong,

labor support for the community college bill,

active

legislation

that unions would seem likely to endorse with vigor,
Belanger's presence on the Special Commission combined with
a general union weariness of opposing Furcolo to earn "a
passive endorsement" from the chief executive of the
AFL-CIO (Lustberg,
Thus,

1979, p.

120).

the sales tax influenced,

albeit subtly,

the

attitudes of key actors in the community college debate.
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While one should not overly generalize, it seems fair to
observe that Furcolo's path on the community college bill
was made more uncertain by the alienation of natural allies
in the sales tax debate.
It is difficult to measure how the chain of events
around one issue affects the outcome of another.

But

certainly, the sales tax fight did not help Furcolo in the
ensuing battle for community colleges.

As noted, he had

antagonized in many his own party without guaranteeing
widespread support from opposing Ccunps.

Moreover, the

Governor spent much precious political capital in a failed
effort.

Third, the sales tax debate would contribute to a

growing public perception that the governor's
administration had difficulty figuring out how to push its
agenda.

And finally, Furcolo was forced to consistently

argue why he was pushing so hard for new and expensive
program if the state confronted such fiscal turmoil as to
require a new tax.
The Politics of Educational Reform:

1957-58

As the first signs of spring moved over Boston Common
and the legislature's focus turned increasingly to the
budget for the next fiscal year (Fiscal Year 1958, to begin
on July 1,

1957) as well as to closing the deficit in the

current year's accounts, debate over the proposed sales tax
dominated the political landscape.

Furcolo looked to the

newly appointed Audit Commission as the foundation for his
progressive program.

The Special Commission, however, was
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quickly becoming a convenient avenue by which the
increasingly disenchanted Powers and Skerry could avoid
action on issues of major concern to the governor.

In a

Herald-Traveler column, political writer Edward Devin
summarized:
Some controversial legislation will be disposed
of by sending it to a study by the newly created
Commission on the Audit of State Needs.
Bills
based on requests of the Governor for legislation
in various fields will be sent to the commission.
These will include bills for state aid to
education and the establishment of state-operated
medical and dental schools and scholarships.
(Boston Herald-Traveler. "Skerry Turns on
Heat,House Docket Shrinks," 4/28/57, Section V,
p. 6)
Furcolo's relationship with Powers, Skerry and others
in the Democratic leadership had deteriorated by early May
of his first term to the point of jeopardizing his
legislative program if not his prospects for re-election in
1958.

Powers, in particular, consistently challenged the

governor on the sales tax issue.

In May, the Senate

president went so far as to spend two and one half hours
before the Joint Committee on Taxation, making clear that
he was "unalterably opposed to the thing the governor has
advocated here"

(Herald-Traveler. 5/3/57, "Opponents Blast

Sales Tax Plan", p. 21).
The administration in late spring of 1957, appeared to
be adrift.

There had been no major legislative victory,

available political appointments remained vacant, and a
general restiveness was growing within the governor's
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party.

Increasingly,

the press pointed to ominous tidings

in the governor's future.
Currently, there is an element in the party which
looks ahead to 1958 with apprehension.
Governor
Furcolo's administration is hardly sensational.
Devoid of important accomplishments, it even has
antagonized vital groups which helped in its
election.
The result is likely to be a big
demand for the Republican nomination . . .
(Herald-Traveler, 5/7/57, "This Is How I See It:
Furcolo Rule So Far Devoid of Anything Hurtful to
GOP," W. E. Mullins, p. 44)
Entering Fall of 1957,
governor.

Furcolo looked to be a wounded

His sales tax proposal had been soundly defeated

by summer's end,

the 1957 budget had been balanced only

through a series of one-time savings,

and there still was

no significant initiative from the Commission on the Audit
of State Needs.

Moreover,

program for education,

in addition to the governor's

he was committed to four other major

legislative items—construction of a new state office
building,
Authority,

establishment of the Massachusetts Port
completion of the Massachusetts Turnpike and

construction of a major parking garage in Boston—all
projects steeped in cost as well as political
contentiousness.
Looking ahead to the election year of 1958 as
determinative for his governorship,

Furcolo moved to set

his administration on firmer political footing.

His first

step was to take advantage of a vacancy in the Malden
District Court to move Skerry out of the speakership.
Furcolo realized that Skerry would remain an impediment to
progressive legislation as long as he controlled the House.
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The Democratic floor leader,

John Thompson, who would

likely succeed Skerry, was a Furcolo loyalist whom the
Herald-Traveler had described as "Governor Furcolo's
right-hand man during the 1957 session"

(10/3/57,

"This Is

How I See It: Artesani Support Aids Thompson for Speaker",
W.

E. Mullins, p.

26).

A strong-willed veteran of the General Court, Thompson
had proved his loyalty to Furcolo by supporting the
ill-fated sales tax proposal.

As Mullins of the

Herald-Traveler summarized:
Although Rep. Thompson was appointed by Speaker
Skerry to serve as Democratic floor leader, they
subsequently came to a parting of the ways on
important issues.
During the 1957 session,
Thompson ardently, supported the administration in
the House while Skerry was a factor in the defeat
of several administration projects, particularly
the sales tax . . . (10/3/57, "This is How I See
It: Artesani Support Aids Thompson for Speaker",
p. 26)
On October 8,

Furcolo submitted Skerry's name to the

Commonwealth's Executive Council

(an elected body which

must approve many gubernatorial appointments)
as clerk of the Malden District Court.

for approval

The nomination to

this choice political slot was part of a larger deal in
which Skerry had agreed to deliver to Thompson key House
votes (particularly Boston members who were inclined to
support Representative John J.

Toomey of nearby Cambridge)

for the Speakership, while Furcolo had committed the jobs
of state purchasing agent and registrar of motor vehicles
to two Skerry loyalists (Mullins,

"This is How I See It:

Artesani Support Aids Thompson for Speaker,"
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10/3/57, p.

26).

On October 10,

House Democrats met in caucus to

unanimously endorse Thompson,

virtually assuring his

selection as Speaker when the full House reconvened in
January.

Later the same day,

the Executive Council approved

Furcolo's nomination of Skerry to the Malden clerkship.
November,
team.

In

Furcolo moved to shore up his own administrative

Most significantly,

he replaced Francis X.

Lang as

Commissioner of Administration (the most powerful cabinet
post) with the governor's young special assistant and
Western Massachusetts protege,

Charles Mahoney.

Seasoned

beyond his twenty-eight years, Mahoney had held key posts
in each of Furcolo's campaigns,

had practiced law with the

Governor between 1954 and 1956 and was acknowledged as
✓

brilliant,

savvy,

and personable.

Most of all,

governor's trust and provided a sure,

he held the

loyal hand at

Furcolo's side.
With Mahoney in place,

Furcolo also took steps to

strengthen his ties with rank and file Democrats in the
Legislature.

In late December and early January,

he began

to schedule more frequent briefings for members of the
Democratic leadership and on January 13,

1958 announced

regularly established opportunities for individual
legislators to visit him on issues of importance to them.
As the Boston Herald-Traveler.

a frequent critic

editorialized:
Governor Furcolo yesterday announced a new "open
door'* policy to improve his liaison with the
Legislature.
Starting tomorrow, legislators are
invited to his office from 2 to 5 pm to discuss
102

any problems or to speak their minds.
Legis¬
lators will be received every Wednesday afternoon
right through to the end of the session.
This
will mark an improvement in the governor's
relationship with the legislature and will help
eliminate much of the friction that existed
during the 1957 session.
It is only one of a
number of steps that the governor is taking to
assure as harmonious a year as possible.
(Herald-Traveler. "Scene and Heard at the State
House: Governor Seeks Improved Liaison with
Legislature," 1/14/58, p. 24)
Having taken steps to smooth the way for 1958, Furcolo
also realized that he needed a major breakthrough on the
legislative front to generate momentum for the election.
Knowing that he had pinned great expectations on the
Commission on the Audit of State Needs,

Furcolo had to

shake substantive policy recommendations out of the body.
After its much ballyhooed introduction in Furcolo's
1957 annual message,
background.

the Commission had faded into the

Not only had it failed to meet its ambitious

April deadline for a preliminary report,

the Audit group

had drifted away from its original focus on a prescribed
set of broad policy issues, becoming instead a
legislatively-driven research vehicle.

Mullins of the

Herald-Traveler assessed the Commission's work in a
Christmas 1957 appraisal of Furcolo's first year in office:
His Commission on the Audit of State Needs
currently is overburdened with a multitude of
demands for research in many areas.
Instead of
being used by the executive department, it has
become an agency employed to inform the
Legislature.
There is the suspicion that the
lawmakers have passed many of its own problems on
to the Commission.
(12/25/57, "This is How I See
It: Governor Furcolo Survey Cites his Three Key
Achievements," p. 48)
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In 1958,

Furcolo would turn to Mahoney and Malian to

push the Commission back to its original policy focus and
to move the group toward recommendations by springtime in
order to allow the possibility of substantive legislation
during the election-year legislative session.

Mahoney

recalls:
By 1958 it had become clear to me that we were
living in a hat box in the State House so I
persuaded the Governor to let me exert control
over the Executive Branch.
That is why I went to
Administration and brought the Audit of State
needs physically under my office.
I used it as a
bully pulpit and a research tank.
(Interview,
July 27, 1993)
Despite his best effort,

Furcolo still faced

significant hurdles in achieving his progrcun. Perhaps most
prominent eunong these was the Commonwealth's continuing
fiscal difficulties.

With estimates of a potential deficit

in the current fiscal year (ending June 30,
million (Herald-Traveler.
12/26/57, p.

1)

1958) of $47

"Record State Deficit Forecast,"

as well as a projection that state costs

could increase by $20 million in the next fiscal year
without any expansion in services (Herald-Traveler,
11/13/57,

Editorial;

"Paying for the HCG," p.

44),

Furcolo

faced a profoundly unpleasant decision as to reintroduction
of his sales tax proposal.
By the end of November 1957,

the State Finance Board

was calling the Commonwealth's financial situation "serious
if not critical," pointing to a total state debt which had
grown from $3.5 million in 1945 to $662 million in 1957
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(Herald-Traveler,
Drive," p.

1).

11/21/57,

"Furcolo Demands Economy

Such data left one pundit musing:

Up on Beacon Hill, Governor Furcolo is wrestling
with next year's budget and trying to decide
whether to ask for a sales tax again. Virtually
all his advisors say it will be poison to push
this unpopular tax in an election year.
And
there is little evidence that the measure has
changed since the Legislature said "no' this
summer.
Yet the need for additional funds
becomes daily more obvious. (Herald-Traveler.
Editorial, 11/13/57, p. 44)
Any effort to reintroduce the sales tax would only
inflame the second problem which continued to face the
governor.

Although Skerry had been removed as a thorn in

the House,

Powers remained as minority leader in the

Senate.

Looking for a Democratic majority in the upcoming

election to ensure him the

Senate presidency.

retained little regard for Furcolo,

Powers

as he made clear in a

December interview with the Herald-Traveler:
As for myself, my contacts with the governor have
not always been happy.
Since he took office, I
have sat down with him only four times.
I had a
feeling that I was not welcome.
I took what I
thought was a sound position in opposition to his
sales tax and I continue to reserve my right to
disagree . . . (12/30/57, William E. Mullins,
"Sales Tax 'Folly' For Gov. Furcolo: Powers Gives
Views on Session," p. 1)
In his annual message to the Legislature on January
1,1958,

Furcolo sought to balance a clear acknowledgment of

the Commonwealth's fiscal reality with a commitment to
progress on a number of fundamental

legislative issues:

The matter of our fiscal rehabilitation continues
to be one of our most pressing problems.
Despite
increasing economies in every phase of
governmental operation, our fiscal condition
remains critical.
I shall in my budget message
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for FY 1959, define those policies which have
been adopted in order that the substantial
additional revenue requirements might be reduced
to a bare minimum.
Economy has been and must
continue to be our watchword, but at the same
time we must not permit the elimination of valued
and necessary humanitarian programs which we have
long labored to establish and maintain.
Despite
the enforcement of the most rigid economy
possible, despite the stringent curtailment of
all departmental requests for FY 1959, and
despite the acceptance of certain measures,
substantial sums of additional revenue will be
required for fiscal 1959 without the enactment of
any additional programs or the provision of
further services. This is our inheritance.
While I do not deem it possible for us to
undertake many desirable and needed additional
activities and programs during the coming year,
we shall not turn our backs upon tomorrow.
We
must face the future with confidence and with the
recognition that the people of this Commonwealth
expect of their government realistic and forward
looking policies. (Senate 1, 1/1/58)
In the area of higher education,

Furcolo continued to

press for a progressive agenda while looking to the Audit
Commission to give his program both substance and
credibility.

In his annual message,

he urged the

Commission to focus its efforts on issues of access for
future high school graduates.
The first quarterly report of the Commission
demonstrated the demand for post high school
educational opportunities which we must soon face
in this Commonwealth.
Within the next ten years
between thirty and fifty thousand qualified young
men and women will be denied the opportunity of
self-improvement through training beyond the high
school unless new and additional public
facilities are provided for them.
The Commission
on the Audit of State Needs has continued its
investigation into the difficult questions
involved in providing adequately for our existing
institutions, and at the same time, it is seeking
answers to the questions surrounding the
establishment of additional facilities.
Our
objective must be to provide quality education,
adapted to the needs of a complex and growing
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society, provided for in the most economical
manner and on a sound fiscal basis. (Senate No.
1, 1/1/58)
As Furcolo completed his annual address,

Speaker-elect

Thompson was moving to consolidate his power and,
so,

in doing

set the foundation for the governor's legislative

program.

The Herald-Traveler's Edward Devin summarized

Thompson's moves:
It will not be a happy New Year, however, for a
number of House Democrats because shortly after
Representative John Thompson (D-Ludlow) takes
over as Speaker there will be shifts made in key
positions, changes that are bound to cause
repercussions. In the major change.
Representative John T. Tynan, an outspoken
Democratic legislator from South Boston will be
dropped as assistant floor leader, or "whip” and
he will also be dropped as a member of the
powerful House Rules Committee.
Tynan will be
replaced as party whip by Representative
Cornelious J. Kiernan of Lowell it was reported.
This will be an important step for it means that
Kiernan will be in line shortly for the position
of Democratic floor leader.
Representative
Charles Artesani of Allston is scheduled to be
appointed floor leader by Thompson as soon as the
House is organized today.
Artesani is also
reported to be in line for appointment by
Governor Furcolo as presiding justice of the
Brighton District Court to replace the late Judge
Thomas H. Connelly.
As soon as Artesani is appointed to the
bench — it won't be for awhile yet — Kiernan
will move up to the position of Democratic floor
leader. In another move, former Representative
Joseph D. Ward of Fitchburg will be dropped as
Counsel to the House Committees.
He will be
replaced by former Senator Albert S. Previte Jr.
of Lawrence. (Herald-Traveler. 1/1/58, p. 1)
This purge,

which included the removal of two

Republicans who had opposed Furcolo's financial program
from the Ways and Means Committee,

permitted Thompson to at

once demonstrate his intention to rule with an iron fist.
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remove key members who had separated themselves from
Furcolo and establish a team loyal to the Ludlow Democrat
rather than to Skerry.
writing,

Mullins summarized the moves by

"Speaker Thompson apparently has moved to

eliminate as far as may be all opposition to the Furcolo
administration"
See It:

(Herald-Traveler.

1/3/58,

"This is How I

Boston Democrats Facing Liquidation as House

Chiefs," W.

E.

Mullins,

p.

12).

With the new year underway,

therefore,

major reform in

Massachusetts public higher education was undeniably linked
to the success of Thompson's speakership,
in Furcolo's legislative relations,
major legislative initiatives

to an improvement

to the outcome of other

(including the governor's

decision concerning another try at a sales tax),
unfolding election campaign,
commonwealth's economy.

to the

and to the status of the

Furcolo's staff had strongly

advised the governor against resubmission of the sales tax
proposal

(Herald-Traveler.

11/13/57,

Editorial p.

Even with Thompson in the Speakership,

44).

the prospect of

another bitter tax battle threatened to deflect attention
away from other key initiatives.

And,

ultimately,

another

overwhelming defeat could cost Furcolo a second term.
In his budget proposal to the legislature for Fiscal
Year 1959,

presented as House

I on January 21,

1958,

Furcolo held back from reintroduction of the limited sales
tax proposal.

The governor,

however,

did call

for "a long

range solution providing for fiscal rehabilitation of the
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Commonwealth"

(House No.

1,

1958).

Moreover,

he argued

once again that "the overall tax structure of this
Commonwealth is antiquated and outmoded for our present and
future purposes"

(House No.

1,

1958).

Examining the details of Furcolo's budget plan for
FY59 brings his dilemma into clear focus.
progressive,

An unabashed

he sought major expansions in state spending

for programs in areas such as mental health and education.
Once again,

however,

the governor was constrained by a

worsening fiscal situation as well as a recalcitrant
legislature unwilling to vote for new taxes.
The Governor's budget proposal called for $418,025,577
in total state spending,

an increase of some $65 million

over the total appropriation of the previous year (House 1,
1958).
Furcolo's recommended spending for the Department of
Education totalled $37,126,720,
million.

an increase of over $3.4

Of the total amount recommended for Education,

over $16 million was dedicated to the University of
Massachusetts,

Lowell Technical Institute,

the

Massachusetts Maritime Academy and the ten state teachers'
colleges

(House No.

1,

1958).

House I was mute on the subject of community colleges,
awaiting recommendations from the Commission on the Audit
of State Needs.

What seems clear,

however,

from rhetoric

of both the governor's annual address and his budget
message,

is that Furcolo believed that ultimately the
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CommonwGalth could not sustain his progrsssive agenda
without the foundation provided by additional revenues.
While only referring to the limited sales tax measure
as his solution of the previous year "to meet the dual
problem of providing adequately for essential State
revenue,

and of providing relief for the homeowners and

rent payers of the cities and towns of the Commonwealth"
(House No.

1,

tax measure.

1958).

Furcolo did reintroduce a withholding

The withholding tax appealed to Furcolo as

both a means of

"assuring collection of taxes when they are

due"

1,

(House No.

1958)

and as a means to secure a revenue

windfall he would later estimate at up to $17 million
(Herald-Traveler.

"Forgive Clause may Save Tax,"

8/4/58,

p.

1).
The

1958 Legislative Program

Furcolo's team pulled together the pieces of its 1958
legislative program as it also prepared for an intense
spring debate over his budget,

for the report of the Audit

of State Needs concerning education and for the heat of the
year's election battle.
Again,

the sales tax would sit at the core of

Furcolo's agenda.

Despite the best arguments of his staff

and his own admission that

"I have been advised by

Legislative members of both parties that there is no
possibility of the membership adopting such a program"
(House No.

1,

1958),

Furcolo would decide to reintroduce a

bill calling for the highly contentious tax,
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believing to

it to be the best option by which a progressive
Massachusetts government could meet its obligations.
During the spring,
anew on Beacon Hill,

as debate over the sales tax began

Furcolo's administration finalized a

major legislative program for the heat of the election
year.

The governor achieved two moderately significant

victories in the spring with imposition of an additional
penny per package tax on cigarettes and an increase in the
number of Supreme Court
mid-summer,

however,

justices from 32 to 38.

the Globe"s S.

J.

By

Micicche could still

rightly claim that much remained to be done:
With the election just three months away,
administration forces will launch a "crash
effort" to improve Governor Furcolo's legislative
record in these intervening weeks.
To a governor
seeking re-election the tally of his legislative
successes and failures carries the equivalent
importance of a baseball player's batting average
when it comes time to renew contracts.
While
Furcolo has managed to better his mark of last
year, several major recommendations still await
action.
His legislative
record
for November
rests largely on the fate of these pending
matters.
(8/4/58, Evening Edition, S. J.
Micciche, "The Political Circuit: Furcolo Starts
Sprint for Legislative Record," p. 17)
In addition to the sales tax,

seven other major bills

formed the core of Furcolo's legislative program.
the withholding tax,

First,

which would be twice approved by the

House in April and July of

1958 only to die in the

Republican Senate.
The third major legislative initiative for 1958 was a
long-awaited measure to activate the Massachusetts Port
Authority.

Created in 1956,

the Port Authority had
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rGmainGci dormant pGnding final iGgislativG and
gubGrnatorial approval of a provision in its Gnabling
legislation which SGt a 4% CGiling on thG ratG at which it
could markGt its bonds.

Furcolo's special messagG

permitted the authority to raise its rate ceiling
contingent upon a set of state controls,

including the

right of the state auditor to examine Authority records,
appointment of a financial advisor,
approval of the final rate
Devin,

"Furcolo

and legislative

(Herald-Traveler.

Insights On Port Rein:

Board's Role to Legislature," pp.

1 &

8/1/58,

Edward

Leaves Issue of the
9).

The fourth major legislative proposal for 1958 was
construction of a state office building in downtown Boston.
Key to the Furcolo proposal

for a $30 million building was

creation of a private non-profit corporation to manage the
development.

The governor's proposed corporation consisted

of State Public Works Commissioner Anthony DiNatale,
Chairman of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority William F.
Callahan,

and State Public Safety Commissioner Otis M.

Whitney.
The fifth measure of major importance called for
construction by the Turnpike Authority of a second tunnel
across Boston Harbor to enhance transportation between the
downtown and Logan International Airport.
Sixth on the Governor's legislative slate was
construction of a public parking garage under Boston
Common.

Viewed by the administration as critical to
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downtown vitality,

estimates indicated that the garage

would cost approximately $30 million.
Seventh on the list of gubernatorial priorities was a
$43 million bond issue to support unemployment relief.
Reduced from an original proposal of $50 million prepared
during the

1957

session,

the bill was

"the nub of the

governor's unemployment program," which also included
extension of unemployment relief benefits,
retraining program,

and accelerated construction of

Division of Employment Security offices
17).

The bond issue,

was by August

1958

a new vocational

(Globe.

8/4/58,

which would support new state

p.

jobs,

locked in the Senate Ways and Means

Committee amid debate over thirteen proposed amendments
(Globe,

8/4/58,

p.

17)

of the measure for the

and questions over the implications
high state debt amid signs that

Massachusetts was emerging from the national recession.
Eighth,

and perhaps closest to Furcolo's heart,

the long-awaited Audit Commission proposal
million higher education expansion,

was

for a $111

including $24 million

for creation of a community college system in the
Commonwealth.
The Audit of State Needs and the Governor's Community
College Program
In late March,

the Commission on the Audit of

State Needs had finally issued a preliminary report on
higher education.

Malian had heavily influenced the report

which included proposed legislation for major expansion of
public higher education in the commonwealth.
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Building on

Furcolo's rhetoric of the past two years,

the Commission

Report described a "crisis in higher education" hitting
squarely on the issue of access:
There is growing agreement among educators and
authorities about the growing shortage of higher
educational facilities.
National and regional
studies, those made in other states and the work
of the Special Commission on the Audit of State
Needs all show that public and private
institutions together do not at present have the
facilities, faculty or finances to meet the
rapidly rising tide of college enrollments.
(House 3035 of 1958)
The Commission pointed to a set of imposing
demographic projections as it called for both an expansion
of the existing fifteen public institutions of higher
learning and the creation of a network of regional
community colleges:
The simplest way to express the growing shortage
in MA higher education is to say that by 1967 the
number of qualified Massachusetts residents
seeking admission to colleges within the State
may range from 107,000 to 118,000 to a possible
higher figure of 133,000.
But even if all public and private colleges
expand to the maximum they now plan, they will
have room for only about 68,000 full-time
undergraduates from this State.
This would mean
a shortage of college places running from 39,000
to 50,000 to a possible 65,000. (House 3035)
In addition to recommending "a unified over-all plan
for public higher education in Massachusetts"

(p.

10) which

would address "the over-all expansion and coordination of
our educational system including curricula and programs of
study at all institutions"

(p.

10),

the Commission report

offered a comprehensive case for "the immediate development
of a statewide system of regional community colleges,
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under

the direction of a new Board of Regional Community
Colleges”

(p.

14).

The Commission pointed to wide-ranging benefits which
could accrue from development of such a community college
system.

The benefits of this system would be great to the

student and his parents, who would save from an average of
$2,000 in the cost of the first two years of college; to
the secondary school which could find that many more
students would be motivated to continue their education,

to

business and industry, which would find available a new set
of trained and skilled employees; to the tax payer who
would be saved the much greater costs of further expanding
four-year residential colleges;

and to the entire

Commonwealth and the nation which would gain in the
knowledge and skills of its young men and women (p.

14).

While drawing heavily on national data to support its
recommendations for a system of regional community
colleges,

the Commission also looked closely at the

individual character of Massachusetts to define the
financing and governance models for the system.
In terms of financing,
that,

the Commission recommended

unlike other states, which relied on county and/or

local support of community colleges, Massachusetts would
have to rely on state coffers.

The large geographic size

and diminutive political power of Massachusetts counties
combined with the diversity of local government models in
the Commonwealth to lead the Commission to full financing
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by the State, with local contributions coining in the form
of dedicated space

(p.

58).

In addition,

the Commission

was influenced by the fact that Massachusetts property
taxes were already second highest per capita in the nation
and that any added burden could jeopardize college
development

(Lustberg, p.

116).

Governance was also to be centralized at the state
level and separated from the Board of Education and its
recalcitrant Commissioner,

Owen Kiernan.

The Commission

viewed the proposed Board of Regional Community Colleges as
a dispassionate authority able to rise above the political
fray on issues such as community college locations and
budgets.

Moreover,

as Coles (1977, p.

4) has written

The Audit Commission urged the development of a
state-wide system of regional community colleges
under the direction of its own board because
members of the Commission did not want the
colleges to be merely adjuncts to secondary
education or other institutions of higher
education.
(p. 4)
The Board would serve as an advocate for the institutions
in a Commonwealth whose "long emphasis on private education
and other factors have combined to create a situation where
many citizens are unaware either of general needs in higher
education or the possibilities of such institutions as
community colleges"

(p.

59).

Morrissey would write in

later years that statewide coordination was the only option
seriously considered (Quoted in Lustberg):
Here [Massachusetts] the organization of two-year
public colleges has been undertaken by a single
state board without local control or direct local
responsibility for operations.
In the
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Massachusetts setting, there is reason to believe
not only that it was the best solution but that
it may have been the only solution.
(p. 117)
The Commission recommended that the Board's membership
include the state's Commissioner of Education,
President of the University of Massachusetts,
of Lowell Technical Institute,

the
the President

and a president of a state

teachers college elected annually.

The total membership of

the Board would be nine with the other five members
appointed to overlapping five-year terms

(p.

65).

A

board-appointed Executive Director would hold
responsibility for "preparation of an over-all plan to meet
the need for community college education in the entire
State"

(p.

66).

While leaving the exact locations of individual
colleges and precise definition of regions to the Board,
the Commission pointed (p.

15)

to nine general regions

deserving attention:
1.

Metropolitan Boston

2.

Lowell-Lawrence-Haverhill-Essex County

3.

New Bedford-Fall River-Taunton-Attleboro-Bristol
County

4.

Greater Worcester

5.

Greater Fitchburg

6.

Franklin-Hampshire Counties

7.

Springfield-Hampden County

8.

Pittsfield-North Adams-Berkshire County

9.

Cape Cod-Plymouth
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The Commission envisioned that the immediate physical
needs of the nascent community colleges would be met
"through the use of high schools or other temporary
facilities

(p.

66).

Over the longer term,

the Commission

looked to the Board to develop a state-wide plan to "make
possible large savings to the taxpayer through uniform
architectural planning and the large-scale purchase of
supplies,

equipment and library books"

(p.

66).

Finally,

the Commission called for passage of a bond issue by the
Commonwealth to pay for capital charges associated with
construction and major equipment purchases (p.

66).

The Commission report was comprehensive and,

given the

strong influence of Mahoney and Malian, presented a
community college program that was wholly consistent with
Furcolo's goals.

Still,

however,

debate existed within the

administration as to the wisdom of presenting a strong
regional college bill to the Legislature in 1958.
The report had generated no groundswell of support
either in communities across the Commonwealth or in the
General Court.
Massachusetts'

Moreover,

there remained the issue of

fiscal problems.

Any new and expansive

program would be a hard sell particularly at a time when
Furcolo was mulling another attempt to secure passage of a
sales tax.
So daunting were the hurdles that Furcolo recalls
meeting with some twenty-five of his advisors from inside
and outside the government.

Twenty-four argued against
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P^^suing a conununity colleg© bill at that timG;

onG arguGd

"I had onG votG," Furcolo rGiiiGnibGrs,

ahGad"

(IntGrviGW,

"so wg WGnt

1988).

ThG pGriod of March through NovGmbGr of

1958

is

arguably thG high watGr mark of thG Furcolo administration.
During this tima,

as ha pursuad tha community collaga bill

as wall as ssvsral othsr ksy piscss of Isgislation,

ons

SGGS tha govarnor at his bast.
Particularly in tha community collaga bill,

Furcolo

damonstratad a focus and a political affactivanass that
this author baliavas ha navar aguallad.
that during this pariod,

tha govarnor workad thraa to four

hours a day on aducational issuas
1993).

In doing so,

(Intarviaw,

July 27,

Furcolo draw on tha formal and

informal powars of his offica.
p.

Mahonay racalls

Lustbarg has writtan (1979,

118):

Daspita tha work of Malian and all tha aducators,
lagislators and othar mambars of tha Spacial
Commission on tha Audit of Stata Naads, this work
would hava baan 117 pagas of wall-documantad but
usalass matarial had it not baan for Govarnor
Furcolo.
(p. 118)
With Furcolo claarly angagad and in control, tha
administration pursuad an aggrassiva thraa-part stratagy.
First,

tha govarnor and his aidas mat ragularly with

lagislators individually and in small groups.
ramambars thasa maatings as attampts to

Furcolo

"aducata" thosa who

quGStionad tha naad for ragional community collagas and to
"convince the legislators who already felt there was a need
but who didn't want to spend the money because they didn't
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believe the state could afford to spend the money”
(Videotape:

"The Massachusetts community College Story: The

Early Years").
Second/

the administration sought to create grass

roots support among key constituencies in those areas
tentatively slated for establishment of community colleges.
Such support would not only help the cause of regional
colleges locally but also/

it was hoped, would have an

impact in the General Court.

As Furcolo recalls

(videotape):
We had to try to go in the back door.
By that I
mean, we had to set up committees in the
districts of the various legislators to try to
educate the people in those districts in the hope
that they then would put some pressure on members
of the Legislature.
We had what was perhaps the most ambitious
citizen participation program in the nation,
where we had citizens participate in every phase
of government.
And so we set up what we called advisory
groups of prominent citizens and influential
people in every region of the state and we
proceeded to educate them and see if we could get
some support.
Third,

and perhaps most important,

Furcolo took one of

the most decisive actions of his governorship.
Audit Commission report to its essential themes,

Culling the
the

governor and his staff developed a special message for
presentation to a joint session of the legislature on July
1,

1958.
In his special message,

for Higher Education,

(The State's Responsibility

Seriate 760 of 1958),

Furcolo

energetically engaged legislative and public opinion
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leadership.

Drawing on his capacity to create an audience

by calling a special session, he set forth the case in
support of his higher education program.

The speech

deserves attention for at least three reasons.
First, it stands as eloquent testimony to the passion
with which Furcolo viewed educational issues.

Calling the

challenges which faced public higher education in the
Commonwealth a "problem of almost overriding importance in
our public life"

(Senate 760), the governor left no doubt

as to the priority which he personally placed upon the
issue.
Second, Furcolo framed the debate in terms
understandable to average families.

He addressed in stark

terms the impact of inadequate facilities upon access for
high school graduates across Massachusetts.
The recent report of the Special Commission on
the Audit of State Needs has demonstrated
conclusively the magnitude of the problem which
faces us in post high school education.
The
Audit Commission study shows that the minimum
number of qualified Massachusetts residents
seeking admission to college will rise from
approximately 78,000 in 1957 to 88,000 in 1960 to
99,000 in 1962 and to 123,000 in 1967.
If every
public, private and parochial college in
Massachusetts increases its capacity to the
limits which it now anticipates, there will be a
minimum shortage within the next 10 years of at
least 39,000 places for qualified young men and
women seeking post high school education.
I wish
to emphasize that the actual shortage may rise
above 29,000 to 50,000 or more.
This is roughly
three times the present enrollment at all 15
state colleges in Massachusetts.
It is roughly
six times the present total enrollment at all the
state teachers colleges.
(Senate 760, p. 16)
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Furcolo built from his fundamental argument of access
to make the case for a statewide system of regional
community colleges.

His arguments echo those of the

Special Commission and give additional insight into the
governor's broad vision for two year institutions.

He

summarized that a community college system "has many
advantages for students,
(Senate 760, p.

17)

for parents and for taxpayers".

He outlined six such benefits;

1.

For Families of Limited Income — "Colleges within
commuting distance, enabling students to live at
home, can mean a savings to the student and the
family of from $1,400 to $4,400 for the first two
years.
Such savings will, in many cases, mean
the difference between going to college or not
going to college."

2.

For Personal and Family Convenience - ". . . the
presence of a regional community college within
an area makes it both possible and desirable for
students to attend college who otherwise have
neither the hope nor the possibility of
furthering their education."

3.

For an Adequate Supply of Technical Personnel "Modern business and industry require not only
newly trained employees but the constant
upgrading and retraining of those already at
work.
A system of regional community colleges
will permit those industrial and vocational needs
to be met in every region of Massachusetts."

4.

For High-Quality Standards and Accreditation "With high quality standards in a state system of
regional community colleges, qualified students
will be permitted to transfer in the junior year
to the state university, the teachers colleges,
the technical institutes and to other public and
private colleges . . . Fully equipped and
properly staffed regional community colleges will
be a source of regional pride and will benefit
from maximum regional participation."

5.

For Adult Education and Community Purposes - " A
community college system will provide evening and
adult programs for people 'from 18 to 80' who
wish either vocational or non-vocational
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schooling.
In addition, a regional community
college can serve as a cultural center and a
source of expert consultants and advisors to many
kinds of businesses, professional and
governmental activities.”
6.

For the Benefit of Taxpayers - "I wish to
emphasize that substantial savings can be
achieved by the development of a state-wide plan
for regional community colleges, utilizing a
single, basic architectural plan benefitting from
large scale purchase of supplies."
(pp. 17-19)

To his special message, Furcolo attached a proposed
capital outlay bill that incorporated all of public higher
education.

Included in the total capital outlay of more

than $111 million was $24 million for "plans, site
acquisition [and] construction of nine regional community
colleges"

(Senate 760. p. 39).

Furcolo formally requested a capital outlay bond issue
of some $43 million for fiscal year 1959 to initiate the
$111 million educational development program proposed by
the Commission on the Audit of State Needs.

Twenty-four

million dollars of that amount remained earmarked for
establishment of the community colleges.

This

recommendation quickly became locked in the House Ways and
Means Committee amid concerns for the state's level of
bonded indebtedness, anxiety about the growing operating
deficit in 1959 and Republican demands for more coherent
plans concerning community college development (Globe,
10/7/58, p.

11).

To break the logjaun, Furcolo and Thompson agreed to
push for immediate passage of only the community college
piece of the legislation.

In addition, the Governor and
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Speaker agreed to press only for the authorization to
appoint the Regional Board and to establish its powers
consistent with the recommendations of the Commission on
the Audit of State Needs.

Funding would be left to a

separate capital outlay bill to follow (Herald-Traveler.
8/12/58,

Edward Devin,

"House Passes Four Furcolo Bills:

Witholding Port Authority Plans Passed," p.

4).

With the

election closing in and Furcolo facing the prospect of a
tough fight with Republican gubernatorial nominee (and
incumbent state Attorney General),

George Fingold, August

was set as the month of decision for major pieces of the
Governor's legislative agenda.

In strategy sessions with

key aides and his allies in the Legislature,

Furcolo agreed

to a plan which would send four essential parts of his
program (withholding tax,
college authorization,

state office building,

community

and Port Authority activation) to

the House in a manner which tied the success of each one to
that of the others.
Thompson intended to present the bills in a tightly
defined sequence which would begin with the withholding
tax,

follow with the $30 million state office building

proposal,

the education plan and finally with the

activation of the Port Authority.

Only after passage of

the first three measures would Thompson allow a vote on the
Port Authority bill

(Globe.

8/11/58,

Evening Edition,

"House Passes Withholding Tax Again," p.

1) which was very

much supported by key members of the House.
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At 1:00 PM on August 11,

Thompson gaveled the House

into what would be a marathon session that would run until
after 3:00 AM the following morning.

As expected,

the

withholding tax measure was approved by voice vote after a
motion for its rejection was defeated by a roll call vote
of 140-86

(Herald-Traveler.

8/12/58, p.

4).

The $30

niillion office building proposal was approved next,
allowing Thompson to move to the community college
proposal.
During two hours of debate on the education bill,
Wojtkowski and others argued on behalf of the measure
against Republicans who called the plan "a political move"
in an election year (Herald-Traveler,
Frank Giles

(R-Methuen),

8/12/58, p.

4).

the Republican floor leader,

railed against the community college bill,

arguing that it

was "thrown to the people in an election year as a
political morsel to try and make voters think the
Democratic Party is deeply interested in the education of
our youth"

(Globe,

8/12/58, William J.

Bills Passed: Withholding Tax Voted;

Lewis,

"4 Furcolo

9 Colleges Approved.

$30 million State Office Building Ok'd," p.

13).

Pointing

to the Commonwealth's continued financial challenges,
K. Thresher (R-Newton)

claimed,

Irene

"We shouldn't kid the

people into thinking they can have things we cannot afford
to give them"

(Globe,

Withholding Tax Voted;

8/12/58,

"4 Furcolo Bills Passed:

9 Colleges Approved.

State Office Building Ok'd," p.
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13).

$30 million

The depth of conservative Republican opposition to the
community college program and the level of passion of both
sides of the issue was evident in an incident involving a
member of the Grand Old Party which the Globe summarized::
One of the first to speak against the governor's
multi-million community college and education
program. Rep. Theodore J. Vaistses (R-Melrose)
stated that he had been threatened in the House
lobby for his refusal to go along with the
governor's program.
Just a few hours ago out
there," asserted Vaistses, as he pointed toward
the lobby, "I was threatened by one of his [the
governor's] cohorts who told me something would
happen to me for not being cooperative."
Vaistses then added, "There's no reason for
somebody like William Callahan to send fear down
on us."
(Globe. 8/12/58, "4 Furcolo Bills
Passed: Withholding Tax Voted; 9 Colleges
Approved.
$30 million State Office Building
Ok'd," p. 1)
In the end,

however,

Representative Wojtkowski

Thompson and his allies such as
held the cards on the

Only two amendments were added to the measure,

bill.

both by

Wojtkowski and both with the purpose of strengthening the
proposed Board's independent power.

The first amendment

authorized the Board to exercise the power of eminent
domain in securing sites for the nine proposed community
colleges while the second (which did not survive in the
Senate)

gave the Board power to set teachers salaries

without prior approval by the Legislature or the State
Department of Personnel and Standardization {Globe,
8/12/58, p.

13).

The bill passed by voice vote with these

amendments in place.
With passage of the first three bills in hand,
Thompson brought the Port Authority bill to the floor.
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After a significant debate in which several Furcolo demands
(e.g.,

his call for a state audit of PA finances) were

deleted,

a bill approving an interest rate ceiling of 5%

for Authority bonds was approved (Globe.

8/12/58. p.

13).

The four measures moved on to the Senate where one
experienced observer (Globe.

8/12/58, p.

1) correctly

predicted a rockier path:
But the real battlefield for all four of these
measures is expected to be in the Senate where
the GOP holds a slim but stubborn two-seat
margin.
The Senate has been the graveyard for
most of the Furcolo administration program this
year and last.
(p. 13)
The community college bill faced a number of powerful
adversaries in the Senate chamber.
Mahar (R-Orange),

Most notably,

Ralph C.

a staunch fiscal conservative and chair

of the Ways and Means Committee,

increasingly questioned

both the notion of delegating expansive powers to an
untested Board and the financial implications of increasing
state debt to fund the proposed institutions.
Republican fears concerning the debt had intensified
during the summer months of 1958 as Furcolo proposed a
series of measures requiring debt financing.

In addition

to the $43,350,000 which would be required for educational
expansion and $43,375,000 for unemployment relief, the
Governor had by late August also proposed a $12,884,000
overhaul of the Commonwealth's prison facilities
(Herald-Traveler.

8/19/58, Killiam, p.

1).

This nearly

$100 million of new bonded indebtedness was layered on top
of a projected deficit in the current fiscal year of some
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$50 million (Boston Herald-Traveler.
Cuff," 8/19/58, p.

22).

Editorial,

"All on the

The growing debt situation had

recently resulted in a Wall Street reduction of the
Commonwealth's rating from AAA to AA (Globe,
1).

10/11/58, p.

In the face of such indebtedness, Mahar recommended

that the community college bill be shelved for study
(Herald-Traveler,

8/13/58, p.

1),

a position supported by

the Herald-Traveler in an August 16 editorial:
Governor Furcolo is reportedly incensed because
the Senate is taking time to deliberate a little
on his regional college bill.
The fact that the
upper chamber has not rubber-stamped the measure
as quickly as the House did makes him suspect a
plot to defeat the project.
This urgency is unseemly and unnecessary.
There is even less reason why the legislature
should "vote first and talk afterwards" on this
measure than on the emergency job bill which the
Governor tried to rush through in the same manner
earlier in the session.
Providing educational
opportunities for our young people, though
important, is necessarily a long-range
undertaking.
There must be months of detailed
planning before any buildings can rise or any
students be enrolled.
The governor has a good idea but the
legislation in which he has embodied it shows his
own too hasty follow-through.
It is hasty and
incomplete.
He wants the General Court to
provide $24 million for the construction of nine
regional community colleges and entrust all the
details of development and administration to a
still-to-be named board.
But he offers no proof
that his precise number of colleges is needed.
He merely suggests the probable locations of the
institutions.
He says nothing about the
recruitment of faculty.
And he makes no mention
of maintenance and other continuing costs
(estimated by the MA Federation of Taxpayers as
upward of $20 million annually).
Most important
of all, he fails to show how Massachusetts, which
cannot meet its regular departmental expendi¬
tures, is going to finance this enormous addition
to its overhead.
(Herald-Traveler, Editorial,
"Time To Deliberate," 8/16/58, p. 4)
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Recognizing that to permit the General Court to study
his community college proposal and assume overt control
over decisions such as campus locations would tie the
measure up indefinitely while also politicizing the
future,

Furcolo and his aides developed a strategy

to force the Senate into action.
First,

the Governor turned to Seymour Harris,

distinguished Harvard economist,

member of the Audit

Commission and proponent of public higher education,

to

make the economic case for the community college plan.
the remaining years of his governorship,

In

Furcolo would find

no more loyal and respected public spokesman on behalf of
two year colleges.

In a letter to the editor of the

Boston Herald-Traveler.

Harris challenged the August 16

editorial in the same newspaper and developed the arguments
which he would utilize in the months ahead:
The $20 million annual estimated cost quoted by
you of the Massachusetts Tax Federation is
absurdly high.
General educational costs for
junior colleges are $50-600.
Hence, the correct
figure is about $5 million per year.
Massachusetts is just about last in public
provision of higher education.
The legislature
has a heavy obligation in this field.
Can it
afford to delay?
(8/28/58, "Junior College Plan
within State Means," p. 18)
The governor played as well a critical trximp card
within the Republican Senate majority.

Edward C.

Stone,

the aging Brahmin from Hyannis who had long sought a junior
college for his district,

became the point person in the

Senate for the community college bill.
and wealthy businessman.

As a conservative

Stone's Republican credentials
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were impeccable.
Means Committee,

And as a senior member of the Ways and
he had the institutional strength to force

a deal on the issue by Mahar and the Republican leadership.
Of Stone's role,
(Interview,

his good friend Wojtkowski has said

June 1993):

Stone made that bill fly in the Senate.
He was a
man who was committed to education, to a regional
college for the Cape in the vacant Maritime
buildings, and to public works programs.
Most of
all, he was a respected Republican power.
Without him, there would have been no community
colleges.
Furcolo played the Stone card by allowing the Senator
to lead on and gain credit for Senate adoption of the Port
Authority bill.

This legislation was of tremendous

importance to Stone and his fellow Republicans.

As such,

by turning to the veteran member of Ways and Means as his
point person on the Port Authority measure,

Furcolo also

solidified his relationship with a critical supporter of
the community college initiative.
horsetraded,

As Mahoney recalls,

"We

giving them the Port Authority in exchange for

the community colleges"
Furcolo accepted,

(Interview July 27,
in turning to Stone,

1993).
a further blow

to his already poor relationship with Powers.

The Senate

minority leader had remained largely silent during the
summer concerning Furcolo's legislative progrcun.

The

governor's willingness to turn to Stone on the Port
Authority bill,
the sales tax,

however,

combined with past tension over

left Powers once again angry at the governor

and unwilling to actively promote the community college
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legislation.
(8/27/58,

As Mullins of the Boston Herald summarized

"This is How I

See It:

Furcolo Port Bill tactics," W.

E.

Senator Powers Confused by
Mullins,

p.

14):

The attitude of Powers toward pending legislation
desired by the administration will be observed in
efforts to assess the political consequences of
this apparent breach between him and his party's
standard bearer . . .
It was indicated that if the administration
had taken him into its confidence 10 days ago the
entire dispute might have been compromised before
it burst onto the Senate floor.
The episode
revealed that the administration does not rely on
him as an official spokesman and it was
particularly disappointing to him because the
spokesman was Stone, an undeviating Republican.
One of the administration's pet measures awaiting
disposition calls for a vast expansion in public
education facilities.
Stone has ardently
supported a crucial part of this program.
Powers
has not given any public indication of his
position on this legislation.
The third key part of Furcolo's strategy was an
intensive public effort to counteract arguments against his
program.

Furcolo's battle plan as the election approached

increasingly focused on a campaign against the Republicancontrolled Senate,

which the governor blamed for his lack

of legislative success during the past months
8/13/58,

William J.

Voters on T.V.," p.

Lewis,

"Pressure G.O.P.

(Globe.

Furcolo Urges

1).

Furcolo opened this public campaign during two
televised appearances paid for by his campaign committee on
August

12 and 13.

proposal,

Arguing vigorously for his education

Furcolo painted to his Republican opponent.

Attorney General George
Daniel

("Chuck")

Fingold and state GOP chairman

McClean as

"trying to kill my education
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program by attempting to put pressure on members of the
Republican-dominated Senate."
to

He further implored voters

"tell your Republican senators you want this bipartisan

education program"

(Globe.

Lewis,

8/13/58,

p.

1).

The fourth part of the governor's game plan was to
continue to separate authorization of the regional board
from the capital outlay proposal

for campus planning and

construction.
By fall,

the Furcolo strategy had crystallized and his

political position solidified.
died suddenly on August 31,
disarray.

His opponent,

Fingold,

had

leaving the Republicans in

The late attorney general's replacement as a

candidate faced the prospect of igniting a campaign from
ground zero and held little prospect of defeating the
incumbent governor.
Thus,
capitalize.

with his position strengthened,

Furcolo moved to

General agreements had been reached with both

the House and Senate leadership that in exchange for final
administration acceptance of the Port Authority bill.
Republicans would acquiesce to passage of three key
gubernatorial initiatives—a second Boston Harbor crossing
to be constructed by Callahan's Massachusetts Turnpike
Authority,

the Boston Common garage and the independent

Callahan-led corporation to build the $30 million state
office building.
With Stone's leadership decisive,

Furcolo had also

secured sufficient votes to pass the legislation
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authorizing establishment of the regional community college
board.

Stone's leadership in navigating the bill through

the choppy Senate waters during the throws of an election
campaign was masterful.
The final Senate vote in support of the regional board
stands as testimony largely to Stone's power and his
determination.

It stands also as Furcolo's reward for

turning to the Republican brahmin to secure a critical
victory.

Finally,

it is testimony to the governor's wisdom

in packaging the legislature with other bills that were
important to Stone and other key political actors.
October 3,

On

Furcolo signed Chapter 605 of the Acts of 1958,

authorizing establishment of a regional community college
board to plan and develop a system of two-year colleges in
the Commonwealth.

Still uncertain,

however,

were the

futures of Furcolo's two major bond proposals for
unemployment relief and education expansion.

As bond

issues,

each required a 2/3 majority in both the House and

Senate,

a difficult prospect at best.

The unemployment relief measure faced a particularly
difficult course.
March,

1958,

When the measure was first introduced in

Massachusetts and the rest of the nation had

been mired in a recession.
to be improving,

By October,

the economy looked

with the governor himself pointing to

30,000 new jobs in private industry and $600,000 having
been spent on new industrial construction during his term

(Herald-Traveler.

10/3/58,

Edward Devin,

133

"Senate Revives

Jobless Aid Bill:

Parties Clash on Need of Fund,” p.

5).

Despite several resuscitations in both the House and Senate
during early October,

the unemployment bond issue would

ultimately die on the House floor on October 7 after what
the Herald-Traveler labelled
10/8/58,

Edward Devin,

Projects;

"Acid”

(Herald-Traveler.

"House Kills $43,475,000 Job

Furcolo Bill Lacks Two-Thirds Vote After Acid

Debate,” p.

1).

The capital outlay was thus left as the last major
Furcolo legislative initiative of

1958.

As the employment relief bill was moving toward its
political grave,

the House Ways and Means Committee was

moving to pare down the capital outlay bill.
House began debate on the

outlay

As the full

at 3:00 pm on October 7,

the original amount of the bond issue for regional colleges
had been cut by the Committee from
million

(Globe.

10/7/58,

Bill Sent to House," p.

$24 million to $8

Evening Edition,

"Capital Outlay

29).

Early in the House debate.

Republican Floor Leader

Giles moved to eliminate the community college piece of the
outlay entirely,
of

104-93

a motion which was defeated on a roll call

(Globe,

Jobs Bond Issue:

10/8/58,

William J.

Lewis,

"House Kills

118-89 Vote Less Than Two-Thirds," p.

23).

Giles received the support of Representative Tynan for his
effort.

Tynan,

a victim of Thompson's purge,

said,

"It is

utterly ridiculous to vote this outlay when the Ways and
Means Committee cannot even now tell us where these
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colleges are to be located or even how many students they
are to accommodate"

(Globe,

Following Giles'

Lewis,

10/8/58,

initial thrust,

p.

23).

a number of motions

were filed which reduced the community college outlay to
sums ranging from $320,000 to $1 million
10/8/58,

p.

23).

Lewis,

Each was defeated on roll call votes.

The most significant challenge,
parliamentary maneuver by Giles.
begun,

(Globe,

however,

came in a

Not long after debate

he filed a motion to postpone action on the outlay

until the next day to allow further study.
Thompson's opposition,
122-82.

Despite

the measure passed on a roll call of

Recognizing that such delay could mean the death

of the bill,

Thompson quickly recessed the House until

7:00

pm that evening.
Although little is known of exactly how Thompson used
the hours available,

it is known that when the House

reconvened it voted 106-94 to reconsider the postponement
measure and that by 1:30 a.m.

of the next morning,

the

House had approved a capital outlay for college development
which included $8 million to plan and develop community
colleges.
Debate in the Senate over the capital outlay was even
more contentious than in the House,
Republican majority,

and given the

its outcome was far more questionable.

Senate ways and Means Chair Mahar was pointing toward
major cuts beyond those in the House—citing as his
rationale the Commonwealth's growing debt and precarious
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bond rating

(Globe,

Cuts Outlay Bill

10/11/58,

$20 Million:

Half in State Budget," p.

William J.

Lewis,

"Senate

Education Items Slashed by

1).

The bill which emerged from the Senate was indeed a
significantly reduced version of that passed by the House.
In cutting the total capital outlay proposal bill by $20
niillion,

the Senate slashed the portion devoted to

education projects by one-half.

The $28 million bill

passed with almost no debate in the upper chcimber and cut
the community college outlay from $8 million down to $1
million,

a figure recommended by the Senate Ways and Means,

despite an attempt by Sen.

William Fleming

(D-Worcester)

restore the $8 million figure on the Senate floor.
Fleming's effort failed on a roll call vote of

15-15

(A

two-thirds majority necessary to approve bond issues)
(Globe,

Lewis,

10/11/58,

p.

1).

Mahar's arguments were seconded by other members of
the Republican majority,

such as Harrison Chadwick who

argued:
The capital outlay program [passed by the House]
contains a blank check for $8 million to be spent
by the governor's proposed community college
commission which has not yet been appointed.
It
contains no emergency items—nothing that cannot
wait until the next session.
(Herald, 10/12/58,
Edward Devin, "Scene and Heard: Words of Wisdom
by Johnson Chadwick Ignored as House Votes $48
Million for Capital Outlay," p. 18)
Ironically,
college outlay,

as the Senate was slashing the community
Furcolo moved to appoint the Board of

Regional Community Colleges

(Globe,
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10/11/58,

"Furcolo

to

Names

12 Members to College Board," p.

3)

(A full list of

original Board is provided in Appendix C).

The Board was

largely comprised of leading educators and supporters of
the Governor's community college initiative.

Chapter VII

provides a detailed discussion of the MBRCC and its
activity during the period 1958-62.
Furcolo and his allies were faced with a moment of
stark political reality.

As a House-Senate Conference

Committee began its efforts to mesh the two versions of the
capital outlay bill,

the Governor and community college

advocates in the House faced three options.
First,

they could attempt to force Senate conferees

into accepting a higher dollar value for the outlay and for
community colleges.
Second,

they could focus solely on the community

college section of the bill,
appropriation,

seeking to increase its

irrespective of the cimounts set aside for

other parts of the bill.
Third,

they could accept a small but partial victory

by accepting the Senate cuts,

choosing to press on and

fight another day.
Recognizing that the first two options each risked
losing everything in a renewed fight as the Legislature
concluded its session,
third route.

Furcolo and his allies opted for the

As House Ways and Means member Anthony

Schibelli explained at the time,

"Let us accept what the

Senate will give us rather than nothing at all"
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(Herald,

10/16/58,

Edward Devin,

'Prorogation Due Today:

Passes Capital Outlay Bill

151-158," p.

Having adopted this strategy,
moved quickly toward agreement,

House

22).

the House and Senate

sending a final capital

outlay bill of $28 million to the Governor's desk before
perogation October 16.

On the same day,

the Governor

signed the legislation which included $1 million to begin
development of community colleges in Massachusetts
10/17/58,

Edward Devin,

(Herald.

"$408,180,000 Session Ends,

Debt Reaches Billion Mark:

State

Furcolo Blasts Senators," p.

17) .
With passage of the reduced capital outlay bill,
Furcolo's attention turned first to re-election,

then to

the Commonwealth's continued fiscal dilemma and to
implementation of key parts of his agenda including the
community college program.
Furcolo's strategy revolved around emphasis on his
efforts

both to provide fiscal stability and to lead an

activist government in pursuit of progressive goals.
Moreover,

he continued to focus strong attacks on the

Republican-controlled Senate,
fraud,

deceit and political

10/17/58,

Devin,

p.

17).

labeling it

fakery"

"one of shame,

(Boston Herald.

In doing so,

he hoped to achieve

not only his re-election but the long-awaited Democratic
control of the legislature.
The Governor accomplished his goals with a solid
across-the-board victory in November.
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Winning nearly

1,100,000 votes to approximately 815,000 for his new
opponent.

Gibbons,

Furcolo carried Democratic majorities

with him in both the House

(147-93)

and the Senate

(24-16).

Furcolo and soon-to-be Senate President Powers would have
the chance to reconcile their tempestuous political
relationship.
As the Governor prepared for his second inaugural,
however,

all was not bright on his horizon.

significantly,

Most

the governor continued to see little

alternative to the sales tax as the foundation for his
progressive agenda,

despite signs that the economy was

beginning to lift itself out of recession.

Ironically,

the

economy's improvement in some ways made Furcolo's
challenges more complex;

for,

as the recovery settled in,

both the Legislature and the general public felt less
urgency to attack the deficit through the Governor's tax
program.

Thus,

as prospects for the sales tax and

withholding proposal continued to diminish,

Furcolo's

maneuverability also declined as he sought to implement his
ambitious program in the face of a still limited capacity
for new spending.
Clearly,

Furcolo needed to identify some mechanism to

pay for his prograan or else lose much of it during the
upcoming budget debate of spring 1959.

Although he stopped

short of formally reintroducing either the sales tax or the
withholding program,

the rhetoric of both the Governor's

inaugural and his subsequent budget proposal indicate his
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continued belief that they offered the only responsible
means by which government could continue to meet its
obligations.
Arguing in his inaugural address that Massachusetts
would need $25 million in new revenue "just to carry on the
regular services to the public for the next six months and
for the twelve months starting July 1,

the State will have

to raise $65 million to continue present services (Globe.
1/5/59,

Evening Edition,

Furcolo," p.

12).

"Must Raise $90 Million,

Says

Furcolo labeled the Commonwealth's

fiscal dilemma "the greatest challenge ever to face state
government"
Furcolo," p.
Still,

(Globe,

1/5/59,

"Must Raise $90 Million,

Says

1).
however,

the Governor remained passionately

committed to the core elements of his progressive agenda.
In describing this agenda,
nearest to his heart

he moved quickly to the area

(Globe,

Control Commission Urged.
Policies Structure," p.

1/9/59,

"Abolishment of Milk

Also Asks New Approach to Tax

13).

Last year, in a special message to the General
Court, I recommended a blueprint for action
designed to enable the Commonwealth to assume its
full share of responsibility in meeting the state
and national crisis in higher education.
That
program included the planned expansion of
facilities at the University of Massachusetts,
the state teachers colleges, the Massachusetts
School of Art and the Lowell Technical Institute.
The Massachusetts Board of Regional
Community Colleges was established last year in
order to provide a statewide system of high
quality, low-cost education in every section of
the Commonwealth.
We must now implement the
authorized program of the Board of Regional
Community Colleges and I shall later make
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necessary recommendations for this purpose.
(House No. 1, 1959)
In his budget submission (House I)
in January 1959,

for FY60,

delivered

Furcolo made no separate request for

additional funds to support the community college program
or the regional college board.

Instead,

he left any such

proposal to later in the spring and concentrated additional
budget dollars for education on the personnel needs of
Massachusetts' existing institutions.

In requesting 217

new positions for the Department of Education,

he stated:

In my Special Message to the Legislature of last
year on "The Responsibility of the Commonwealth
in Higher Education," I pointed out that
accompanying the recommendations for the physical
expansion of badly needed educational facilities
must be adequate support to recruit and retain
competent teaching and administrative personnel.
I, therefore, requested that the Informal
Coordinating Committee of the Presidents of the
public institutions of higher learning make a
comprehensive study of the minimum salary and
staffing administrative personnel.
I believe
that they have successfully and responsibly
demonstrated the need for additional support.
Although the Board carried primary statutory
responsibility for implementing a community college
program,

Furcolo continued to serve as advocate,

both

behind the scenes with legislators and in public
appearances around the state.

As detailed in Chapter VII,

he lobbied hard on behalf of Wojtkowski's bid for a
Pittsfield college as well as for seed money to support the
first campus and operations of the Board of Regional
Community Colleges.
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By summer 1959,

however,

the Governor's attention was

again diverted by the sales tax issue.
achieved

Having finally

victory in January on the withholding program,

Furcolo had resubmitted the 3% limited sales tax to the
General Court.

Despite his passionate entreaties and

promises of property tax relief, the Democratic House
defeated the measure by an overwhelming 197-24 margin on
August 6,

1959,

ending any chance of passage that year.

In documenting the Furcolo administration, the failure
of the sales tax stands as a chronic political bete-noire
for the Governor.

Like Prometheus struggling vainly to

push his heavy stone up an unforgiving mountain,

Furcolo

three times returned to the ill-fated tax as a means to
provide stable revenue for his ambitious program.
Honorable in his intent and only a matter of years ahead of
history on the issue,
his guest.

the Governor paid a high price for

Alienated from members of his own party,

perceived as pushing for more taxes in the face of an
improving economy and buffeted by the ripples of three
major political losses on the issue,

it is impossible to

quantitatively measure the impact of the sales tax on other
parts of his program.

But it is undeniable that it had an

impact and that the impact on the Furcolo governorship was
significant.
Fall 1959 also found the Governor consumed by other
difficult legislative issues beyond the sales tax and
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community college development.

Two stand as particularly

informative.
First,

during the summer,

the Governor had supported

legislation raising the salaries of faculty at the
University of Massachusetts and the ten state teachers
colleges.

Arguing that the state's fiscal situation

precluded more,

Furcolo failed to push for concomitant

increases for the other 35,000 state workers,

including

non-faculty at the Commonwealth's institutions of higher
education.

This position was endorsed by outgoing

University President Mather as well as other college
presidents, but earned the ire of pro-labor Democrats such
as then Boston mayoral candidate Powers
employees and union leaders.

as well as state

The Legislature would

ultimately pass a general pay increase.
At the same time,

debate was proceeding on a capital

outlay bill totaling some $22 million which the Governor
had submitted late in the legislative session.

Inspired by

an improving economy and probably in no small measure by
the upcoming advent of an election year.

House members had

added some $80 million to the bill before sending it on to
the Senate.

Ironically,

none of the proposed spending was

dedicated to community college planning or development. The
Upper House,

in a similar spirit of largess increased the

outlay to $34.6 million before passage.
In mid-September, with both general pay increases and
the nearly $35 million outlay on his desk awaiting
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signature,

the Governor shocked his legislative colleagues

by vetoing nine major pieces of the latter bill
9/16/59, William J.
Drive," p.

1).

Lewis,

(Globe,

"Legislature Fails in Windup

An angry and tired Legislature was forced

to remain in session to respond.

It did so,

resoundingly

defeating the vetoes on roll call votes on September 16 and
17(Globe,

9/16/59, William J.

8 Months/" p.
Thus,

Lewis,

"Lawmakers Quit After

1).

the Governor ended the 161st session of the

General Court facing a still testy relationship with the
Democratic majority in both houses.
Completion of this somewhat rocky legislative session
allowed Furcolo to focus on the next chapter of his
political life,

speculation about which had mounted as to

whether he would make another run against Senator
Saltonstall in 1960.
The Governor's annual special message to the General
Court

(Senate No.

1,

1960)

could be seen as setting the

stage for the Ccunpaign to come.

Reaching beyond education

which had been the bell-weather issue of his
administration,

Furcolo identified seven issues as his

"positive state prograon" to spur economic development in
the year ahead.
1.

Natural resources and the promotion of related
technologies

2.

Programs of economic assistance and industrial
promotion
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3.

Improved transportation facilities

4.

Protection of consumer interests

5.

Progress in labor management

6.

Greater odiousness and economy in operation of
state government

7.

Constitutional revision and reform

In his budget submission for FY61 (House No.

1,

1960),

the Governor proposed a total of $34,382,057 in state
spending, including $900,000 of new expenditures for
essential state services and a total increase of some $3
million in General Fund requirements.

Of the $900,00 in

new expenditures recommended $85,000 was slated for the
MBRCC to help in the opening of Berkshire.

This community

college proposal was markedly less that the $200,000
requested by the Board, a fact which is at least as
reflective of the still tenuous state of legislative
support as it is of the Governor's continued sense of
fiscal fragility.
The Governor's budget also called for more than
$58,000,000 in capital construction projects for the
upcoming

fiscal year, including over $30,000,000 to

complete the three-year educational plan submitted in 1958.
Although there was little chance of this aggressive outlay
passing, it offered more than election-year posturing.
again demonstrated the Governor's deep-seated belief in
educational access.
(House No.

1,

As he noted in his budget address

1960):
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It

In this budget more than 1200 new students have
been provided for in September of this year at
our institutions of public higher education, and
this increase in student capacity reflects
construction approved over the past three years.
The need for additional higher education
facilities is increasing, however, and the years
immediately ahead promise to produce an
unprecedented demand for added classrooms,
laboratories, etc.
for the qualified young
people of Massachusetts.
The progrcun that I am
recommending will assist thousands of
Massachusetts students to take full advantage of
higher educational opportunities, and will enable
Massachusetts more effectively to meet the
educational challenge of the present and the
future.
The Governor's announcement of a Senate run had
combined with the Presidential bid of favorite son, John F.
Kennedy, to energize the Massachusetts political scene.
While some six Democrats battled for the nomination to
succeed the governor, the first-term Mayor of Springfield,
Thomas O'Connor, opened a long-shot bid to defeat Furcolo
in the Democratic contest to select Saltonstall's opponent.
A full review of the 1960 election in Massachusetts
lies beyond the scope of this study.

It is ironic,

however, that as John Kennedy's political star achieved its
zenith, that of his rival Foster Furcolo fell suddenly from
the sky.
Having won the party's nod at its June convention,
Furcolo moved to the September 12 primary as the odds-on
favorite for formal nomination.

O'Connor, however, refused

to quit the race, arguing both that the Governor had
coerced support from convention delegates and that Furcolo
ultimately would do no better against Saltonstall than he
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had in 1954.

While Furcolo campaigned on his achievements

in areas such a higher education,

O'Connor relentlessly

portrayed himself as an outsider who had cut taxes each
year of his term as Springfield's Mayor (Globe,
Advertisement,

p.

9/12/60,

3).

O'Connor's vigorous campaign caught hold in the late
summer weeks.

A series of alleged scandals in the

purchasing and public works areas of state government hurt
the Governor as investigations loomed.

Moreover,

Furcolo

was probably damaged by the nearly inevitable outcomes of
two terms in executive office—an intangible public desire
for change to a new younger generation of political
leadership (not unlike the mood that helped carry Kennedy
to the presidency)

as well as the cumulative scars of

legislative battles.

As political columnist John Harris

summarized on the eve of the primary (Globe,
"Rebel Democrats Enliven Election," p.

26),

9/12/60,
"The dissenting

vote has often proved significant in past primaries when
Governors seek re-election or other office when their terms
draw to a close."
O'Connor's victory in the Democratic primary was
shocking,

as he claimed over 268,000 votes against the

Governor's more than 218,000

(with some 70,000 votes to

Middlesex County Registrar of Deeds,

Edmond C.

Buckley).

O'Connor had accomplished a smashing victory in what would
prove to be Furcolo's last campaign.

It is poignant and

ironic that one of the final stops of that last campaign.
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opening ceremonies at the new Berkshire Community College
on September 10,
Hurricane Donna.

had to be postponed due to the threat of
An emotional Furcolo,

unable to complete

his remarks, would attend that ceremony as outgoing
governor in December,

1960.
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CHAPTER

VI

VOLPE: THE COMMUNITY COLLEGE PROGRAM BEGINS TO GROW

Every governor or elected official assumes office with
a distinct set of priorities that are driven partially by
the temperament and background of the individual and
partially by the moment in which he or she governs.

Just

as Woodrow Wilson came to power with a priority commitment
to economic reform only to be cast as world leader during
the Great War, so too did Foster Furcolo come to his
governorship with a progressive agenda centered on his
personal commitment to education only to have fiscal
reality and legislative difficulties draw him into new
battles over tax policy.
John Volpe assumed the Massachusetts governorship with
his own set of priorities and his own value structure.

A

successful self-made Republican contractor, he believed in
government's responsibility to support major social
programs in areas such as education and mental health.

He

was, moreover, committed to cleanse state government of
corruption and cronyism, while promoting constitutional
reforms that would make the infrastructure of government
more modern and efficient.

Most of all, Volpe was at heart

a builder who sought to expand the Commonwealth's
construction activity while maintaining fiscal restraint
and providing property tax relief.
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Unlike Furcolo,

Volpe did not hold education, much

less community colleges, as his primary area of interest;
although he endorsed expansion of the two-year community
college system.

It is important to emphasize, however,

that while his support of education was sincerely felt and
helped to spur the expansion of community colleges, it was
not fundamental to Volpe's governorships.
It is this dichotomy—the willingness of Volpe to back
community colleges as good things which offered attendant
political benefits, combined with his apparent lack of
focus as to either the frcimework of the community college
system or its mission that opened a vacuum of policy
opportunity for others to fill.

The story of Volpe's

governorship as it relates to community colleges and to
educational issues in general is largely a story of how
momentum created by his predecessor combined with events as
well as with the efforts of leaders in both the Legislature
and the community college movement to draw a willing
governor toward a significant expansion in campus
development.
The 1960 Election
The election of 1960 electrified Massachusetts as its
junior Senator became the youngest man and first person of
Irish Catholic descent to achieve the presidency of the
United States.

But as John F. Kennedy swept the

Commonwealth by a margin of 500,000 votes (Globe,
John Harris,

11/9/60,

"Bay State Splits for Jack, Salty, Volpe,
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McCormack," p.

1) over Vice President Richard M. Nixon,

two

other major Democrats were facing surprisingly one-sided
defeats in races for statewide offices.
Having defeated Furcolo in the Democratic primary.
Mayor O'Connor carried on his aggressive campaign against
the stalwart Senator Saltonstall.

Despite his attempts to

set himself as a vigorous alternative to "Salty",
Massachusetts voters opted for the established Republican
Brahmin by some 299,000 votes
Edition,

C.

R. Owens,

Margin 299,000," p.

(Globe,

11/9/60,

"Volpe Wins by 132,000,

Late
Saltonstall

1).

In the race for Governor,

Secretary of State Joseph

Ward survived a primary challenge from six other Democrats
to earn the right to face Republican businessman John A.
Volpe.

Despite Kennedy's big win. Ward carried the burden

of a bitter and divisive primary contest as well as the
continuing investigation of alleged corruption within the
MDC and DPW.

These disadvantages combined with a smaller

than expected pro-Ward vote in Boston to ensure a
Republican win.

Volpe, who had never before sought

elective office,

captured the governorship with a plurality

of 132,000 votes

(Globe,

11/9/60,

Late Edition, Owens, p.

1).
Amidst the euphoria of his victory.

Governor-elect

Volpe faced the reality of increased Democratic control in
the Legislature.

Twenty-four Democrats would sit in the

upcoming 162nd session of the Senate,
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as opposed to 14

Republicans
21-17).

(the margin in the previous session had been

The Democrats had also increased their margin in

the House,

to 143-92

(Globe.

11/10/60, William J.

"Slim Pickin's for Bay State GOP,” p.

Lewis,

12).

Volpe was surrounded as well by a full slate of
Democratic state constitutional officers.

Edward

McGlaughlin of Boston was elected to serve as Lt.

Governor.

Attorney General Edward McCormick was re-elected to the
post of Attorney General.

Representative John Driscoll of

Boston won the contest for Treasurer, with Kevin White
elected to succeed Ward as Secretary of State.
Thomas Buckley,

Finally,

a Democrat who was carrying out the

investigations into the M.D.C.

and D.P.W.,

earned

re-election as Auditor.
Thus,

despite Saltonstall's victory, Volpe's election

was an aberration in the campaign of 1960.

As Globe

political reporter John Harris wrote in a retrospective two
days after the election (Globe.
"Volpe,

Salty Didn't Squeak in .

11/10/60,
.

John Harris,

., They Raced," p.

1):

. . . There is no question that he won widespread
acceptance as a successful businessman deeply
interested in civic affairs.
But his election won a heavy assist from
what the Democrats did to themselves in the
primary and an even greater assist from voters
who wanted to show their disapproval of the
scandalous situation that was revealed in the
M.D.C.'s operations.
The Governor-Elect
Volpe,

himself, was something of a new breed of

Massachusetts Republican.

In a state whose GOP leadership
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had been comprised largely of Brahmin stock,

the

52-year-old Governor-elect was a self-made man who had
built a major construction business from ground zero.
A former journeyman union plasterer, Volpe had taken
evening classes at Boston's Wentworth Institute before
quitting his job to become a full-time day student.
support his day studies,

To

he took a job selling shirts in

the evening.
Upon completion of his studies,

the future governor

opened Volpe Construction with $500 borrowed from a friend.
In World War II,

he gave up operation of his business to

become a civil engineer in the Navy.

Following the war,

Volpe returned to his construction business and led it to
prominence throughout New England.
In 1953,

Republican governor Christian Herter

appointed Volpe

(who had become Deputy Chairman of the

Republican State Party in 1950) to the post of Commissioner
of Public Works.

Appointed by President Eisenhower as

Federal Highway Administrator shortly thereafter, Volpe
helped the administration develop the massive national
highway program of the 1950s.

Upon his return to

Massachusetts, Volpe again moved to a position of
prominence in the business community, becoming President of
the Boston Chamber of Commerce.
The Volpe Agenda:

1961

Three key factors shaped the first year of the Volpe
administration.

First, was the new governor's attempt to
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capitalize on public dissatisfaction with the alleged
corruption and mismanagement in the MDC and DPW by making
political and constitutional reform synonymous with his
administration.

Second, was Volpe's personal history as a

builder and his innate interest in issues related to
construction: to creating roads, bridges and buildings as
fundamental cornerstones of his legacy.

Third, Volpe faced

the dilemma of achieving his program in the face of
Democratic majorities in the Legislature who were already
looking to a return to executive power in 1962.
Volpe's inaugural address, which the Boston Globe
described as "moderate”
Owens,

(Globe.

"Volpe Calls a Halt:

1/5/61,

Late Edition,

C.

R.

Plans Changes in DPW, MDC, MTA.

Bars New Spending with $1 Billion Debt," p.

1)

sought to

establish the new governor as an agent of reform who would
maintain progress on key fronts while ensuring fiscal
prudence. He offered few specific proposals and made no
direct references to higher education or community
colleges.
Reform was the major topic as the Governor's address
called for reorganization of both the MDC and the
DPW—recommending that each agency be run by an executive
director instead of the existing multi-commissioner format.
He also called for a standard code of ethical conduct for
all Massachusetts public officials,

saying that it was time

to "rebuild public respect for our government"
January,

1961).

(Senate I,

Finally, Volpe set the stage for future
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proposals on constitutional reform by arguing that "there
is an overwhelming need for action"

(Senate I,

1961) to

modernize the infrastructure of state government.
The Governor's ensuing budget message
1961)

(House No.

1,

for Fiscal Year 1962 is interesting on several

fronts.

First,

its rhetoric concerning fiscal affairs is

remarkably similar to that of Furcolo in 1956 and not
unlike that which one would expect of any governor assuming
power from a member of the opposing party:
I found when I started work, on this budget that
there was $25 million less to work with than I
had looked forward to a month earlier to pay for
state purposes and local aid.
(House No. 1,
1961)
Arguing that there were 5,000 more state employees
than five years earlier (707 in education), Volpe pointed
to his overall $57 million reduction of departmental
requests

for the upcoming fiscal year.

This said,

he

called for an $11,000,000 increase in total general fund
appropriations,

labeling it "the minimum required to meet

obligations for which we are committed"

(House No.

1,

1961).
Of 245 recommended new positions in state government,
Volpe slated 62 for the new regional colleges, the second
highest figure (after the Belchertown Nursery)
department or agency.

awarded any

The Governor also recommended an

additional 59 new positions for the University of
Massachusetts and 13 for the Commonwealth's state colleges.

155

Overall funding for the community colleges was also
markedly increased.

As summarized in Table 1,

the proposed

total budget for community colleges was nearly $551,000,

an

increase of almost $400,000 over the FY61 appropriation.
Some $37,000 of this amount was earmarked for the Board's
operating costs, while the remainder was divided among the
four nascent colleges

(Berkshire,

Cape Cod, Metropolitan

Boston and Northern Essex).
In describing the rationale for these proposed
increases, Volpe's words again echoed these of Furcolo in
their professed commitment to access (House No.

1,

1961):

The 13 positions for the state colleges will
allow them to enroll 450 more students as
planned.
The expansion program of the University
is based on taking 600 more students in 1962 and
provides 50 clerical, technical and maintenance
positions for new buildings and for administra¬
tion.
For the Regional Community Colleges, 53
positions are for a planned first year enrollment
of about 800 at Boston, Haverhill, and Hyannis,
and nine more positions for the second year at
Pittsfield for 150 students.
This the total of 134 college positions will
make it possible to enroll 2,131 additional
students making a grand total of 19,385 as
compared with 17,254 now in state operated
colleges.
Clearly, Volpe was presenting a vision for community
college development which was consistent with Furcolo's
agenda.

By May, when the Legislature concluded the

shortest session in its history,

almost all of Volpe's

recommendations for community college expansion would be
enacted.
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It appears logical,

then,

to assume that education

remained a high priority and high visibility issue for the
new governor.

Interestingly,

however,

a review of major

press during the first year of the Volpe administration
generates nary a major speech or gubernatorial message
focused on community colleges.

Nor do those who observed

the governor at the time remember him as a passionate
advocate for community colleges.

Wojtkowski recalls,

"It's

fair to say Volpe wasn't a big education person in terms of
his basic priorities.
21,

He was a builder"

(Interview,

July

1993).
By March, Volpe had initiated a significant effort to

push lawmakers into supporting his recommended
reorganization of the MDC and DPW as well as his proposed
code of ethics and a reform of the Massachusetts
constitution.

Specifically,

the governor sought to

modernize the 180-year-old document by moving to four-year
gubernatorial terms and by establishing coterminous service
by key executive branch officials

(e.g.,

administration,

comptroller, budget

purchasing agent,

director, personnel director)

commissioner of

and the governor.

In the

general concern for good and efficient government, Volpe
had found an issue than could separate him from the
Democratic establishment in the Legislature and possibly
earn him popular legislative victories that could in turn
provide momentum for the rest of his program.
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The push for reform dominated much of the Boston media
discussion during the spring 1961 session of the
Legislature.

As prominent legal scholars and public

officials joined the media to support a constitutional
convention to modernize the Constitution,
to board the bandwagon.

legislators began

Speaker Thompson went so far as to

float the idea of a joint session to debate both four-year
gubernatorial terms and the idea of a graduated income tax
which Democrats had traditionally found appealing as a
basis for substantive tax reform.
Beyond political and constitutional reform, Volpe's
attention focused on a delicate issue concerning the New
Haven Railroad.

On the verge of bankruptcy,

had turned to the governors of New York,
Island and Massachusetts for relief.
moved to aid the New Haven Railroad,
to assist the Boston and Maine.

the carrier

Connecticut,

Statutorily,

Rhode

if Volpe

he was also required

In committing himself to

tax relief for the railroads as well as to state assumption
of various maintenance functions such as bridge repair and
to the state purchase of a railroad right-of-way between
Boston and the southeastern city of Braintree to be used
for rapid transit development,

the governor presented what

one observer called ”the biggest legislative package which
must be resolved this year”

(Globe.

3/7/61,

S.

J. Micciche,

”$1.2 Million 'Safe Haven” Bill Given Legislature by Volpe
Today,” p.

1,

Volpe Rule As

and 4/21/61,

S.

J. Micciche,

'Era of Good Feeling,'” p.
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“Thompson Hits

8).

The railroad measure would generate partisan
controversy throughout the spring as Thompson and other
Democrats criticized such extensive tax relief for the two
carriers

(Globe.

Volpe Rule As

4/21/61,

S.

J.

Micciche,

'Era of Good Feeling,'" p.

On the construction front,

"Thompson Hits
8).

Volpe's early attention

focused on agreements for a $170 million extension of the
Massachusetts Turnpike into Boston and on a new $127
million "inner belt"

roadway through the state capital.

The Turnpike extension was the more contentious.

It

had stalled over the issue of whether it should be a toll
road or a freeway.

Turnpike Authority Director

Democratic powerhouse)

(and

William Callahan strongly supported

a toll road under his agency's direction while the new
governor endorsed a free route.

Agreement on the issue

would elude the two throughout Volpe's term,

as would a

final go-ahead on the inner beltway.
Other major public construction projects were about to
start in Metropolitan Boston.
funding.

With 90 per cent federal

Route 95 North and South of Boston as well as

Route 93 through the city were underway.

Final design

competition was in progress for a new government center and
city hall complex in downtown Boston,

preparatory work

continued on the Boston Common garage.

The new state

office building and the second harbor tunnel—all passed
during Furcolo's

1958

legislative push.
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On the private

side,

the long-awaited Prudential Tower finally seemed

ready for a go-ahead.
Still,

by the end of April,

Volpe could point to few

major legislative accomplishments.

Democrats in the

legislature were already talking of bringing the session to
a close.

Boston Globe political analyst,

viewed the governor's prospects as bleak
Done

.

.

.

but Done Fast," p.

William Lewis,
(4/21/61,

"Little

17):

The 1961 legislative session to date has been
mostly sound and fury.
Much legislation has been
killed outright or sidetracked.
Little
legislation of major import has cleared the
branches. It has been a stalemate in the
Legislature clearly dominated by the Democrats.
Virtually all of Republican Governor Volpe's
legislative program is in limbo and apparently
destined for defeat.
As is often the case,

the waning moments of the

session saw a last minute flurry in the Legislature with
Volpe achieving at least a portion of his legislative
priorities.

Most significantly,

the governor secured

passage of both three-year 60% tax relief for the railroads
and the power to purchase the Boston-Braintree
right-of-way.

In addition,

the Legislature approved a

modified reorganization of the MDC which maintained the
four-person governing commission but gave the agency's
director expanded powers
"MDC Reorganized;
failed to act,

(Globe.

Murphy Now Czar," p.

however,

James H.

4).

Hammond,

The Legislature

on the Governor's proposals

concerning constitutional reform,
belt roadway,

6/1/61,

an ethics code,

the inner

or reorganization of the MTA and DPW.
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Of particular interest for this study,

however,

is the

rather odd fact that as the Legislature was putting the
brakes on many of Volpe's major initiatives,

it

joined him

to support significant increases in day-to-day operating
appropriations for a variety of state agencies.
By the time the Legislature ended the shortest session
in its history on May 25,

1961,

it had passed and the

governor had signed a budget of over $483 million for the
upcoming

(1963)

fiscal year as well as a supplemental

appropriation of some $4.5 million to close the books on
Fiscal Year 1961

(which would end June 30).

This increased

spending reflects a growing sense in the General Court that
the Commonwealth's worst fiscal woes were over and that the
economy was in a period of growth.

For the Legislature the

net result was an explosion of pent-up demand for spending
on a range of projects.

As Wojtkowski remembers

"there was

money to spend."
In accepting the largest budget in the Commonwealth's
history,

the Legislature and Volpe also tacitly accepted an

inevitable budget deficit for Fiscal Year 1962.

Estimates

by state fiscal officers indicated that the $483 million
budget would result in a deficit of between $5-10 million
and that an additional $18 million would be necessary to
match the normal increases in state costs during the
1962-63 fiscal period

(Globe.

5/24/61,

"Deficit Bound Volpe Serene," p.
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17).

C.

R.

Owens,

This last minute

largesse allowed both Volpe and the Legislature to claim
victory on several important fronts.
The budget provided the governor at least some sense
of achievement and movement in areas across state
government.

Moreover,

as shall be discussed subsequently,

in areas such as higher education,

the budget allowed Volpe

to give key legislators victories in their home districts.
Finally,

as C.

R.

Owens of the Globe noted in a

retrospective on the

1961 session,

the inevitable deficit

of FY92 offered Volpe the opportunity to again engage the
sales tax issue.

Writing that

"there hasn't been a

governor in recent memory who has faced the prospect of
deficit spending with more equanimity than does John A.
Volpe,
p.

" Owens went on to speculate

(Globe.

5/24/61,

Owens,

17):
It is more likely that the governor will wait
until next year before asking the Legislature to
enact the tax measure to provide the needed
money.
The 1962 Legislative session will have
five or more months before the Commonwealth
actually runs out of funds.
With an empty
treasury facing them, the Legislators may be more
amenable to approving a tax increase—such as a
sales tax levy which Governor Volpe supported
during the administration of Governor Furcolo.
For Democrats in the Legislature,

fulfilled a set of needs.

First,

the budget also

it maintained fundamental

elements of the progressive agenda established during the
past four years,
initiatives.

while blocking approval of several Volpe

Moreover,

during the next year.

if a tax increase became necessary

Democrats could put the governor in

the unenviable position of pushing for new revenues during
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an election year.

Finally,

as noted above,

the budget

provided many Democrats with benefits to bring back to
their home constituencies.
This interesting balance of needs between Volpe and
the Democratic Legislature is important to the core issue
of this study.

As Table

1 demonstrates,

adopted and the governor approved,

the Legislature

major increases in

appropriations for the community college program.

The

final Fiscal Year 1962 operating budget of $538,085
(including $20,484 in a supplemental budget to the general
appropriations bill),

though some $12,000

requested in Volpe's House

1,

less than that

represents approximately a

$400,000 increase over« the appropriation for Fiscal Year
1961.

All this despite minimal public discussion of either

community colleges or public higher education by either the
governor or the legislative leadership.
”The Mess in Massachusetts Education"
the Agenda

— The Media Focuses

The world of politics and policymaking is often as
much reactive as proactive.
Sputnik)

Events in far-off lands

or in the nation's capitol

legislation,

(e.g..

funding for new initiatives)

(e.g..

Civil Rights
can shape popular

opinion and thus directly or indirectly affect policymaking
at the state level.

The press,

particularly in the pages

of the state capitol's major dailies or on the airwaves of
network affiliates,

holds the power to shape the politics

of the moment and to focus the policy debate through the
power and reach of their influence.
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Table 1
Massachusetts State Budget Chronology — Coininunity Colleges
Fiscal Years 1959-1962
The Furcolo Administration
October 3,

1958

Governor Furcolo signs Chapter 605
of the Acts of 1958 which
established a Massachusetts Board
of Regional Community Colleges and
provides for the establishment of
regional community colleges.

October 16,

1958

Governor Furcolo signs Chapter 650
of the Acts of 1958, a Capital
Outlay which includes $1 million
for community college planning and
development.

January 12,

1959

Governor Furcolo presents his
proposed budget for FY 1960 (House
I) which includes no request for
additional community college
funding.

April 6,

1959

Passage of Chapter 171 of the Acts
of 1959, a supplemental budget
which includes $25,000 for
administration of the community
college program.

July 31,

1959

Passage of Chapter 433 of the Acts
of 1959 (Budget for FY 1960) which
includes no additional funding for
community colleges.

September 17,

January 25,

1959

1960

Passage of Chapter 604 of the Acts
of 1959 (Special Capital Outlay)
which includes no additional
funding for community college
development.
Governor Furcolo presents his
proposed budget for Fiscal Year
1960 (House I) which recommends
$85,521 for community college
operations.
This recommendation
is less than the figure of

Continued,
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$200,699 requested by the MBRCC,
but represents an increase of
$396,335 over the Fiscal Year 1961
appropriation.
April 13,

June 30,

1960

1960

Passage of Chapter 318 of the Acts
of 1960, a Supplemental Budget and
for Fiscal Year 1960 which
includes $82,950 for the regional
community college at Pittsfield.
Passage of Chapter 507 of the Acts
of 1960 (Budget for Fiscal Year
1960).
Includes:
Administration of community
college program
$22,126
Regional community college
in metropolitan Boston
$16,400
Regional community college
in Northeast MA
$16,400
Regional community college
in Southeast MA
$16,400
$71,326

November 23,

1960

Passage of Chapter 774 of the Acts
of 1960.
A Special Capital Outlay
which includes funds ($300,000 to
be added to funds in Chapter 650
of the Acts of 1958) to develop a
system of regional community
colleges in Massachusetts
(including plans, agreements with
local communities, supplies,
furnishings and equipment).

November 23,

1963

Passage of Chapter 784 of the Acts
of 1960, a Supplemental Budget for
Fiscal Year 1961 which includes
funding for:
Administration of the community
college program
$21,000
Regional community college
in metropolitan Boston
$ 7,596
Regional community college
in Northeastern MA
$ 7,271

Continued,

165

next page.

Table 1—Continued:

Regional community college
in Southeastern MA
$ 7,394
Regional community college
in Central MA
$20,000
Regional community college
in CT. valley
$20,000
$83,586

The Volpe Administration
January 25,

May 5,

1961

1961

Governor Volpe presents his budget
proposal for FY62 (House I).
It
includes $550,942 in proposed
spending on community colleges, a
reduction of $102,834 in the
amount requested by the MBRCC.
Specifically, Volpe's budget
recommends:
Administration
$ 37,242
Community College,
metropolitan Boston
$191,650
Community College,
Northeast MA
$ 88,550
Community College,
Southeastern MA
$ 89,050
Community College,
Pittsfield
$144,450
Community College,
Central MA
Community College,
CT Valley
$550,942
Passage of Chapter 430 of the Acts
of 1961 (Supplemental Budget for
Fiscal Year 1961), which includes
language limiting the college in
Metropolitan Boston to "not more
than 26 permanent positions;" the
regional community college in
northeastern MA to "not more than
8 positions"; the regional
community college in southeastern
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MA to "not more than 8 permanent
positions"; and the community
college in Pittsfield to "not more
than 16 permanent positions."
May 23,

1961

Passage of Chapter 495 of the Acts
of 1961, Budget for Fiscal Year
1962 which includes:
$ 41,794
Administration
Metropolitan Boston
(not to exceed 31
$179,965
permanent positions)
Northern Essex
(not to exceed 11
$ 74,194
permanent positions)
Cape Cod (not to
exceed 11 permanent
$ 74,888
positions)
Berkshire (not to
exceed 20 permanent
$146,760
positions)
$517,601

May 27,

1961

Passage of Chapter 543 of the Acts
of 1961, a Supplemental Budget to
the General Appropriations Act,
which includes:
Metropolitan Boston
(not to exceed 31
permanent positions)
$12,500
Northern Essex (not
to exceed 11
permanent positions)
$ 3,000
Cape Cod (not to
exceed 11 permanent
positions)
$ 3,992
$19,512

May 27,

1961

Passage of Chapter 544 of the Acts
of 1961, A Special Outlay Program
for the Commonwealth which
includes $750,000 to supplement
that in Chapter 650 of the Acts of
1958 including colleges in the
Worcester and Springfield areas.

Continued, next page.

Table 1—Continued:

January 23,

1962

Governor Volpe presents his
proposed budget for Fiscal Year
1963, which includes $928,708 in
new proposed spending on community
colleges as compares to $1,231,531
requested by the MBRCC.
Specifically, the budget proposal
recommends:
Administration
$ 44,891
Massachusetts Bay
$345,396
(Maintenance)
Northern Essex
$144,202
Cape Cod
$149,809
Berkshire
$168,630
Regional College of
Central MA
$
Regional College,
CT Valley
$
Community College,
Upper CT Valley
$ 75,780
$928,708

April 26,

1962

Passage of Chapter 373 of the Acts
of 1962, a Supplemental Budget for
Fiscal Year 1962.
Specific community college
portions of the bill include
increasing the position caps
mandated in Chapter 543 of the
Acts of 1961 to 51 for Mass. Bay,
21 for Berkshire and 20 for both
Northern Essex and Cape Cod.
The
bill also expands the language of
Chapter 544 of the Acts of 1962 to
include community colleges in
Boston and Greenfield areas as
well as Springfield and Worcester
areas.
The Supplemental also
includes:
Northern Essex
$ 3,600
Cape Cod
$ 5,380
Berkshire
$ 3,880

Continued,
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June 17,

1962

Chapter 591 of the Acts of 1962
(the Budget for Fiscal Year 1963)
which includes $952,857 in total
community college spending.
Specifically:
Administration
$ 43,641
Mass Bay
$346,834
Northern Essex
$148,180
Cape Cod
$156,180
Berkshire
$176,330
Upper Ct. Valley
$ 80,692
$952,857

July 11,

1962

Passage of Chapter 649 of the Acts
of 1962, a Special Capital Outlay.
Specific community college items
approved are $255,000 to support
planning and development of
community colleges in Boston,
Greenfield, Springfield and
Worcester areas (amount added to
appropriations in Chapter 544 of
1961) and $15,000 for furnishings
and equipment at Cape Cod
Community College.

July 21,

1962

Passage of Chapter 705 of the Acts
of 1962, a Capital Outlay Program,
which includes $150,000 in
additional monies to support the
planning and development effort
detailed in Chapter 649 of 1962.

The Boston Globe has traditionally held a special
policymaking influence in Massachusetts.

As New England's

largest newspaper and the paper of record in the
Commonwealth's major city and capitol,

the Globe has

historically spoken with a potent and liberal voice.
An interesting example of the Globe's influence
occurred in September 1961, with publication of a
seven-part series entitled "The Mess in Massachusetts
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Education."

This series, written by the paper's general

education reporter,

Ian Forman,

and its scientific

education reporter,

Ian Menzies,

returned education to the

front rank of policy issues and set the stage for a major
review of all levels of education in the Commonwealth.
The series presented a scathing indictment of
Massachusetts public education from kindergarten through
graduate school.

Describing the situation in near

scandalous terms,

Forman and Menzies labelled public

education in the Commonwealth "an archaic mess" in which
"the sons and daughters of Massachusetts citizens are being
cheated"

(Globe.

9/17/62,

Ian Menzies & Ian Forman,

Cares About Schools in Massachusetts?", p.

6-A).

"Who

Pointing

to "a lack of direction and drive for progressively higher
standards," the series assailed the Legislature as "slow
with funds";
"lackluster";

educators and education boards as
and the efforts of the Massachusetts

Department of Education as "inadequate"
Menzies & Forman, p.

6-A).

Moreover,

(Globe.

9/17/62,

it described the

funding mechanism for local school systems, which relied on
property taxes for sustenance,

as leading to "two kinds of

public education available to children in Massachusetts
today—first class and second class"
Menzies & Forman,

p.

(Globe,

9/17/62,

6-A).

Forman and Menzies reserved special criticism for the
Commonwealth's higher education institutions, writing that
"public education in the state is at its worst at the
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college level" and that few people in Massachusetts could
even name 75 percent of our 19 institutions of higher
education.

That's the kind of impact they've had"

9/17/62, Menzies & Forman,

p.

(Globe.

6-A).

In criticizing public higher education,

the authors

pointed to a "war" within the system which had its roots in
"a historical background of political,

private school and

religious strife" and emphasized that "Catholic Boston
considered the University of Massachusetts
Western Massachusetts Protestantism,

a stronghold of

alleging

discrimination against Catholic faculty and students "and
that legislators, only three or four of whom at any one
time were graduates of the University,

opposed money for

the University on these often unstated grounds"
9/17/62, Menzies & Forman,

p.

(Globe.

6-A).

Arguing that the "10 state teachers colleges were
looked on more favorably by the predominately Boston area
legislators who felt these schools could provide a low-cost
education for the sons and daughters of their
constituents," Forman and Menzies labelled as
"unsatisfactory" these institutions' progress in becoming
"full-fledged four-year degree granting colleges"
9/17/62, Menzies & Forman,

p.

(Globe,

6-A).

For the new community colleges,

Forman and Menzies

offered relatively positive words:
The two year community college idea was pushed
through in the Furcolo administration by
educators somewhat disenchanted with our state
colleges.
They kept it out of the hands of state
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educators by assigning them an independent
governing board.
These quite dynamic and needed
schools, which have attracted good teachers, have
however, further clouded the higher education
picture from the overall administrative,
integrated angle.
(Globe. 9/17/62, Menzies &
Forman, p. 6-A)
In response to this "clouded picture" and in an effort
to correct the "mess in Massachusetts education",

Forman

and Menzies argued strongly for a thorough review of public
education in the Commonwealth:
One thing must be done.
It has been done in
California, New York, Indiana and other states.
A master plan for higher education must be
produced.
At the same time, there must be a
similar plan drawn up for elementary and
secondary education.
The present confusion, lack
of money, lack of direction and internal strife
must end.
(Globe. 9/17/62, Menzies & Forman, p.
6-A)
The Globe series had a profound effect on both the
governor and the Legislature.

Its tone fit with the

general reform sentiment in the Massachusetts political
air.

Moreover,

its temper and timing dovetailed with the

continuing high number of high school graduates who were
demanding entry to higher education as well as with the
increasing perception that the nature of the economy was
shifting toward a more scientific and technical base.

And,

finally,

in its criticism of local elementary and secondary

systems,

the series confirmed the sentiments of homeowners

whose property taxes supported schools that often seemed
unaccountable and out of step with educational advances.
For all of these reasons,

the Forman-Menzies series

reestablished education as a core political issue on the
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eve of the 1962 election year.

As one long-time observer

of Massachusetts education pointed out,
drove the issue of educational reform,
(Kevin Harrington,

interview,

"Forman and Menzies
as did the Globe"

8/16/93).

The series generated an irresistible momentxim for
political action.

As prominent educational and business

voices endorsed the validity of the series,
Globe gave their words a wide hearing.

Forman and the

For example,

in

October when the University of Massachusetts President
spoke on behalf of "a major survey and re-evaluation of
Massachusetts educational resources,"

Forman gave the

speech extensive coverage, writing that President Lederle
".

.

.

added his voice to the growing number of state

officials,

legislators,

educators and laymen calling for a

review of Baystate education"

(Globe,

10/17/61,

Ian Forman,

"UMass President Asks review of Education Resources in Bay
State," p.

8).

In early October,
of the Globe series.
(D-Holyoke)

only one week after the conclusion

Senate Majority Leader Maurice Donahue

filed legislation to authorize a master

planning effort akin to that recommended by Forman and
Menzies.
recalls,

That,

as then Senator Kevin Harrington (D-Salem)

set the wheels turning in the executive branch.

"Volpe's people said to him,

this is a red-hot thing that

Donohue has filed," Harrington explained in an interview
years later.

"You'd better do the same."
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In an October 17 Convocation speech at Northeastern
University,

the Governor attempted to catch the tide of

educational reform created by the Globe series saying that
he was preparing a program for the "first-class
re-evaluation of the state's entire public education
system."

Volpe announced,

"I shall ask the incoming

Legislature for adequate funds with which to finance this
vitally needed study"

iGlobe.

Maps School Survey," p.

10/18/61,

Ian Forman,

"Volpe

1).

During the Northeastern speech, which the Governor
entitled "Building for Education in the Commonwealth",
Volpe reviewed the Massachusetts educational scene and
echoed the arguments of Forman and Menzies,

"the picture as

it stands today is not encouraging"

10/18/61,

Forman,

pp.

1,

2).

(Globe.

Describing higher education,

the

Governor pointed to the Commonwealth's private universities
as a tremendous asset" but emphasized that "it is not
possible for them to meet the educational needs of all our
people"

(Globe,

10/18/61,

Forman, p.

2).

The Governor concluded by recommending enhanced
support for higher education,

arguing that "there is some

danger that Massachusetts will be left behind if it does
not expand its public support for higher education and
begin to match the pace that has been set by our private
institutions"

(Globe.

10/18/61,
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Forman, p.

2).

Volpe in 1962:

A Legislative Marathon and An Election
Surprise

January 1962 on Beacon found both Democrats and
Republicans looking ahead to the November election with a
heightened sense of partisanship.

Tension was particularly

high as stories continued related to ongoing investigations
of the DPW, MDC and alleged improprieties in 1959-60
planning of the Boston Common garage.

Worse yet,

recent

allegations from within the Senate that some members were
under the influence of bookies sent Legislators into a
frenzy.

Looking to the year ahead and to the opening of

the second session of the 162nd Great and General Court,
veteran political observer S.

J. Micciche wrote:

Governor Volpe unveils his 1962 program at noon
today to a Massachusetts Legislature fretting
over its public image in an election year,
lawmakers will convene an hour early to
officially begin work on a record number of bills
peppered freely with a large portion of
controversial matters.
House and Senate members
predicted last night a long and hard year with
politics tingeing every major proposal.
They
ruled out any repeat of the modern day record for
speedy deliberations set last year.
(Globe.
1/3/62, S. J. Micciche, "Legislature Fretting
About Public Image," p. 1)
In his annual address,

the first volley of election

year rhetoric, Volpe once again focused on corruption which
he said "cast a shadow over the general repute of thousands
of civil servants and public officials" and challenged the
Legislature to pass his controversial proposal for a
Commission on Crime and Public Morality (to investigate
organized crime and serve as watchdog over the conduct of
public officials).

He also demanded reorganization of
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state agencies under a strengthened chief executive and
presented proposals on a range of issues from a $2.3
million study of mass transit in the Commonwealth to
expansion of mental health facilities.
Concerning education,

the Governor grasped the issues

raised in the Forman-Menzies series and spoke in language
that built on both their sense of alarm and his October
speech at Northeastern University:
Here in Massachusetts, where the first public
school in America was established and where
exists an awesome and world envied assembly of
great schools and universities, we cannot afford
to remain smug about our achievements or ignore
our potentials . . .
There have been efforts over the years to
examine the critical problems of our schools and
colleges but for the most part, these studies
were not comprehensive.
I am submitting a
request for creation of a twelve-person unpaid
commission to examine our total picture on public
education, including financing, which now rests
solely on real estate and to provide a guide for
a program in our Commonwealth.
This commission
would be appointed by the governor and the
Legislature and provided with the sum of $100,000
for necessary expenses.
I feel this is needed in
view of the serious problems facing education
nationally and in our state.
(Senate No. 1,
1962)
Among those listening to the Governor's address were
four men who would play leading roles in establishing the
study commission during the

1962 session and who would also

help to drive it to a substantive and important report by
1965.
The first was Forman.
thoughtful,

The highly opinionated,

yet

education writer for the Globe was passionately

committed to the idea of a master plan for Massachusetts

176

education.

In his regular Sunday column,

as well as in his

coverage of Legislative action on education,

Forman would

become a cheerleader for the commission and its members.
Respected and widely read,
praise and criticism.

Forman was unabashed with both

Forman was thus a player to be

reckoned with on Beacon Hill.
Also listening to the Governor's proposal was Senator
Kevin Harrington (D-Salem).

Chair of the Senate Education

Committee and a forceful advocate for the state colleges
(particularly Salem State College in his native city),
Harrington was a rising star in the upper house of the
Legislature.

Imposing at over six-foot-five inches tall,

the Senator possessed the accrued instincts of an
established political fcimily on the North Shore and
combined the look and easy intelligence of a Brahmin with
the charm and tenacity of a first rank Irish politician.
favorite of Forman,

A

Harrington shared the reporter's

commitment to educational reform and saw in the Governor's
proposal an opportunity for substantive achievement on both
the policy and political fronts.
Maurice Donahue of Holyoke,

the Senate Majority Leader

who would in two years succeed Powers as Senate President
listened to the Governor's words on education reform with
special interest.

Harrington describes Donahue as "a great

pusher for the University principally because of its
geographic location near Holyoke” and as one "who
understood and truly believed that public education was the
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state's only salvation”

(Interview,

8/16/93).

The Majority

Leader also possessed the requisite political savvy to
understand that while Volpe's support of the educational
master plan was important.

Democrats had to remain out

front on the issue or risk losing it to the Republican
Governor.
Fourth among those who listened attentively to the
Governor's annual address was the remarkably resilient
Speaker of the House John Thompson.

Unerringly loyal to

Furcolo during the governor's two terms,

Thompson had

fought Volpe publicly on a series of issues in 1961.

Most

notable among these issues was the latter's crime
commission proposal

which the Speaker believed would stand

as an inappropriate legislative watchdog.
Thompson had also earned the enmity of many within his
own party.

Ever the "Iron Duke," Thompson would spend the

remaining two years of his Speakership beating back
increasingly bitter challenges to his leadership and
fighting allegations of impropriety that would eventually
lead to his indictment.

In 1962,

he would also face a

surprisingly difficult re-election ceimpaign.

As one who

had shown his commitment to education and who was fighting
for his political life against an unruly House and a public
perception that linked him to Beacon Hill cronyism,
leadership on educational reform offered an attractive
opportunity.

And as long as he was speaker,

reform would require his active support.
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any serious

Generally,

the response to the governor's annual

message was what one might expect at the outset of an
election year.

Republicans praised Volpe's effort while

the Democratic leadership said the governor had "displayed
intellectual bankruptcy in his 1962 program"
1/4/62,

S.

J. Micciche,

(Globe.

"Democrats Hoist Storm Flag as

Volpe Launches Program," p.

1).

Overall,

the press

response was positive, with the Globe praising the Governor
for presenting "a moderate program whose very
reasonableness gives it strength"
Editorial,

(Globe.

"What the Governor Seeks," p.

1/4/62,
20).

In his budget message on January 24,

the Governor

again addressed the need for an overhaul of public
education and reaffirmed his call for "a commission to be
provided with the sum of $100,000 to examine the present
structure of public education and to make recommendations
for improvement"

(House No.

1,

1962).

For higher education, Volpe proposed a significant
boost in funding noting that "one of the largest
departmental increases in this budget is caused by
increases in enrollment in state colleges"

(House No.

1,

1962) .
Specifically,

the Governor recommended an increase of

$2,660,000 for the Department of Education in Fiscal Year
1963,

of which $2,097,833 was slated for operation of the

University and public colleges.

Once again,

as Furcolo had

done before him and Volpe had done in his budget message of
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the previous year,

the governor justified his call for

additional dollars by emphasizing the issue of access.
Arguing that his budget would "provide additional teachers
and related expense for 2,273 additional students, Volpe
went on to emphasize

(House No.

1,

1962);

I know that we want to provide facilities that
will enable every student in Massachusetts
capable of achieving a higher education to enjoy
that opportunity.
In view of the rapid rise in
numbers of students preparing for college and of
the announced limitations in enrollments made by
private colleges, there is no other course open
than for the state to go ahead with plans for
expansion of publicly supported institutions of
higher education, not only for 1963, but for the
years ahead.
As Table 1 indicates,

some $928,708 of the proposed

increase in educational funding was slated for the regional
community colleges,

so as to allow an additional enrollment

of 990 at the four existing institutions.

Although less

than those requested by the MBRCC—and rarely does a
department receive its full request—the proposed increases
are noteworthy and represent growth of nearly $400,000 over
the sum appropriated by the General Court in 1960,
Furcolo's last year as governor.
Volpe concluded his discussion of higher education by
announcing that he had "asked each of the governing boards
of our institutions of higher learning to set down in
public reports their ten-year anticipations of enrollment
and to relate them to plans for necessary new
construction."

The Governor's intended wish was that these

reports provide the Legislature with a "better under-
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standing" and allow it to express "approval or disapproval"
(House No.

1, 1962).

Chapter VIII will discuss the report

prepared by the MBRCC in some detail for it provides an
interesting snapshot of community college mission evolution
during the early 1960s.
With the introduction of Volpe's budget,
season was in full sway.

In this context,

the political

three issues

would dominate the educational debate.
First and foremost, was the proposed Master Plan for
Massachusetts education.

Forman continued to press the

issue in columns throughout the spring,
Plan Commission "the number 1

calling the Master

'must' bill on education

before the Massachusetts Legislature right now"
4/8/62,

Ian Forman,

(Globe.

"State Education Board Under Sharp

Scrutiny," p. A-56).
Behind the scenes Donahue and other members of the
leadership pushed for legislative action on the Commission.
By mid-spring, Donahue's bill,

(Senate 615)

creating a

commission has been approved.

It still remained,

however,

for the Senator and his allies to secure funding for the
planning effort.

With Forman's support in the Globe,

Donahue aimed to raise Volpe's recommended funding level
from $100,000 to $250,000.

As the final June battle over

the budget loomed, Donahue's proposal was locked in the
Ways and Means Committees of both houses.
The second major educational issue facing the General
Court was the long-discussed proposal to develop a
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four-year state medical school as part of the University of
Massachusetts.
Paul Dever,

First presented in 1948 by then Governor

the medical school proposal enjoyed the support

of Western Massachusetts legislators Wojtkowski,

Thompson

and Donahue as well as the endorsement of other key players
such as Harrington.

Despite this support and the best

efforts of Dever and Furcolo,

the medical school had never

been able to overcome opposition and private universities
(who perceived a threat to their enrollments)

and their

Republican allies.
Volpe appears to have been at best indifferent to the
medical school recommendation.

Unwilling to take the lead

on the issue in the face of opposition within his own
party,

the Governor remained on the sidelines as the issue

percolated.

By fall,however,

school legislation improved,

as prospects for medical
he would be prepared to step

in and attempt to score a quick political victory in the
midst of the election campaign.
The third major educational issue of 1962 concerned
another long-debated matter:

fiscal autonomy for the

University of Massachusetts.

Another favorite of Western

Massachusetts legislators,

the proposed legislation

provided the University with the freedom to manage its
appropriation free of legislative control.

Opposed by

legislators of both parties who were unwilling to give up
such leverage over the flagship of public higher education.
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Donahue and Thompson faced a tough but winnable fight,
again without active gubernatorial engagement.
Despite the significance of these matters,

the primary

issue of debate in 1962 remained corruption in state
government.

A review of the period's media provides a near

soap opera level of daily articles concerning indictments
in the Boston Common garage scandal,
investigation at the DPW and MDC,

continuing

firings of longtime staff

in major departments and a continued swirl of allegations
of corruption in the Boston Police Department.
The corruption issue provided Volpe a card that he
played adroitly.

Holding an impeccable personal record,

he

moved to oust individuals (often Democratic appointees) who
has been accused of wrongdoing;
fanfare.

and he did so with great

Most notable were his efforts to fire both the

State Waterways Director who had been accused of misconduct
in office and the Boston Police Chief following allegations
of racketeering in the department.
In the corruption issue, Volpe had found a weapon that
concerned the Democratic leadership, particularly when a
Massachusetts taxpayers Foundation Poll indicated that 80%
of Bay State residents considered corruption to be one of
the Commonwealth's major problems
A-4).

Globe columnist C.

(Globe. July 15, 1962, p.

R. Owens wrote of "a deep-seated

fear that Republicans have scored with the issue of crime
and corruption and that the political tides are running
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against the Democrats
p.

...»

(Globe.

April

15,

1962,

A-4).
It is interesting to reflect on how the education

Master Plan fit into the overall issue of reform in
Massachusetts politics.
election year,

In the contentiousness of an

it provided one area of relative common

ground which met the needs of both Democrats and
Republicans.

First,

education reform was an issue that

resonated with parents who paid significant property taxes
to support the school systems that Forman and Menzies had
pilloried and who sought admission for their sons and
daughters to increasingly inaccessible and crowded state
institutions of higher learning.
a commission the political

Second,

in the notion of

leadership on both sides of the

aisle could find short-term safety in the benefits of a
high-profile study knowing that no hard and potentially
controversial recommendations would follow until after the
1962 election.

Third,

for Volpe,

whose reform agenda

remained bottled up in the Legislature,

the commission

offered the promise of tangible achievement on an issue
that the Democrats held as one of their own.
Democrats such as Donahue and Harrington,

Fourth,

for

the Commission

promised both eventual substantive and progressive
achievement in an area they held dear and the opportunity
to reclaim for their party the mantle of reform.
passage of authorizing legislation in March,

With

the only issue

that remained was its level of funding—$100,000 as
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proposed by Volpe or more as Donahue and other legislators
hoped.
It became increasingly clear by late spring,

that on

the vast array of issues floating across Beacon Hill,

there

would be little common ground and much jockeying for
political advantage.

June saw both parties preparing for

their nominating conventional;

the air was thick with

politics Massachusetts-style and the General Court was far
from completing its work.

A host of major legislative

initiatives awaited action including Volpe's proposed crime
commission and code of public ethics,
appropriations bill
bill

($512 million),

($190 million),

the general

a highway borrowing

a capital outlay

($31 million)

and a

supplemental budget of $6-10 million to close books on
Fiscal Year 1963

(Globe,

6/17/62,

C.

Financial Records from Auditor," p.
education initiatives

R.

Owens,

4-A).

"Would Keep

The major

(Master planning commission.

University of Massachusetts Medical School,
autonomy for the University)

and fiscal

all also remained to be

completed.
At their respective June conventions in Springfield
and Worcester,

the Democrats and Republicans nominated

their slates for the November elections.
The Democratic affair was filled with a special
electricity as the President's youngest brother Edward
squared off against State Attorney General

(and nephew of

the venerable Speaker of the House John McCormick)
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Edward

McCormick in the fight to fill John F.
Senate seat.
fight,

Kennedy's vacant

While Kennedy prevailed in the nomination

this battle between Massachusetts dynasties stands

as one of the fiercest in the Commonwealth's recent
history.
While the Kennedy-McCormick race dominated the
Convention,

delegates selected Endicott

its nominee for Governor.

"Chub” Peabody as

Peabody was the son of a

prominent Episcopalian bishop and held seemingly impeccable
credentials for political office.
Boston Globe
.

(6/17/62,

He was described by the

Photo Caption,

p.

19)

as having ".

.

the political reputation of a Yankee with a liberal

streak and a Democrat who gets Republican votes."
All-American guard on Harvard's

An

1941 football tecun,

had earned the Silver Star in World War II,

Peabody

graduated from

Harvard Law School and served on the Commonwealth's
Executive Council.

Despite these credentials,

he had yet

to win statewide office having lost the nomination for
attorney general in 1956

and 1958 and the nomination for

governor in 1960.
Both Kennedy and Peabody left the convention on a
high.

But Massachusetts law leaves final party nominations

to a September primary.
rival,

Joseph Ward,

primary ballot,

Both McCormick and Peabody's

chose to take their cases to the

leaving the possibility of upset to stir

the summer air.
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Volpe,

on the other hand,

received his anticipated

unopposed coronation at the Republican convention.

Despite

the first faint rumblings among some delegates that the
governor's political operation had isolated itself from the
party and although Republicans faced the prospects of
somewhat contentious primary battles for other statewide
offices,

the GOP left Worcester confident that under

Volpe's leadership,

the party would hold its own in

November.
The post-convention problems of Speaker Thompson
further inspired Republican confidence.

On July 3,

dissatisfaction among Democrats over "the Iron Duke's"
style and his increasingly evident battle with alcohol
exploded as thirty-five members of the party called for his
ouster and expressed a "feeling of disgust" with both
Thompson and the House Democratic leadership
7/4/62,

(Globe.

"35 Democrats Seek Ouster of Thompson," p.

As this unrest festered in the House,
with two well-timed political

1).

Volpe struck

jousts on key education

issues.
First,

the Governor suddenly doubled his proposed

funding level for the education commission to $200,000.
Offered as part of the year-end supplemental budget,
Volpe's new proposal earned plaudits from across the state.
As

Harrington recalls

(interview,

August

13,

1993),

the

Governor had "upped the ante" on the education master plan
and in doing so had at least momentarily grasped the
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limelight on the issue.

The Globe would write of Volpe's

proposed increase in funding for the commission

(7/8/62,

"Volpe Urges $200,000

10):

for Education Survey," p.

Perhaps the Governor responded to the pressures
of many top educators and groups throughout the
state; perhaps he saw it as a shrewd political
move; perhaps he did it from truly altruistic
motives.
Whatever his reasons for boosting the
amount, he made many persons happy.
By the time of Volpe's new proposal,

the education

commission had taken on a dynamic of its own.
Donahue,

Harrington,

With

and Thompson driving the bill and

Powers supportive of Donahue's efforts,
legislative path was secure.

the commission's

Volpe's strong public

endorsement practically ensured that a mutually beneficial
deal could be reached between the Republican governor and
the Democratic leadership in the Legislature.

And to

prevent the measure from being lost at session's end,

the

Globe maintained persistent coverage of its progress.
Harrington recalls

(interview,

August

13,

1993)

Globe continued to be a great pusher on this."

that

"the

The major

issue seemed to be at what point the ante would stop
growing.
On July 13,
commission.
additional

the House gave its final approval to the

Not to be upstaged by Volpe,

Thompson added an

$50,000 to the governor's supplemental request,

bringing the total amount passed by the House for the
master plan effort to $250,000.

The only opposition to the

measure came from a few disgruntled Democrats and long-time
Republican opponents of education spending such as Theodore
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Vaistses of Melrose who argued,
an educational junket"

(Globe.

"...
7/13/62,

$250,000 for Education Survey," p.
Within days,

"House Votes

4).

the Senate had also approved the

supplemental budget,
committee.

They'll spend it on

as had a House-Senate conference

With nary a whimper concerning the additional

$50,000 appropriated to the commission, Volpe signed the
bill.
Volpe also made a tactical political move on another
big ticket educational issue as the commission moved toward
reality.
hand,

With the recess commission recommendations in

the word among key Beacon Hill observers was that the

governor would veto the state medical school legislation
rather than antagonize the Commonwealth's medical society
and the private universities who operated prestigious
medical schools.

In that the bill had passed by only a

19-17 roll call vote in the Senate despite the efforts of
Powers, Donahue and Harrington,

it was doubtful a veto

could be overridden.
Then in July the Governor did an apparent about-face
and suddenly announced that he would sign the legislation
if the 14-member university Board of Trustees was expanded
by five to allow him to appoint physicians experienced in
management of a medical school.
Almost immediately.
proposal.

Powers endorsed the Governor's

Having lost his dream of Boston's mayoralty over

his opposition to a university payraise in 1958,
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the Senate

President was not anxious to again be seen as standing in
the way of such a high visibility issue affecting U/Mass.
Powers said of the Governor's plan,
governor wants 50 trustees.
iota"

(Globe.

7/26/62,

S.

"I don't care if the

It wouldn't bother me a single

J. Micciche,

Rider; Medication School in Doubt," p.
Thompson,

on the other hand,

on Volpe's proposal.

'House Kills Volpe's
1).

issued a scathing attack

Calling it a "thinly disguised

sellout" to medical school opponents

(Globe.

7/25/62,

"Powers, Thompson Clash on Medical School Bill," p.

1),

the

Speaker argued that the governor's proposal was an attempt
to simultaneously grasp control of the U/Mass board by
appointing "the deans of private medical schools who would
sabotage the Legislature's intention for a first-class
medical school"

(Globe.

Medical School Bill, p.

7/25/62,

"Powers,

Thompson Clash on

1).

With Powers and Thompson

at odds over the bill,

it

was left to Donahue to step into the breach and find a
workable compromise that would also earn the governor's
support.

The Holyoke Senator recalls

(Interview August 19,

1993):
John Thompson was one of my closest friends.
And
Johnny Powers was very supportive of me as I rose
to majority leader.
This was one of several
occasions when I worked to get them to smoke the
peace pipe.
By month's end, with The Legislature in its final
hours, Thompson,

Powers and Volpe agreed to a compromise in

which the Governor would add three trustees to the
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University Board.

To earn the Speaker's support,

language

was included in the final conference committee measure that
prevented the governor from appointing representatives of
private medical schools to the University board.
agreement,

With this

the bill calling for a $10 million state medical

school received final legislative approval and was signed
by Volpe on July 27.
The third and final major education-related measure by
1962 concerned fiscal autonomy for the University.

Long

sought by Furcolo, Donahue and others to correct what
Harrington described as a situation in which "every time a
light bulb went out you had to go to the Department of
Education to get authority to purchase another"
August 13,

1993),

(interview,

the bill had never been able to overcome

fears in the Legislature

concerning both the loss of

direct fiscal control through legislative line items and
the prospect that the measure could set a precedent for
similar initiatives concerning the state colleges and
community colleges.
Recommended by Donahue's recess commission on the
University,

the bill held the backing of Thompson,

and Harrington.

The governor remained supportive but

relatively mute through July,
Legislature.

Powers

awaiting disposition in the

That action came early in July when Thompson

pushed the bill through the House and Powers and Donahue
combined to force it though the more conservative Senate.
Volpe signed the legislation quickly in the same month.
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The measure would ultimately help lead to a similar,
somewhat coincidental empowerment of the MBRCC in 1964.
In a summary article

(Globe.

7/28/62),

Forman offered

"high praise" for the year's legislative accomplishments in
the educational arena:
Vast gains were accomplished in the area of
public education as the lawmakers faced up to the
fact that many more millions must be spent to
meet the challenge of present-day educational
demands.
(Globe. 7/28/62, "Volpe Made Great
Strides in Legislative Year: Season's
Achievements Listed, p. 5")
Despite almost no discussion of community colleges in
the Legislature's flurry of education-related initiatives,
the MBRCC received a significant increase in funding as the
session Ccune to a close.
In addition to the education bills,

a number of other

hotly contested measures were approved before the
Legislature finally perogued on July 27.

For example,

the

General Court approved Volpe's crime commission (a stunning
victory for the governor); passed a $10.2 million
Federal-state study of mass transportation in the
Commonwealth;

endorsed a bond issue to pay for

Massachusetts $110 million highway program;

sustained a

gubernatorial veto of Callahan's proposal to give the
Turnpike Authority control of air rights around the
turnpike extension into Boston.

All in all,

despite

defeats on proposals such as his reorganization plan for
the DPW,

the year's work seemed to provide momentum to the

governor as the election neared.
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The November Surprise:

Governor-Elect Peabody

The focus of political pundits remained on the heated
Kennedy-McCormick race as the September primaries
approached.

In the shadow of this dynastic battle,

held to an advantage in the gubernatorial primary

Peabody
given

his status as the convention's chosen candidate.
Meanwhile,

on the Republican side, Volpe continued to

run a low-key campaign taking opportunities to point at his
record and avoiding where possible remaining above the
overall election-year fray.
In the September primary,
victory over Ward.

Peabody won an impressive

In earning the nomination,

he also

achieved a new measure of respect from political observers
as having a shot at upsetting Volpe.
Peabody stood as an anomaly in Massachusetts politics;
he was in Donahue's words,
(interview, August 19,

"a new-look Democrat"

1993).

The question was whether

this "new look" would candidate hold the traditional ethnic
Democratic base while appealing to sufficient Republicans
to upset the incumbent.
The final month of the 1962 gubernatorial campaign
stands as an intriguing case study which deserves greater
scrutiny than this work can provide.

Two points deserve

specific mention.
First,
campaign.

to the end,

the governor held to a low-key

Rarely referring to Peabody by name, Volpe

refused to debate his opponent or to respond to the
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Democrat's blistering attacks.

Choosing to remain above

the fray by simply pointing to his record and his standing
as a known quantity, Volpe relied on polls which showed him
holding a consistent lead.

Not only did this strategy open

the governor to criticism from other Republicans that he
was not actively working for the GOP candidates,

it also

opened the door for Peabody who ran a tireless campaign
under the careful guidance of Congressman Thomas P.
O'Neill.

Moreover,

the Kennedy camp provided support to

Peabody.

The Kennedy assist gained extra weight when the

President journeyed to Boston to vote and personally
endorsed Peabody.
Further complicating the landscape was President
Kennedy's October announcement that offensive nuclear
missiles had been discovered in Cuba.
extraordinary days,
news,

For thirteen

the Cuban Missile Crisis dominated the

casting the Massachusetts election into the

background.
Observers at the time estimated that the political
fallout of the crisis aided Volpe by moving Peabody out of
the limelight just as his campaign was coming together.
Thus,

as the Cconpaign entered its final days, most smart

money seemed to remained on the Republican.
On election day,

however,

offered a different verdict.

the voters of Massachusetts
Buoyed by a strong

performance in traditionally Democratic urban areas and by
a surprisingly solid performance among suburban voters.
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Peabody maintained a narrow lead that would hold up through
a recount requested by Volpe.
number of factors,

Peabody owed his upset to a

as summarized by Globe political editor

Robert Healey (Globe.

11/11/62,

Robert Healey,

Democrats Are Back on the Reservation," p.

"State

6-A):

What happened?
Well, the governor just played it
cool . . . The Cuban Crisis turned out to be a
great break for Peabody in more ways than one.
He was short of money.
There was no point in
spending on television or radio during the
crisis.
So Peabody was able to throw it all into
the last week when the Cuban situation eased
. . . And the real bust was the corruption issue.
Gov. Volpe was not running against the entire
Democratic slate.
He was running against Peabody
and there was no mileage in the corruption issue
with Peabody.
(p. 6-A)
Volpe's stinging defeat,
consumed much of November,

confirmed in a recount that

remains one of the most

significant upsets in recent Massachusetts political
history.

More salient to the present study is the legacy

of his first term as governor (Volpe would win a re-match
with Peabody in 1964),

particularly as it relates to

development of community colleges in the Commonwealth.
Conclusion
Most political observers would not list community
college development

(or education in general)

as a major

component of John Volpe's legacy between 1960-62.
himself,

Volpe,

referred to two-year colleges on only rare

occasions and almost never discussed their mission in any
thoughtful, much less, visionary manner.
During his initial term,

however,

funding increased

significantly for the planning and development community
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colleges.

This level of support,

Master Planning Commission,

along with passage of the

University Fiscal Autonomy and

the Medical School proposal, Volpe's record could be
interpreted as highly successful in public higher
education.
As noted earlier,

this record owed more to strong

legislative leadership than to the governor's vision.
Perhaps Volpe's greatest contributions lie in his
underlying acceptance that public education was a good
thing worthy of financial support and in his political
understanding at critical moments that education offered
the chance to upstage the Democrats on an issue close to
their policy core.
The community colleges also owed their growth under
Volpe's governorship to the MBRCC.
leadership of Kermit Morrissey,

Under the strong

the regional board used its

voice and legislative connections to push an agenda of
growth.

Chapter VII briefly reviews the role played by the

MBRCC between 1960-62.

196

CHAPTER

VII

THE MASSACHUSETTS BOARD OF REGIONAL COMMUNITY
COLLEGES: 1959-62

Chapters IV and V describe the political context
within which the community college program in Massachusetts
was born and nurtured between 1958 and 1962.

This chapter

looks within that context to identify a number of subtexts.
Specifically,

it examines the early activity of the

Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges,
analyzing the process which the MBRCC brought to its first
decisions regarding campus locations and institutional
mission.

It also presents a detailed summary of

appropriations which the MBRCC secured from the General
Court during the period in question,

as well as something

of the political dynaanic which inspired those
appropriations.

Finally,

this chapter examines the

Legislature's level of influence over the activities of the
regional community college board, particularly as the Board
designated sites for the first campuses.

Through this

examination of the MBRCC and legislative roles in community
college development,

the fundamental issue of gubernatorial

role comes into clearer focus.

This focus,

in turn,

illuminates a fundamental irony — why the pace of campus
planning and the level of state financial support both
appear to have increased in 1961-62 despite John Volpe's
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lack of policy attention relative to that which Foster
Furcolo brought to the issue.
Furcolo:

,

On January 21

Shaping the Board;
1959,

annual budget proposal,

1958-62

only days after submitting his

Governor Furcolo met with the new

Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges (MBRCC).
After formally swearing in the members,

the Governor

re-emphasized his commitment to the community college
program and "indicated that the facilities of the
governor's office,

the Commission on Administration,

and

the Special Commission on the Audit of State Needs would be
available to expedite the progrcim as rapidly as possible"
(MBRCC Minutes,

1/27/59).

One cannot adequately present Furcolo's impact on
Massachusetts community colleges without looking closely at
the governing board.

Through his influence over the

structure and temper of the MBRCC,

the governor arguably

left his most enduring legacy.
Furcolo's vision of community colleges,
Chapter V, was broad.

as noted in

He saw them as institutions of

access which would "meet the needs of all students"
(Interview, November 1988),

allowing individuals of all

socio-economic backgrounds to rise to the maximum of their
abilities through career preparation or transfer to
baccalaureate programs.

The governor left it to Malian,

Morissey,

and others to provide the details on issues of

mission.

His most profound contributions remain the
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conviction with which he fought for his broad vision,

the

infrastructure that he provided for the long-term
management of the system and his willingness to adopt a
political strategy which would achieve early progress
despite Massachusetts'

fiscal challenges and the persistent

doubts of naysayers.
Membership of the MBRCC
The Commission on the Audit of State Needs had
recommended that the regional community college board
consist of five gubernatorial appointees and four other
specifically defined members
Education,

(state Commissioner of

president of the University of Massachusetts,

president of Lowell Technical Institute and a president of
a state college elected by his or her peers) who would
serve overlapping five-year terms.
Chapter 605, which resulted from fine-tuning on the
part of the administration and members of the legislative
leadership expanded the board membership to fifteen and
mandated inclusion of
the Commissioner of Education, the president of
the University of Massachusetts, a president of a
state teachers college elected annually by
presidents of the state teachers colleges
including the Massachusetts School of Art, a
president of a Massachusetts technical institute
elected by the presidents of such technical
institutes and eleven members appointed by the
governor with the advice and consent of the
[executive] council, at least one of whom shall
be the president of a private college,
university, or junior college in the
Commonwealth.
(Chapter 605, Acts of 1958)
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The modifications in board composition allowed Furcolo
seven additional opportunities to exercise his power of
appointment.

They also ensured that key constituencies in

both private higher education and from public colleges and
universities would be drawn into collaboration with the new
community college program.

Finally,

it afforded at least

the slim possibility of co-opting the obstreperous
Education Commissioner Owen Kiernan,

long a foe of a

separate community college board beyond his direct control.
Chapter 605 also amended the Audit Commissioner's
recommendation concerning board tenure.

In the place of

staggered five-year terms for gubernatorial appointees,

it

mandated a somewhat more complex formula:
The governor in his initial appointments shall
designate three members to serve for six years,
three members to serve for five years, two
members for four years, one member for three
years, one member for two years, and one member
for one year.
Upon the expiration of the term of
office of the member of the board his successor
shall be appointed for a term of six years.
(Chapter 605, Acts of 1958)
The changes prescribed by the final community college
enabling legislation offered Furcolo the opportunity to
appoint individuals who would serve well after he had taken
his final walk down the statehouse steps.

The governor

used this opportunity to good advantage as over time he
appointed three of his most trusted allies to the MBRCC.
The appointments of Harris
board),

Morissey

(an original member of the

(appointed 11/61)

and Malian

(12/61)

ensured that the governor's interests would be voiced by

200

individuals who possessed sound academic credentials,
passion for the community college agenda,
political instincts. Most of all,

and solid

they guaranteed that his

vision of community college development would echo at least
throughout the mid-1960s.
Furcolo gave intense personal attention to selection
of the original board as well as to subseguent appointments
during his last term.

His seriousness of purpose was born

of both a personal commitment to the nascent

community

college program and a recognition that appointment of a
weak board would threaten the viability of that program.
Years later,

the governor elaborated on the basic criteria

he brought to board selection (videotape).
It was important to have people on that Board who
were of excellent character. ... We wanted to
get the best qualified people not only in terms
of standing and reputation in the community but
also from the point of view of being doers,
people who were willing to tackle a challenge and
something that would be new.
Now the reason for
this is that this was a brand new system.
We
wanted to try and build confidence in it and
trust in it.
We wanted the legislature and the
public in general to know that the best qualified
people possible were running these colleges.
We
also wanted to be certain that they were truly
non-political and bipartisan so that there could
be no question of the fact that they were doing
what was best for education and without any
political considerations of any kind.
For that
reason, we very carefully screened and selected
people who would serve on the community college
board.
(videotape)
Furcolo seems to have achieved his goal of appointing
a "non-partisan" group of "doers" who held an "interest in
education" and were "willing to take on a challenge."
Individuals appointed during the governor's tenure included
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Republican attorney Theodore Chase,
Harris,

Jaffe,

and Mather,

noted educators such as

and respected business leaders

such as Springfield's Roger Putnam.
credibility to the board,

Each brought

as well as sincere commitment to

the task of establishing a community college system
irrespective of the fact that initially they had almost no
money or broadbased statewide support.
The governor's assertion that he appointed a board
that would act "without any political consideration of any
kind" is less easy to substantiate and serves as a subject
for discussion later in this chapter.
Furcolo appears to have accepted some political
dynamic with his appointment of several MBRCC members who
brought with them the support of constituencies which were
important to the long-term health of the community college
program.

For example,

Old Colony Trust,

he appointed the chief executives of

the Massachusetts AFL-CIO and the

Massachusetts Congress of Parents and Teachers,

all with an

eye to the groups they represented (Brint & Karabel, p.
146).

As noted earlier,

the mandated inclusion of

representatives from private and public universities and
colleges as well as that of Kiernan similarly recognized
the need to bring potentially troublesome or important
constituencies under the tent.
The net result of Furcolo's efforts was a board
comprised of key educational advisors, major business
leaders and representatives of important constituencies —
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almost all of whom shared a commitment of rapid progress.
Brint and Karabel have written of this group:
Businessmen and educators on the Board worked
closely together.
As Furcolo had hoped, members
of the Board tended to view one another as people
capable of "getting things done."
Members of the
Board shared, above all, a strong commitment to
the signature elements of managerial culture:
efficiency and productivity . . . High praise was
reserved for those who were regarded as
results-oriented, hard-headed and effective.
(Brint & Karabel, 1989, p. 146)
The MBRCC quickly embarked on a five-part strategy
which centered around a consensus concerning the need to
get campuses established quickly.

The Board sought to

generate demand for colleges among residents,

government

officials and particularly business in key cities and
towns; to work with the civic and business leadership in
these communities to develop studies which would
demonstrate the need for a college;

to open temporary

campuses in available public buildings provided by local
communities; to seek donated land to serve as permanent
campuses;

and,

finally,

to work with the administration to

secure at least some operating monies to support the
program.
Costello

(interview. May 1993)

recalls that early

board discussions concerning campus locations focused on
two sites as "givens."
Cod,

The first was in Hyannis on Cape

home to both Senator Stone and the recently closed

Hyannis Teachers College.
Boston area.

The second was the Greater

During an interview with Lustberg,

recalled that "Cape Cod demonstrated need .
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.

Costello

. but it was

a Republican area,

represented by a Republican strong-man

and we thought that a community college there would give it
bipartisan support”
situation,
author,

(1979,

p.

141).

Of the Boston

Costello said in a May 1993 interview with this

"If we wanted long-term credibility we had to go to

the largest metropolitan area and the one with the largest
legislative delegation."
Pittsfield soon emerged as the third site for a campus
and,

in fact,

became the preferred location of the

inaugural project.

Its incarnation as the first community

college warrants a detailed examination.
Berkshire Community College:

Choosing the First Campus

The earliest efforts of the new regional community
college board focused on establishing the criteria for
location of the Commonwealth's first colleges.

The board

summarized these criteria in a retrospective report
presented to Furcolo in December 1959:
In order to determine sites for regional
community colleges in Massachusetts, it was
necessary to devise some method of assigning
priorities based upon, among other things,
greatest need, population, interest of people,
and services rendered by existing institutions of
higher education in the various areas.
The
current and potential secondary school junior
and/or senior student population of an area, for
example should be large enough to insure a
minimum enrollment necessary to offer enough
different programs to meet the needs of the
region and also to insure an economical
operation.
The interest of the people in the
region is also an important factor in determining
sites for community colleges.
The presence or
cLbsence of other college facilities in an area
considered for community colleges should be given
close attention.
The Board realized soon that
the need would probably be more urgent in regions
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without adequate college facilities.
Report, p. 36)

(Progress

The board needed an implementation plan which would
set community colleges in place quickly and with the
maximum local support.

To do this in a manner which also

demonstrated a viable educational need in the first
locations,

the MBRCC adopted a four-phase approach to

implementation:

Phase One — Prioritization of potential

community college sites statewide into three categories
(A,B,C)

according to "total population,

potential,

enrollment

and the extent educational needs are currently

being met by existing institutions of higher education"
(Progress Report,

p.

41).

Phase Two — Surveys of areas designated A,B,

or C in

priority to determine "(1) the level of interest of the
people in having a community college,
an institution in the area"

(2) the need for such

(Progress Report, p.

41).

Phase Three — Submission of findings in phase two to
the MBRCC to permit final prioritization of 1,
5

2,

3,

4,

or

(1 being highest and 5 the lowest priority).
Phase Four — Planning for community colleges in those

locations designated as Priority 1.

This planning included

appointment of "a core of administrative people for each
community college" and hiring of teachers "at least three
months or earlier [before opening of the college]
prepare the curriculum"

(Progress Report,

p.

to

43).

The preparation of Phase One by the Board was
influenced by the works of contemporary leaders in the
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community college movement such as Wattenbarger and
Martorana.

Each had completed studies concerning the

location of community colleges.

Wattenbarger's work had

been central to the establishment of Florida's two-year
college system.
Influenced by Wattenbarger and Martorana,

the MBRCC

determined that "for area priority A there should be a
minimum of 1,000 high school graduates within a commuting
radius of 20-30 miles of the community college to insure an
enrollment of at least 400 students in the two years
(Progress Report, p.

39).

This recommendation was

basically consistent with that of the Commission on the
Audit of State Needs.
Phase Two was particularly crucial to both the
governor and to the MBRCC.

Unless support could be

generated quickly and evidenced through the local

surveys,

the two-year college program could lose its viability.
The governor had sought to ensure grass roots support
through creation of local advisory groups as part of
Chapter 605.

These groups, which would advise individual

colleges as to local needs, were consistent with both
Furcolo's commitment to "citizen participation" and his
belief that community colleges could only survive through
development of core groups of supporters in cities and
towns throughout the Commonwealth.
Pittsfield seems,

at first blush,

an unlikely

contender to lead the way in meeting the criteria of the
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Board's first three phases.

A closer analysis,

however,

is

illuminating.
First,
Wojtkowski,

Pittsfield was home to Representative
whose steady support had been crucial to

passage of the community college legislation and whose
position on the powerful Ways and Means Committee made him
important to community college funding.
go so far as to write that

Brint and Karabel

"the location of the first

college in the relatively isolated Berkshire mountain town
of Pittsfield discharged the Board's debt to Pittsfield's
representative,

Thomas Wojtkowski”

To their great credit,

(1989.

however,

p.

146).

Wojtkowski and his

allies in Pittsfield had worked diligently to enhance the
city's status as a potential college site.

For example,

the

representative had compiled data showing the need for a
college to provide technical and transfer education in
Pittsfield during his

1956 effort

to pass community

college legislation.
Moreover,

Wojtkowski had campaigned tirelessly to

build local enthusiasm for a community college in
Pittsfield and had identified a former high school in the
downtown as a temporary site.

Costello recalls that

"Tom

had compiled a great deal of data which essentially served
as a local study.

And,

of course,

a temporary site"

(interview,

June

he had worked to identify
1,

1993).

Sensing the prospects for a successful campus
start-up,

the MBRCC quickly sent Thomas O'Connell,
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a

consultant in its employ

(and eventually the first

president of Berkshire Community College),

to meet with

senior executives of General Electric and the Berkshire
Eagle to push for rapid completion of the formal study
(MBRCC Minutes).

Members of the Board were also actively

engaged in the effort to achieve success.
that Putnam and Dr.

Stanley Salwak

Minutes reflect

(a University of

Massachusetts professor who served as a consultant to the
MBRCC)
as 1959

encouraged local activity in the Berkshires as early
(MBRCC Minutes,

April 22,

1959).

Dr. Salwak stated that both he and Mr.
Putnam had been hard at work.
Both had been in
the Pittsfield area and suggested that a pilot
program might be set up ... In addition both he
and Mr. Putnam met with professional and leading
citizens of Pittsfield in order to determine
first hand any interest in having such an
institution in their town.
They also met with
other people in the Northern Berkshire area and
nearly every other community and thoroughly
discussed the need and possibility.
Costello, who visited other communities as a
member of the staff, recalls that it was not
uncommon to use significant energy building local
demand for community colleges (Costello
interview. May 1993)
Brint and Karabel also emphasize the role played by
the Board in helping to create local demand for community
colleges,

particularly among businesses:

In the local communities, the Board's promotional
efforts were usually channeled through
major
economic interests and most often through local
chambers of commerce.
There were practical
political reasons for this:
the leading
businessmen were often the most influential
forces in local political affairs.
If they could
be convinced of a project's usefulness, the
project stood a good chance of acceptance. But
the Board also saw the economic appeal the
college might have for employers.
The colleges
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were promoted for their potential not only to
bring new customers to local businesses but also
to provide better and more cheaply trained
workers.
(1989, p. 147)
In reviewing the Berkshire study,

the Board professed

to being persuaded on at least four counts
Report,

p.

(Progress

52):

1.

Pittsfield's lack of established colleges
open to county residents and isolation from
other areas where there are colleges.

2.

The large number of high school graduates in
the Pittsfield area with no place to go to
college and the resultant low college-going
percentage and high indication of reported
interest by present high school seniors in
attending a community college.

3.

The availability of a rent-free building in
Pittsfield (the Central High School) which
could be used, with some renovation, by the
college on a sharing basis with the
Pittsfield School System during the 1960-61
school year, and in its entirety by the
college starting in September 1961.

4.

The availability in the Pittsfield area of
qualified teachers for a wide range of
standard and specific subjects.
(p. 52)

Furcolo and the senior members of his administration
also saw a compelling logic in Pittsfield's candidacy to
host the first community college.

Most significant was the

fact that the college could open quickly and enjoyed the
support of both a significant member of the General Court
and the backing of major local business and community
leaders.

Morissey summarized the administration's position

many years later

(videotape):

Berkshire would not rank in the top priority of
the state population-wise or need-wise. But they
were spending a great deal of money in Berkshire
County training technicians to serve the needs of
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General Electric in that part of the state.
So
with a massive technical need in that part of the
state and with substantial local support — from
the Miller family, the newspapers and just about
everybody out there was in favor of it — we went
for an appropriation . . .
The MBRCC was prepared by mid-1959 to recommend that a
community college open in Pittsfield in Fall
an initial student population of

1960 and serve

125 students.

Those

students would pay a maximum tuition of $200 and take
classes in Central High School

(MBRCC Minutes,

April 22,

1959).
Renovations to the school were slated to come from the
1958 capital outlay of $1 million.
however,

Still unanswered,

was the question of where to find operating

dollars for the new Ccunpus as well as how the MBRCC would
obtain a general operating budget to sustain its operations
and its efforts to open additional colleges.
The administration's decision to support the MBRCC in
its

1959 bid to secure an initial appropriation of to seed

its efforts in Pittsfield was a critical first test of
community college viability.

The proposal immediately fell

prey to attacks from opponents who were not prepared to
support new spending by the MBRCC absent a fully completed
master plan.

Ultimately,

despite active lobbying by the

governor and the support of Speaker Thompson,

the

appropriation failed in 1959 on a roll call vote in the
House

(Morissey,

videotape).

The administration and the MBRCC each recognized that
the entire community college program was in jeopardy.
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It

was critical to earn another vote on the appropriation and
secure a victory.
The governor turned to Boston and Maine Railroad
General Counsel and former state senator Joseph Mulhern to
lead the MBRCC and nail down the appropriation.

Mulhern

was considered a power on Beacon Hill who controlled a
strong lobbying network. Mahoney points out that Furcolo
believed Mulhern's strength in the legislature could
neutralize opponents such as Senator William Fleming
(R-Worcester) who continued to oppose the governor from his
position on the Ways and Means Committee
interview,

July 25,

1993).

(Mahoney

Mahoney also recalls a certain

level of amazement on the part of Mulhern as to the
governor's intensity in pursuing him to join the Board
(Mahoney interview,

July 25,

1993).

The governor and Mulhern agreed that the latter would
assume the chairmanship of the MBRCC from Putnam until the
initial appropriation could be secured.

At that time,

Mulhern would resign from the Board and re-focus on his
other interests (Mahoney interview,

July 25,

1993).

Morissey described Mulhern as "just a good tough guy"
who brought "some muscle to the Board" and allowed it to
"take the appropriations process seriously"

(videotape).

He also emphasized the critical role which Mulhern played
during his short tenure as chair (videotape):
It was the governor's theory that once the first
appropriation was made it would be all done, and,
of course, he was correct. The critical vote was
the first vote.
Joe Mulhern took the job as
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chair in December 1959 and served until summer
1960; got the appropriation; Berkshire opened in
Fall 1960; he resigned from the Board; and I
became chair . . .
The appropriation
April

13,1960)

(Chapter 318 of the Acts of

1960,

which Mulhern's power helped to secure as

part of a general supplemental funding bill in April
provided $82,950
Pittsfield."

1960

for "the regional community college in

Most of all,

it provided a critical

foundation for subsequent appropriations to support the
opening of other regional colleges.

The first Berkshire

appropriation appears to be a watershed in the early
funding history of the community college program.
provides a chronological

Table

1

listing of all appropriations to

the community college board and to individual colleges
between 1958-62.

It is interesting to contrast the funding

pattern which preceded the April
the pattern which followed.

1960 appropriation with

Before April

1960,

Furcolo and

the Board had confronted a series of hurdles in setting the
community college program on a sound fiscal base.
than the $1 million capital outlay appropriation of

Other
1958,

the governor and the MBRCC could point to only a single
$25,000 appropriation for administration of the program
which had been included as part of an April
supplemental budget
1959).

(Chapter 171,

Acts of

1959

1959,

April

6,

So bleak had been the prognosis for community

college funding amid Furcolo's continuing difficulties in
the Legislature,

his sales tax defeats and his continued

public emphasis on the Commonwealth's fiscal difficulties.
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that the governor had not even requested additional funding
for the MBRCC in his formal budget proposal for Fiscal Year
1960

(House 1,

January 12,

1959).

Moreover,

no additional

capital dollars for community colleges were included in a
major special outlay of September 1959,

despite the fact

that the bill ultimately included over $12 million in
higher education projects
September 17,

(Chapter 604,

Acts of 1959,

1959).

The outlook through much of early 1960 appeared little
rosier.

The administration slashed the MBRCC's budget

request of $200,699 to a figure of $85,521 in the
governor's budget proposal for Fiscal Year 1961
25,

1960).

(January

Until Mulhern lifted the Berkshire

appropriation out of the Legislature,

the administration

and the MBRCC were left to create a community college out
of high intentions,

singleness of purpose and a near-empty

operating account.
By contrast,

two major operating appropriations and a

significant capital appropriations followed in 1960 on the
heels of the Berkshire vote.

A general supplemental which

passed in June included over $71,000 to support
administration of the MBRCC and to begin development of
colleges in metropolitan Boston as well as Northeastern and
Southeastern sections of the Commonwealth.

A second

infusion of $83,000 in operating dollars to support the
same ends followed in a November supplemental
Acts of

1960).

Finally,

(Chapter 784,

a special capital outlay bill of
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November 1960 included an appropriation of $300,000 to
augment the $1 million outlay of 1958

(Chapter 774, Acts of

1960).
Furcolo had been right; the first appropriation was
key to provide momentum behind community college
development.

With the appropriation of April 1960,

Berkshire became a physical and political inevitability.
This reality,

in turn,

catalyzed a reaction among other

environmental factors which ultimately led to a series of
larger appropriations in 1961 and 1962.
The ironic outcome of this reaction is that while
Foster Furcolo's energy and policy focus made the community
college program a reality,

it was the far less engaged John

Volpe whose first administration witnessed nearly $2
million in critical new funding for two-year college
expansion and operations.
This irony,
inspired it,

and the environmental factors which

deserve some focused discussion.

factors are particularly important.
discussed,

First,

Three

already

is the momentum created by the 1960 Berkshire

appropriation.

Second is the approach of Volpe whose

surface disengagement belies a sophisticated strategic
position.

Third is the fiscal status of the Commonwealth

which had begun to show signs of improvement by mid-1960,
an improvement which inspired renewed interest on the part
of legislators to spend.

Fourth,

arguably most important,

is the active involvement of legislative leaders who,
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in

the face of a tangible post-Chapter 318 community college
initiative in Pittsfield, were not to be left at the
starting line in securing campuses for their districts.
Fifth,

there remains the role played by the MBRCC.

This

group of largely Furcolo "doers" maintained fidelity to its
maxim that community colleges must be set in place quickly
so as to ensure the program's long-term viability.
Volpe 1961-62
The conclusion of Foster Furcolo's governorship ended
a unique period of executive branch focus on community
college development.

Never in the more than thirty years

since has a governor dedicated such energy and emphasis to
two-year college growth.
to his labors,

And yet,

thanks in good measure

community colleges have survived and grown

in the commonwealth.
John Volpe,

as noted in Chapter VI,

came to power with

a different set of policy priorities and political
exigencies than did his predecessor.
self-made Republican businessman,

A builder and

he pursued a legacy of

government reform and completion of major construction
projects.

Surrounded by Democratic majorities in both

houses and facing an increasingly Democratic sentiment
cunong voters, Volpe held a tenuous mandate.

To survive

required acute political antennae and an ability to corner
the Democrats on difficult issues such as corruption while
stealing their thunder on matters such as education.
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Partially because of his inherently fragile position,
Volpe's term is rich in ironies concerning the community
college program.

MBRCC minutes indicate only two meetings

during the period 1961-62 at which senior administration
budget officials were in attendance

(as opposed to the

regular attendance of Morissey and Mahoney during Furcolo's
governorship).

Volpe's personal papers reflect almost no

focus on issues of community college development or
mission.

Newspaper accounts from the period rarely link

the governor to two-year colleges and Volpe's major
speeches only refer to community colleges in the most
general manner.
And yet,

during his first administration,

opened in Boston,

Hyannis,

colleges

and Haverhill; MBRCC efforts to

open colleges in Worcester and Greenfield intensified; and
budget appropriations to the MBRCC and to individual
schools increased markedly.
The community college program which Volpe found upon
coming to power appealed to his self-made experience as
well as to his political instincts.
established;

The program was

it was slowly developing a core of business

support in municipalities across the Commonwealth; key
legislators were seeking colleges for their districts; the
budget situation was improved to the point where some
increased spending was perceived as acceptable; Forman and
the Globe were beginning to rumble about unmet needs.
all these reasons,

For

despite his limited policy interests in
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community colleges, Volpe had much to gain from supporting
reasonable growth in the program and little to gain by
standing in its way.
Thus,

it is not surprising that in their first meeting

with the new governor on February 10,

1961, Morissey Chase,

and Putnam found Volpe "understanding and sympathetic,
ready to discuss the Board's problems at any time"
Minutes,

February 20,

(MBRCC

1961).

The Minutes of the MBRCC meetings during the first
Volpe term reflect only two substantive policy interactions
with the governor.

First,

on March 20,

1961, Assistant to

the Budget Commissioner, William Bixby, met with the Board
to relay the governor's request for consideration of a
tuition increase.

Beyond a cursory discussion and simple

reply concerning the Board's rationale for a tuition
consistent with other public higher education institutions,
there is no evidence that this policy discussion continued
beyond the next meeting.
The second policy interaction between the governor and
the Board came with Volpe's request for a ten-year plan
from the MBRCC.
annual address,

This request came during Volpe's second
as the pressure for an education Master

Plan was peaking.
February 23,

The report presented by the Board on

1962 received little public notice and there

is so evidence that it drew any extraordinary attention
from Volpe.
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Perhaps the most intriguing of Volpe's decisions
concerning the Board was his willingness to leave Kermit
Morissey as chair during his entire first term in office.
Under Chapter 605,

the governor held the right "to

periodically appoint a chairman"
1958).

(Chapter 605, Acts of

Thus, Volpe could have removed his predecessor's

close ally from the chairmanship and offer the political
plum to a loyal Republican.
When Mulhern resigned following achievement of the
community college appropriation in 1960,

Furcolo was a

soon-to-be defeated candidate for the United States Senate.
By this time, Morissey had left the administration to
become assistant to Brandeis President Abraham Zachar.
a major step toward insuring his legacy on the Board,

In
the

outgoing governor reached an agreement with Zachar allowing
Morissey to assume the chairmanship.
Immediately Morissey became the Board's lifeblood.
Irrepressibly candid,

politically sophisticated,

passionately committed to community colleges,

and

he led the

Board through the power of his personality and the strength
of his convictions.

He was Board Chair in title and chief

executive officer in fact.
To remove Morissey as chair would have created a
significant vacuum in leadership of the MBRCC.

With this

loss of leadership would likely come a slowdown in
community college expansion;
failed to serve Volpe's end.

a prognosis which ultimately
Moreover, Morissey held

218

respect in both the Legislature and in the academic world.
Volpe could work with Morissey and the governor had no
interest in creating problems at the MBRCC which would draw
him from more pressing issues.

Again,

the short-term

rewards of replacing Morissey with a Republican loyalist
did not outweigh the longer-term risks.
It is interesting to note Volpe's appointments to the
Board.

The governor's appointments to the MBRCC during the

period 1961-62,

including Reverend Richard Sullivan,

President of Stonehill College,
Asa Knowles, were serious,
advantageous.

and Northeastern President

if also politically

Furcolo himself, much later, would

acknowledge that his successors,

including Volpe,

maintained a standard of excellence in their appointments
to the regional college board (Videotape).
Thus in his board appointments,
retain Morissey as chair,

his willingness to

and his general willingness to

support campus expansion, Volpe kept faith with the
community college program.

In doing so,

he allowed what

was essentially a Furcolo board to continue the former
governor's strategy of establishing campuses quickly to
generate sustainable momentum as he remained above the fray
concerning legislative influence over campus locations.
The consummate irony,

summarized in Table 1,

is that it was

the Volpe administration which provided the greatest early
infusion of monetary support to develop the early campuses

219

in Haverhill, Cape Cod, Worcester and Greenfield while also
providing additional support to Berkshire.
On the issue of community college expansion, as with
others in education, Volpe seemed comfortable to ride the
wave others had created.

Community colleges had developed

a certain momentum by 1961.

Money was increasingly

available and key legislators (several with a particular
interest in higher education) were prepared to spend it on
visible projects in their districts.

Education was a hot

issue thanks largely to Forman and Menzies and the upcoming
Master Planning effort.
Volpe's strategy appears to have revolved around
securing a place in line when credit for educational
expansion.

Community colleges ("the people's colleges")

were on track and Volpe, who endorsed their purposes, was
more than willing to share the limelight for their
successes.
The Legislature and Early Decisions Concerning Campus
Location
The Legislature's role in shaping the early community
college program during the period 1961-62 has received some
scholarly attention.

Most notably. Coles and Lustberg have

discussed the influence of key legislators in pressuring
the Board to open campuses in specific locations.
It is important, before discussing the legislative
role in detail, to briefly note the environmental realities
which help to define that role during the period in
question.
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First, by early in Furcolo's second term, the
Massachusetts fiscal picture had begun to show signs of
improvement.

The national recession of the mid-1950s had

bottomed out and employment in Massachusetts had begun to
tick upward.

Republicans had used this changing economic

picture to their advantage in battling Furcolo's 1958
unemployment relief bill, citing increases in employment
numbers as well as a general improvement in the
Commonwealth's economy.

This enhanced fiscal picture was

further confirmed by a surprising surplus at the end of
Fiscal Year 1958

(Brint & Karabel, p.

145_).

The Massachusetts economy was well-poised for growth
by 1961.

The nation had entered a period of sustained

growth, which the Kennedy tax cuts would soon reinforce.
Continued high levels of defense spending and dollars spent
to jump-start the space program was particularly helpful to
the Massachusetts economy with its heavy concentration of
research universities.
This economic growth and renewal optimism fed the most
traditional instincts of the now Democratic Legislature.
Influenced by an activist President whom most knew
personally, the Democratic leadership was positioned to
exercise its pent-up demand to private government to work
in pursuit of a liberal social policy agenda.

For young

Democrats who were entering leadership positions such as
Donohue, Wojtkowski, and Harrington, education was central
to this agenda.
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Volpe, although a Republican, was a moderate political
temperament.

A self-made man, devoid of Brahmin roots, he

believed government had a role to play.

Moreover, if he

were to survive politically, he had to catch the wave of
positive energy established by the nation's young
president.

These were the days of Kennedy, not Coolidge,

and if a Republican were to succeed in Massachusetts, he
had best represent progress.
As the legislature and the Board pressed for community
expansion and general reform, Volpe joined the parade.

He

pressed for hefty budget increases for the MBRCC and he
supported each new Cconpus which the Board voted to
establish.

His support was steady, if far more understated

than Furcolo's.

Mostly he stayed out of the way, allowing

the Legislature and the Board to fill the void.
Funding of the community college program was the most
obvious leverage which the legislature held in the process
of opening the commonwealth's first community colleges.
Debate has continued through the years as to the role
played by legislators in determining the location of
individual campuses and their sequence of opening.
The few studies available which discuss the
establishment of Massachusetts community colleges focus on
the Legislature's role in site selection.

Cole (1977)

argues both that in a number of instances there is a direct
relationship between participants in .

.

. key legislative

roles and the location of opening dates of the community
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colleges"

(p. 2).

Lustberg writes that "as we do down the

list of foundings we find one story of political
interference after another"

(1979, p.

141).

Brint and

Karabel assert simply that "legislative influence
contributed to these first location decisions"

(citation).

To illustrate his argument Lustberg (1979, p.

141)

points to a chain of events related to the decision to
establish Cape Cod Community College.
from its April,

The MBRCC minutes

1960 meeting reflect some internal debate

as to Cape Cod's application.

Between April and June,

Lustberg points out that Senator Fleming called Roger
Putnam threatening to delay $75,000 slated for the MBRCC
unless the Board declared its support for community
colleges in Cape Cod, Haverhill (represented by long-time
Senate Ways and Means power, John Rurak) and Boston.
Lustberg guotes Morissey as saying that Fleming further
demanded that preparation begin for a campus in his home
city of Worcester (thus setting in motion the process that
led to establishment of Quinsigamond Community College in
1963), despite Costello's difficulty in generating either
significant local support or a donated temporary facility.
By June of 1960, the Board had given final support to the
Cape Cod and Boston sites and had begun the push for a
Worcester campus.
There is no denying that politics played a significant
role in the locations of Massachusetts community colleges.
Wojtkowski, in fact, once went so far as to say that "the

223

House of Representatives is the Board of Trustees of the
community colleges”

(Lustberg,

1979, p.

140).

If one acknowledges the fact that politics played a
substantive role in the siting process,
to what end?
this point,

then one must ask

While Chapter IX will elaborate further on
it is fair to make a number of observations at

thus juncture.
The central thesis of Cole's 1977 paper,

"The Dynamics

of Non-Planning in the Massachusetts Community College
System,

1958-1972" is that undue political influence was

used to site the Commonwealth's system of colleges and that
the influence of Senate House Ways and Means Committee
members was particularly pervasive.
Cole argues that a number of adverse effects resulted
from this legislative influence.

First,

any serious planning effort by the MBRCC,

that it usurped
such as that

called for both by Furcolo and by the Special Commission on
the Audit of State Needs.

In concluding her paper,

she

writes:
As a result of the dominant role played by the
state legislature in determining the location of
the community college system and the order in
which they opened, the Massachusetts community
college system today is a collection of
institutions located in areas which are not
always convenient to the population centers of
the state or to the communities where there is a
high percentage of college-age youth not pursuing
post secondary education.
(p. 20)
Cole further argues that in establishing the Berkshire
campus in temporary facilities provided by Pittsfield and
by accepting land donated by Barnstable for the permanent
224

Cape Cod college,

the MBRCC set a dangerous precedent which

limited its options concerning the locations of future
campuses and led to formalization of Board policies
concerning the opening of colleges in temporary space and
the requirement that communities provide land for permanent
campuses.

As Cole summarized:

Both these policies were based on the precedents
set by the willingness of the City of Pittsfield
to provide a temporary facility at no cost for
what became the first community college in the
system and the Town of Barnstable to give the
land for a permanent campus for Cape Cod
Community College, the second college opened.
While the original legislation for the community
college system had not specified these
conditions, once communities set the precedents,
the state legislature resisted appropriating
funds for the rental of temporary facilities or
the purchase of land for permanent campuses.
Instead of confronting this resistance, the MBRCC
followed the lead of the legislature and adopted
these precedents as policies for the community
college system.
The Board's support of these
policies extended to initiating legislation
making it legal for communities to raise local
taxes in order to purchase land for the Board.
(p. 21)
While Cole's arguments are reasoned and persuasive,
one must reach deeper to fully analyze the politics of
establishing the Massachusetts community college system.
First,

it is important to remember that there was no great

early groundswell of local support in any major city or
region behind two-year colleges.

As Mahoney correctly

recalls:
You must remember that at first there was no
outpouring of demand for these colleges.
As
such, we were prepared to work with anyone who
was prepared to work with us.
(Interview, July
27, 1993)

225

Wojtkowski and Stone were ready.

They offered

arrangements that would allow early tangible results for
the MBRCC,

potentially leverage additional appropriations

for expansion to other communities

(particularly given

Wojtkowski's and Stone's positions on the Ways and Means
Committees of their respective houses) and repay a
political debt for their service in passage of Chapter 605
and the initial capital appropriation.
Costello argues that, particularly in these early
difficult days when the MBRCC lacked either resources or
strong community support statewide,

the Board "used"

legislative figures to set colleges in place and to secure
appropriations

(Lustberg,

club at the Board's neck,

1979, p.

144).

Rather than a

legislative pressure may in fact

have been one of the few points of leverage by which
Furcolo and the MBRCC could achieve the goal of rapidly
establishing campuses.
It also deserves note that not every legislator who
desired a college was able to secure one.

Lustberg points

specifically to Stone's foiled attempt to establish a
second college on the Cape

(1979, p.

145)

and the continued

failure of Quincy to acquire a public community college in
the city (1979, p.

144).

Board minutes from late 1961 and

early 1962 reflect strong and formal Board opposition to
legislative mandates concerning college locations, most
notably concerning bills filed by legislators from Quincy
and Lynn calling for colleges in their cities
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(MBRCC

Minutes, December 18,

1961 and January 13,

1962).

Costello

holds that such cases are evidence that while "we certainly
listened to what the Legislature had to say,

its input was

not always decisive."
A final point can be made,

at least in terms of the

Board's decisions concerning Pittsfield,
and Worcester.

Cape Cod,

Boston

Each of these sites was an original part of

the Audit of State Needs Master Plan.

While it is true

that the planning process was probably far less formal than
that originally envisioned by the Commission or by Furcolo,
the fact remains that the first three campuses opened by
fall,

1961 did so in regions consistent with those

identified by the Audit Commission as having need.
Early Discussions on Mission and Philosophy:

1959-1962

The MBRCC's focus during the period 1959-62 was
clearly on issues of campus location and funding.
Comparatively little time was spent on matters related to
mission or educational philosophy.
When issues of mission were raised,
dichotomy appears in the Board's minutes.

an interesting
On the one hand,

MBRCC members were clearly committed to developing a
curriculum that was responsive to the labor force needs of
local businesses.

This commitment inclined the Board

toward occupational and community service programming;

an

inclination which grew in no small part from the Board's
quest to earn local business support.

227

On the other hand,

the MBRCC was not prepared to cast

its lot completely with an occupational program.

Its

members perceived the need for a strong liberal arts and
transfer foundation in order to achieve academic
credibility for the two-year colleges.

Clark (1960)

as

well as Jencks and Riesman (1969) have argued that
community colleges have traditionally lacked the capacity
to shape their own identity in that much of their curricula
and academic status depends on acceptance by baccalaureate
institutions.

As Brint and Karabel have summarized,

this

dependency played a role in Massachusetts:
Given the Board's curricular preferences (for
occupational programs), it may seem surprising
that the colleges themselves initially
concentrated on developing liberal arts rather
than occupational programs.
Little real
contradiction existed, however.
Key Board
members and campus officials understood clearly
that the legitimacy of the colleges depended on
their acceptance as institutions of higher
education, which meant their offering liberal
arts courses closely resembling those offered in
four-year colleges and universities.
As Kermit
Morissey recalled, "Liberal arts gave
respectability—the steunp of legitimacy.
The
standards for higher education were standards of
private colleges ... a six-week training
program for secretaries would not have been
regarded as higher education.
The transfer part
had to be nailed down first."
(1989, p. 148)
In order to understand this tug-of-war concerning
mission,

it is important to consider the historical context

within which the MBRCC operated.

Three points are

particularly salient in this regard.
First,

the nation in 1958-62 stood at the height of

the Cold War,

confronting a clear and seemingly monolithic
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foe on the world stage.

This conflict framed public policy

on almost every major federal and state issue.

Sputnik had

placed education at the center of the Cold War in 1957,
convincing many Americans that their country's scientific
and technical skills lagged dangerously behind those found
in the Soviet Union.

And,

as Brint and Karabel summarize,

this perception of inferiority ’’encouraged national elites
to take a greater interest in community college vocational
programs”

(1989, p.

Second,

83).

the 1950s and 1960s witnessed an extraordinary

growth in college enrollments due to the G.I.
post-war baby boom.

Bill and the

This enrollment pressure, which

profoundly influenced Furcolo and other political and
educational leaders in the nation,

created a demand for

higher education that the elite universities and colleges
neither could nor wanted to meet.

The result was both a

remarkable increase in community college enrollments and an
intensification of the debate as to what the two-year
college mission should be.
Third,

the 1950s and early 1960s was a period of

relative affluence and optimism in the United States,

a

time of unequalled military and economic stature in world
affairs.

Americans generally accepted the premise that

through hard work and innate ability,

individuals from any

social or economic strata could improve their stations.
And despite fiscal concerns such as those expressed by
Furcolo or outrage over the occasional political scandal.
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there remained an underlying pre-Vietnam and pre-Watergate
faith that government and its institutions could and should
contribute to the public welfare in a positive way.
The Cold War and the socio-economic forces at play in
the United States combined to strengthen the appeal of
community colleges.

Much of this appeal was rooted in the

notion of "meritocracy”—the principle that community
colleges allowed access to higher education by students of
all socio-economic classes who would,
their maximum levels of ability.
process,

in turn,

achieve at

In this sorting-out

community colleges would filter their most

talented students through to baccalaureate institutions
(who would thus be saved the pressure of potential freshmen
banging on their doors).

For the rest—the majority—

community colleges would provide a meaningful outlet,
allowing them to contribute to an increasingly technical
economy that required more than basic manual skills.
One of the leading voices for such a system was
Harvard's James Conant, who had first argued for a
"differentiation in higher education" in his 1948 work
Education in a Divided World.
summarized,

As Brint and Karabel have

Conant called for a higher education system

that "was at once meritocratic and technocratic."
Through Conant's discussion of junior colleges in
Education in a Divided World was frcuned in the
context of his very genuine desire to expand
educational opportunities, his specific vision of
community colleges emphasized that they "should
be defined as terminal two-year colleges."
While
subscribing to the official AAJC (American
Association of Junior Colleges) ideology that the
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junior college should be a "comprehensive"
institution offering college preparatory, general
and vocational programs, his clear preference was
for the terminal functions.
(1948, p. 200)
Conant's arg\iments and those of other like-minded
voices combined with demographic and socio-economic
realities in the post-war United States to influence the
leadership of public higher education across the country.
Brint and Karabel

(1989)

have summarized the debate

concerning the two-year college mission which occurred in
the AAJC beginning in the
"vocationists"

1930s.

By the 1950s,

(those favoring a terminal,

focus at community colleges)
prominence in the

the

occupational

had gained a position of

junior college movement over the

traditionalists who favored a preeminent emphasis on
liberal arts and transfer.
The AAJC leadership,
the position of Koos,

by 1959,

Conant,

had essentially adopted

and others

that while

academic credibility lie in the liberal arts,

it would be

occupational programs which would provide long-term
viability to community colleges.

It would be vocational

programs which would allow two-year colleges to emerge as a
clearly definable identity in American education,

enjoying

the support of key constituencies such as small business.
The influence of Conant and others can be seen in the
so-called California Master Plan which was implemented
under the leadership of that state's university president,
Clark Kerr.

According to Brint and Karabel,

the plan was

"widely viewed as a model in providing for both broad
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public access and the maintenance of academic excellence,"
while

"diverting large numbers of matriculating students

away from the state colleges and universities"

(1989,

p.

).

86

In projecting a limitation of 41 percent by 1975 in
the number of lower division students attending
California's senior institutions,

the Master Plan combined

open admissions at community colleges with progressively
restrictive criteria at the state college and universities.
Thus was the number of lower division students in the top
two segments limited
goal,

(Brint and Karabel,

in the words of the plan,

1989,

was to insure that

best students get into the right institutions"
Brint and Karabel,

1989,

meeting of the MBRCC,

p.

p.

87).

Thus,

86).

The

"the

(Quoted in

by the first

the curricular emphasis of the

national community college movement was clearly leaning
toward occupational programs.
noted,

".

.

As Brint and Karabel have

.by 1959 the battles in the AAJC between the

traditionalists and the vocationalizers were well on their
way toward being resolved in factor of the vocational wing"
(1989,

p.

148).

Conant and others in the forefront of the debate over
the two-year college mission were invited to address the
MBRCC during early 1959.
President Elbert K.

On March 10,

Fretwell,

Jr.

Conant and SUNY

spoke to the Board

concerning the mission of two-year colleges.

232

Minutes of the meeting reflect that Conant pointed to
California as a model system referring positively to the
concept of a "filtering process"
key to a good program,

and saying that

as in California,

the state university play the same role"
March 10,

1959).

"the whole

would be to have
(MBRCC minutes,

Conant also focused his remarks on "the

terminal student",

arguing that such a student

develop skills in specialized fields."

"must

He further argued

that the needs of the terminal student made it particularly
"important to have a community college set up so that a
student may readily commute;
area;

discover the needs of the

hire a good man to run it and let him handle the

local situation."
Fretwell spoke of the New York experience,

focusing on

the importance of local involvement and support of two-year
colleges.

He argued that

"programs are adopted not only to

the needs of local high school graduates but also to the
needs of the community"

(MBRCC minutes,

In subsequent months,

S.

V.

Martarana

and Welfare)
the AAJC)

(U.S.

and Edmund J.

campuses,

For example,

Department of Health,
Gleazer

on March
Education

(Executive Director of

participated in a panel discussion of the fifth

meeting of the Board.
the Board,

1959).

other noted leaders in the

educational world met with MBRCC.
25,

March 10,

Each discussed the policy role of

various criteria to consider in locating
the relation of two-year colleges to the

university and the balance between transfer and terminal
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programs.

Gleazer argued that vocational and technical

curricula were particularly important for Massachusetts
"because of the need for a continued supply of trained
technicians and skilled workers"

(MBRCC Minutes, March 25,

1959).
The Board's desire to create both a credible liberal
arts cornerstone and a strong vocational program which
focused on the needs of local businesses is evident in its
recommendations concerning curricula at Berkshire.
First,

the MBRCC called for "a Liberal Arts offering

to prepare students for transfer for four-year institutions
for their last two years":
At first this program should be modeled carefully
on the freshman-sophomore progrcum offerings of
the University of Massachusetts so that
Pittsfield Community College students who do well
can plan to transfer to the University. This is
not to say that all transfer students of the
Pittsfield Community College will or should plan
to attend the University of Massachusetts for
their last two years. The standards of the
Pittsfield Community College should be high
enough to provide students who do well with the
possibility of transferring to any one of a
number of four-year institutions.
(Progress
Report, p. 55)
The language of the MBRCC consistently places
community college liberal arts progrcuns in a subservient
position to those at four-year institutions.

Standards are

to be set by baccalaureate colleges and universities with
two-year colleges left to appreciate the fact that senior
institutions would consider some number of transfer
students.

As the MBRCC wrote of the University of

Massachusetts,

"there is a clear advantage to using the
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excellent University of Massachusetts programs as a basis
for developing the Pittsfield Community College liberal
arts or transfer program,

particularly since the University

has expressed its willingness to take as transfer students
in the

junior year a number of those Pittsfield Community

college graduates who do well"

(Progress Report,

p.

56).

The Board envisioned a single vocational program for
Berkshire's first year.

The program would train electrical

technicians and "would parallel the apprenticeship course
conducted by the Pittsfield School System for tool makers
and draftsmen for 13th and 14th year level students"
(Progress Report,

p.

56).

Designed with the needs of

General Electric clearly in mind,

the electrical

technicians program would be the first of an expanding
number of vocational initiatives:
The Board's plan is to increase the number of
offerings at Pittsfield to include one or two
more occupational programs as the need becomes
apparent.
These might be in the areas of
mechanical (as distinct from electrical)
technology and business (including accounting and
secretarial courses.
(Progress Report, p. 57)
Governor Furcolo and his aides appear to have been
satisfied to leave specific curricular discussions to the
MBRCC.

The administration's goals remained to see colleges

start and succeed quickly,
comprehensive program,

to push generally for a

to secure sufficient funding and

local enthusiasm to set the colleges and the Board on a
reasonably firm footing and to maintain a Board whose
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character was one of integrity and whose predisposition was
to action.
MBRCC minutes and interviews indicate that Governor
Volpe expressed no more interest in the details of mission
than did Furcolo.

The only tangible expression of any such

interest is found in his 1962 annual address request that
the MBRCC develop a ten-year plan.

This request,

however,

came amid the push for a statewide educational master plan
and probably grew more from political strategy than
personal policy priority.
The ten-year plan which the Board sent to Volpe in
February 1962 provides a lens into the Board's long-term
projections as to campus development,
program emphases.

enrollment levels and

The report's brief discussion concerning

programs warrants remark.

This section focuses on three

program areas in which it argues a "distinct probability
that over the next decade the nation will experience a
great upsurge of interest"
First,

(p.

5).

the Board points to

"technical-vocational

programs with the recommendations that in areas in which
finely equipped technological
public auspices,

facilities do not exist under

these facilities should be established in

community colleges."

Second,

on "shorter re-training

,

the Board calls for emphasis

refresher programs,

and upgrading

programs — as required by increasing technological
requirements and,

especially,

automation."

Finally,

Board indicates the need for "general studies,
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the

as developed

out of the growing realization that alert men and women
capable of voting intelligently need opportunities to keep
abreast of the times under able and exciting teachers"

(p.

5).
None of these three program areas relate directly to
the traditional

liberal arts transfer program.

Clearly,

as

the MBRCC and the Massachusetts community college
presidents looked to their future,

they saw vocational and

general studies courses which were rooted in local need as
defining much of their niche.
By 1962,

then,

the picture which emerges of the MBRCC

is one of a board working

to quickly establish Ccimpuses in

key locations across the state;

a board seeking to create

demand for such campuses among critical constituencies such
as local businesses

and legislators;

the many details of Ccunpus start-up;

a board dealing with
a board seeking

increased resources to support its efforts;

and a board

beginning to deal with basic issues related to mission and
philosophy.
Perhaps most significantly,

the MBRCC by 1962

represents a Board whose identity and viability are each
emerging on solid ground.

Thanks to Furcolo's energy,

commitment and focus on key matters such as appointments
and to Volpe's willingness to endorse the Board's
activities during the key 1961-62 period,

the MBRCC had

achieved relative stability by the time of Endicott
Peabody's election.

Furcolo's dream of a two year college
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system, though buffeted by strong winds and somewhat
patched together across the state, was a reality and would
survive and grow.

CHAPTER

VIII

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The methodology and style of the present study owes
much to master historians such as Neustadt, May and Burns,
whose works set high standards of excellence in historical
scholarship.

They understand,

as few others,

is part story and part analysis.
entertaining,

that history

Story alone, while

lacks connections and meaning.

Analysis

alone ignores the whimsy and the varied colors which give
historical study its context.

History that enriches and

teaches is that which molds story to analysis with words
worthy to the task.
The "story” of this study has centered on the
comparative roles which two very different governors played
in the birth and early development of the Massachusetts
community college system.
provides a

Itself intriguing,

this story

snapshot of politics, personalities and

policymaking in the commonwealth.

Lessons,

however,

within the story and demand careful analysis.

lie

Such

analysis encourages the conclusions and recommendations
which characterize serious scholarship.
Drawing these lessons has required much care and a
heavy dose of humility.

As Michelet has argued,

is a reconstruction of life in its wholeness,
superficial aspects,
process"

(Oates,

but of the deeper,

1984,

p.

33).
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"history

not of the

inner organic

Successful scholarship

thrives in this spirit — sensitive to context; wary lest
the values and assumptions of one era be ascribed to an
earlier place and time;

always searching for the organic

process of an historical moment.
This study has exaimined the gubernatorial role in the
birth and early development of community colleges in
Massachusetts as one piece of a deeper organic process.
Matters of little direct connection to two-year colleges —
matters large and small,

global and national,

local — shaped the context of 1957-62.
also influenced the values,

state and

In doing so,

they

needs and goals of those who

steered the early development of the commonwealth's
community colleges.
Neither Foster Furcolo nor John Volpe encountered
community college development in a policy vacuum,
unaffected by other issues,
for that matter,
General Court.

events,

and personalities.

Nor

did any member of the Massachusetts
Only by understanding the scope and

interplay of these issues and their effect on the key
actors in the drama,

can one hope to achieve a rich

understanding of early community college evolution in the
commonwealth.
Such richness of understanding requires the capacity
to step outside the confines of one's preconceptions and to
engage an earlier time on its own terms. While no student
of history can completely set aside preconceptions and
assumptions,

the most successful scholars present a moment
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within the context of its place and time, not within a
framework dictated by the demands of the present.
Traditionally,

study of the American governorship has

fallen within the realm of political science.
Distinguished scholars such as Lipson,

Beyle,

and Sabato

have contributed significant studies which focused on the
mechanics of gubernatorial power.
This study has attempted to bring the historian's
perspective to bear on the American governorship. Utilizing
a case study,

it has reached beyond mechanics to touch the

deeper organic process which describes how and why two
governors used or did not use the formal and informal
powers of their office.
Thus,

one must analyze the lessons of Furcolo, Volpe

and the early days of Massachusetts community colleges with
restraint and with a sincere attempt to walk in the
footsteps of those who shaped politics and policies in the
commonwealth during the period in guestion.
Hopefully,

through its reliance on interviews,

newspaper accounts and official documents of 1958-62,

as

well as through a consistent effort to recognize the
appearance of personal preconceptions or historical bias,
this study has engaged the period on its own terms and
within its own context.
Early community college development in Massachusetts
was the product of many ingredients.

The executive branch,

under both the forceful and focused leadership of Furcolo
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and the more passive,

less committed hand of Volpe, played

a central role in this development.

It is fair to say that

without Furcolo there would have been no Massachusetts
community college program and that without Volpe that
program could well have lost its momentum and quite
possibly its prospects for long-term viability.
History affords numerous examples of leaders who,
during moments of supreme challenge to a cause they hold
deep,

rise to the full measure of their office.

Among the

most significant such examples in American history are
Lincoln's strength in preservation of the Union and
Johnson's boldness in pursuit of civil rights legislation.
Furcolo's effort between 1958 and 1961 to create and
sustain community colleges in Massachusetts is less
glcunorous but still a worthy case study. Had he wavered in
the heat of an often lonely battle or diverted his
attention to other less controversial matters,

two-year

institutions in the commonwealth would have been aborted or
still-born.
It is perhaps easy in the distant passage of nearly
four decades to ignore the extent to which Furcolo cast the
lot of his governorship with the cause of community
colleges.
1958,

From the moment of his special message in July

he accepted the burden of personal leadership on an

issue that lacked,

at least initially,

constituency.
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any major vocal

This moment of personal leadership,

a moment in which

Furcolo drew on the full array of direct and indirect
powers at his disposal,
administration.

is the high point of his

Though constrained by fiscal challenges

through much of his tenure and weakened in the Legislature
by recurrent battles over the sales tax,

as well as by his

outsider status on Beacon Hill and his ongoing problems
with Senate President Powers,

Furcolo skillfully drew on

the formal and informal powers of his office to make the
community college program a reality.

At critical moments,

when a governor less committed to the idea of two-year
colleges would have wavered,

Furcolo was focused and took

the political steps necessary to keep his idea alive.
It is also easy to minimize the substantive strategic
foundation which supported Furcolo's efforts during the
period in question.
not,

Massachusetts community colleges are

as some would have them,

simply the political outcomes

of legislative muscle-flexing and policy ad hocracy.
Rather,

their earliest development reflects conscious

policy choices on the part of Foster Furcolo.

These

choices, made before and after passage of Chapter 605, were
born of three essential realities — the governor's deep
personal commitment to community colleges,

the fragile

state of his relations with the legislature and the lack of
any large or coherent public constituency supporting
two-year colleges across the commonwealth.
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The reality of Furcolo's leadership position in
1958-1959 mitigated against any strategy which reguired
significant time or general systemwide planning.

Any such

lengthy process would have exposed the governor's weak
legislative position,

affording his opponents multiple

opportunities to undermine the foundation of his community
college agenda.

Moreover, were the governor to leave

office in 1960, most likely to pursue his long-time goal of
the United States Senate,

he needed to have a sound

governing board securely in place as well as colleges both
operational and in the pipeline.

Otherwise,

an unknown

successor would control the fate of his entire community
college progreun.
To succeed,

Furcolo required in late 1958 a strategy

which created momentum and a sense of credibility for
community colleges.

He also needed a strategy that would

quickly take advantage of positive factors such as the
gradually improving economic and fiscal situation in the
commonwealth.
legislature,

In attempting to persuade the public and the
Furcolo could not depend (as Johnson had done

in the civil rights battle and Wallace had done in
establishing Alabama's community colleges) on force of
personality or fear of retribution among recalcitrant
legislators.

He had to rely instead on a strategy which

would overcome his hurdles in the Legislature and create a
core of public support, building momentum through moderate
successes and partial victories.
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The keys to this strategy

were initial approval of community college legislation
(Chapter 605)

and successful establishment of a college

quickly to confirm the program's viability.
The Furcolo strategy of "begging, borrowing,

and

stealing" to establish campuses and build momentum also
reflected the governor's temperament,

as well as that of

the community college board which he appointed.
engaged a long,

To have

highly formalized campus planning process

would have violated his inherent desire to do big things
and do them quickly.

The seune spirit which moved so

rapidly to engage the sales tax issue and held so little
time for detail was congenitally ill-suited to further
study the implementation of his community college program.
The Commission on the Audit of State Needs provided his
planning framework; with passage of Chapter 605 it was time
to establish campuses.
Thus,

Furcolo's strategic approach reflects both the

dynamic of his political situation and the reality of his
personality.

For him to have taken any other strategic

course in 1958-1959 would have been politically tenuous and
personally out of character.
Strategic choices have policy consequences,

however.

Once Furcolo accepted a strategy based on speed and
momentum,

he also accepted the implications of his decision

- a limited initial capital outlay,
campuses in temporary facilities,

encouragement of

designation of Pittsfield

as home to the first institution and a willingness to open
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colleges where local support could be generated rather than
according to a fixed developmental plan. Perhaps most
significantly, the Furcolo strategy led almost inexorably
to strong legislative influence over decisions related to
Ccunpus location.
To achieve rapid successes, Furcolo had to demonstrate
that colleges could open without permanent homes; that they
could operate at limited cost; and that they could earn
popular support.

Berkshire's opening demonstrated that

colleges could open on a shoestring and that local
enthusiasm could be generated. This success, combined with
an improving fiscal picture created a dynamic which no
powerful legislator could ignore — a governor and MBRCC
dependent on accessing additional state funds (and without
a local or county funding source to turn to), state
revenues available to appropriate and a model in place
which enjoyed increasing support among key constituencies.
This situation was too enticing for even a traditional
community college foe such as Senator Fleming to ignore.
The decision by Furcolo to emphasize rapid openings of
colleges represents a classic political trade-off in
democratic policymaking.

To succeed in ensuring the

short-term survival of his program and thus enhance its
prospects for long-term survival, the Governor accepted the
consequences of legislative influence.

By 1960, the nose

of the legislative caonel was under the community college
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tent; that tent, however, was firmly embedded in solid
ground.
Furcolo made a second decision, quite possibly
unconsciously, which affected the evolution of community
college identity in Massachusetts.

He opted to avoid

detailed involvement in the nuances of community college
mission, preferring instead to focus on the broad notion of
access and on the imperative of establishing colleges
quickly.

Specifics concerning issues such as the relative

place of transfer versus occupational progrcims were left to
the MBRCC and, in the tone and emphasis of the governor,
consigned to secondary importance behind getting the
program in place.
It is not unusual for a governor to paint policy in
broad strokes, leaving the details of implementation to
governing boards or experts.

Rare is the successful chief

executive who is temperamentally or professionally suited
to embrace the details of institutional mission.

What

makes the Furcolo case interesting is that, in his rush to
establish campuses quickly, he appointed a group of "doers"
to the MBRCC who shared his broad vision as well as his
impatience.

The focus of both Furcolo and the MBRCC was

clearly on campuses first, with the details to follow.
This situation did not change under the governorship
of John Volpe, who was even less concerned with the details
of mission than was his predecessor.

With Furcolo's board

still essentially intact and focused on achieving viability
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through campus development, issues related to mission
received only limited concentrated attention.
While this lack of deep reflection concerning mission
is understandable and was likely inevitable within the
context of the time, it too was not without consequences.
The Massachusetts community college system never built an
identity of its own during its crucial early years.

As

Brint and Karabel describe, and MBRCC minutes reflect, the
Board generally accepted the national direction of
community college evolution toward vocational programming
and continued to speak of mission largely in the general
terms of access.

There was limited debate as to how the

national community college model could best be shaped to
fit the Massachusetts reality.

Arguably, this debate has

never occurred to the present day.
When Furcolo turned over the gubernatorial reins to
Volpe, the momentum behind community colleges was beginning
to grow.

Legislative influence over the process of caunpus

location grew concomitantly and inexorably with this
momentum.

As with the Furcolo case, one should not

underestimate the strategic underpinnings of Volpe's
response to the situation which he inherited.
The contrasts between Volpe and Furcolo are evident
and have been previously documented in this study — the
former, a moderate Republican who had

made a fortune in

construction; the second, a Democrat whose liberal
instincts reflected the Roosevelt tradition and whose
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expansive world view set him apart from the majority of
political figures in Massachusetts.

The similarities

between the two men are less obvious, but are of
significant importance to an understanding of the strategic
decisions each made concerning the politics of community
college development.
The first similarity between Furcolo and Volpe is
impossible to guantify, is subtle in its manifestations and
relates directly to the point made above concerning mission
development.

Each, through both his life experiences and

worldview had accepted two fundamental arguments concerning
higher education in Massachusetts during the late 1950s and
early 1960s — that the existing system of public colleges
and universities were insufficient to meet the burgeoning
demand for postsecondary training and that community
colleges,

“democracy's colleges,”

correcting this situation.

were a basic part of

Furcolo and Volpe might have

differed in their passion concerning the policy importance
of higher education and community colleges, but nothing in
the historical record disputes the assertion that they held
common ground around the need to expand the public system.
To the contrary, comments made by each concerning public
higher education (e.g., in their respective annual
messages) emphasized the issue of access as fundamental.
The second similarity between Volpe and Furcolo lies
in the basic fragility of the relationship each held with
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the Legislature.

Although a Democrat with majorities in

both houses from 1958 through the end of his tenure and
with a friendly speaker in the House,

Furcolo entered the

governorship as an outsider and (thanks in good measure to
the sales tax imbroglio) never developed a solid working
relationship with many in his own party.
Volpe's difficulties with the Legislature are more
easily understood.

A Republican with no roots in elective

office and elected by only a narrow margin, Volpe had no
strong foundation of camaraderie in either the House or
Senate upon which to draw in his efforts to secure passage
of his program.

Nor did he possess an electoral mandate

with which to bludgeon the unfriendly majorities in the
Legislature.

He was,

in the minds of many Democrats,

an

cdDerration to be replaced in two years by one of their own.
To afford him victories on his legislative program,
particularly on his anti-corruption initiatives,

could only

help to validate his governorship at the expense of the
Democratic Party.

Thus,

1961 and 1962 were

remarkably

quick legislative sessions with passage of little
noteworthy legislation.
Volpe appears to have employed essentially a
three-pronged political strategy to overcome his weak
legislative position.

First,

he continued to attack the

Democrats at their Achilles heel,
reform.

corruption and government

Painting Thompson and other members of the

Democratic leadership as entrenched and self-interested.
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the Governor succeeded in some measure of role reversal —
he became the voice of the person in the street while the
Democrats increasingly became caricatures of machine
politicians who were out of touch with the values of their
constituents.
Second, Volpe pursued an aggressive construction
program.

Although his proposals enjoyed scattered success

in the Legislature,

his efforts on behalf of projects such

as the Prudential Tower,

the Massachusetts Turnpike

extension and the Boston inner beltway both reflected the
builder in his soul and presented him as an aggressive
governor seeking tangible progress for the Commonwealth.
Third,

and most' directly related to community

colleges, Volpe selectively jumped on the wave to support
proposals traditionally associated with Democrats.

The

most obvious manifestation of this strategy is his response
to a series of education issues during his first term.
Education had traditionally been a Democratic issue in
Massachusetts.

Furcolo had championed expansion of public

higher education, Wojtkowsi had led in the fight for
community colleges, Harrington had become a powerful voice
for the Commonwealth's state colleges and Donahue an
equally resonant voice for the University of Massachusetts.
Almost alone among major Republican figures.
considered a leader on educational issues.

Stone was
As noted in

Chapter VI, Volpe had demonstrated little evidence during

251

the early days of his governorship that education would be
an issue of gubernatorial focus.
The Forman and Menzies series in the Globe changed the
parameters of the field,

however.

Suddenly,

education had

become a hot issue in the Commonwealth and, with Forman
consistently turning up the heat in his columns, Volpe
faced the prospect that Harrington, Donahue, Thompson and a
Democratic foe in 1962 could use the issue against him if
he failed to respond.
During 1962,

as the education reform debate began to

percolate on Beacon Hill, Volpe coyly played for time on
potentially controversial issues such as the proposed state
medical school,

fiscal autonomy for the University of

Massachusetts and the master planning effort for which
Forman and Harrington were champions.
issues,

On each of these

the Governor would ultimately offer his support,

clearly enough to earn a measure of credit in the 1962
Ccumpaign and with enough caveats to hold the conservative
voices in the Republican Party in check.
The issue of community college development was subtly
different than others Volpe faced in the educational arena.
By 1961,

Furcolo's strategy had succeeded in creating a

momentum behind college development.

Ironically,

community

colleges provided a rare issue of mutual interest between
Volpe and the Democratic leadership.
While none of these individuals (with the possible
exception of Thompson)

shared the deep visceral commitment
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which had driven Furcolo,

each shared at the very least an

acceptance that community colleges were a reality and an
acceptance of the positive potential for such institutions
both to address the challenge of growing post-secondary
enrollments and to provide opportunities to students of
varied backgrounds and needs.
Thus,

as the Commonwealth's fiscal picture improved,

it served the political interests of no major political
figure to stall the momentum for community college
development.

To the contrary,

it served the interests of

Volpe to encourage the construction of such institutions as
evidence of achievement in an otherwise meager legislative
record.

Similarly,

as the Democratic leadership held much

of Volpe's agenda hostage,

community colleges offered an

opportunity to deliver a tangible resource to increasingly
receptive communities.

The mutual benefits which community

colleges offered to Volpe and to the Legislature created a
wide pathway for the MBRCC,

a pathway which the aggressive

board followed with vigor.
It is tempting, within the context outlined,

above to

undervalue Volpe's role in the increased pace of community
college funding and development during 1961-1962; to argue
that the Legislature would have funded such development no
matter who was governor and no matter what position that
governor assumed on the issue.
tempting,

While such speculation is

it unfairly undervalues the decisions which Volpe
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did make as well as those he did not make that a lesser
governor might have made.
Perhaps the most important decision which Volpe did
make was to accept Morrissey as chair and spirit of the
MBRCC.

Generally,

governors covet such positions as

opportunities to reward a loyal supporter or to establish a
policy direction.

Rare is the chief executive who both

accepts and encourages the policy intimate of his erstwhile
rival.

In avoiding confrontation with Morrissey Volpe at

least tacitly endorsed a program which was fundamental to
his predecessor's legacy,

as well as the policy direction

which that program had taken.

To have done differently,

would have stripped the MBRCC of its life force and its
most powerful visionary at a critically sensitive stage in
the history of Massachusetts community colleges.
yet,

Worse

to have made a purely political choice to attack

Morrissey,

surely a temptation to a new governor surrounded

by appointees of a different party,
momentum generated by Furcolo,

could have killed the

undermined the credibility

of the Board and even further politicized the campus
development process.
The second major decision which Volpe made was to
allow the process of community college development to go
forward with relatively little gubernatorial interference.
It is interesting to speculate what might have happened had
Volpe taken a more activist interest in the process; had he
intervened to stop Democrats from securing colleges in
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their districts,

or challenged the policy of opening in

temporary facilities,
planning process.

or called for a more comprehensive

Any of these decisions would have

affected the course of community college development.
Arguably,

given the state of Volpe's legislative

relations and the still tenuous status of community
colleges,

it is highly possible that such decisions would

have led to stalemate and to loss of momentum.

Given

Volpe's lack of apparent policy emphasis on community
colleges, Thompson's growing problems in the House and
Wojtkowski's increasing difficulties with the leadership,
two-year institutions would have faced this loss of
momentum without a resonant voice in government.

At the

very least, Morrissey and the Board would have had to
significant energy to re-establish their position.
One can argue what chain of events might have ensued
had Volpe chosen to play a more activist role. The fact
remains,

however,

that he chose not to step into the fray

and that the Furcolo strategy of speed and momentum
continued to drive policy during the first Volpe
administration.
As the basic Furcolo strategy of community college
development carried forward into the first Volpe term,
too did the policy consequences of that strategy.

Colleges

continued to open in temporary facilities and the
Legislature continued to influence decisions concerning
Ccunpus locations.
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so

Chapter VII summarizes the arguments of scholars who
criticize the influence which legislators brought to bear
on campus development.
measure persuasive,

While these arguments are in some

it is the opinion of this author that

they hold the Massachusetts case to an unrealistic
standard.
First,

they fail to recognize the strategic

imperatives which forced a weakened Governor Furcolo to
pursue a strategy of speed and momentum.

To have opted for

any other strategy in the context of his time would have
likely doomed tangible campus development before the
election of 1960,

thus leaving the future of two-year

institutions to a very uncertain future.
Second,
Volpe.

they fail to consider the position of Governor

Also the victim of a weak legislative position,

Volpe effectively assumed Furcolo's strategy concerning
campus development.

Had he chosen any other course,

momentum behind community colleges would likely have
shifted,

funding would have been threatened and the process

even more politicized.
Third,

critics of the Legislature's role in the

development of Massachusetts fail to acknowledge that other
states faced similar situations in the development of their
systems.
example,

Wattenbarger (interview, April 1994),

for

recalls that the earliest community colleges in

Florida developed in rural areas due to the influence of
individual legislators and Katsinas
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(1993, p.

2) describes

the situation in Alabama as one in which

"two thirds of

the eventual 41 system institutions were placed in the
southern third of the state,

a reflection of the rural

power base in the state's political system
Fourth,

.

.

(p.

2).

critics fail to recognize the extent of

planning that did occur concerning community college
development in the Commonwealth.
Report,

Dating back to the Zook

numerable studies had taken place which analyzed

the need for two-year institutions in specific regions of
Massachusetts.

Most notably,

the Commission on the Audit

of State Needs provides a fairly well-documented
articulation of regional needs for such institutions.
Finally,

while admittedly pushed by an anxious MBRCC,

the

local studies prepared in each prospective college
community,

did provide important insights as to level of

need and support.

It should further be noted that such

local studies were also a cornerstone of planning in
Florida,

a state recognized for the excellence of its

two-year college system.
Contemporary literature concerning the evolution of
America's community colleges tends to focus either on the
sociological
Zwerling,

foundations of such institutions

Brint,

& Karabel)

Monroe,

politics,

Cohen,

Clark,

or on the essentially

chronological presentation of data,
(e.g.,

(e.g.,

& Brawer,

personalities and dates

Witt et al).

The role of

the inherently messy and human face of
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policymaking,

has been comparatively ignored

(Katsinas

standing as a notable exception).
To ignore the political dimension is to invite an
artificially antiseptic view of policy development,

a sense

that rational decision making based on clearly presentable
models is not only possible but to be expected.
example,

Brint and Karabel

For

fail to incorporate the

political dynamic into their presentation of an
"institutional” model of mission evolution in Massachusetts
community colleges.

Coles recognizes a political dynamic

in her study of Ccunpus planning,
inappropriateness;

but only to criticize its

as though in a better world politics

would remain discretely beyond the field of policy
decisions.
This study proceeds from a very different perspective
— that politics and policymaking are inherently linked.
Any attempt to divorce one from the other,
pristine policymaking environment,

to create a

denies a fundamental

reality of the democratic process and unfairly diminishes
the human character of policy development.
It is impossible to remove politics from policymaking.
Particularly in a situation of gubernatorial vulnerability,
legislative bodies will assume greater policy influence.
When this occurs,
messy,

the process inevitably becomes more

as multiple legislators jockey for position.

In a democracy,

it seems fair to

judge the role of

politics in policymaking against a long-term standard of
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outcomes rather than against a standard of purity in
apolitical planning.

In 1994,

fifteen community colleges

serve over 75,000 students in Massachusetts.

While

political influence led to campuses in communities of
arguably less need,

the fact remains that over time each

region identified in both the Zook Report and the report of
the Commission on the Audit of State Needs received a
campus.

Despite a lack of intense or focused debate

concerning mission,

the system has evolved, with each

institution finding its own identity in the community it
serves.

For all its admitted compromises,

and limitations,

the Furcolo strategy of speed and momentum — a strategy
essentially assumed by Volpe — set the foundation for a
viable community college system.
therefore,

In the final analysis,

this author believes that both Furcolo and Volpe

deserve history's acknowledgment for the positive role each
played in the early development of community colleges in
Massachusetts.
General Lessons for Contemporary Governors
The Furcolo and Volpe case studies offer innumerable
examples of how two individuals of different backgrounds,
temperaments and parties drew on the powers of their office
to secure passage of their programs.

Chapters V-VIII

describe these cases in detail.
The purpose of analyzing these studies has not been to
provide a "how-to” primer for contemporary governors. Each
governor must lead in a particular time and place.
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confronting challenges in a specific context for which
history offers no perfect template.
There are,

however,

certain overarching lessons that

today's governors can draw from the experiences of Furcolo
and Volpe.
The Furcolo case reconfirms that an activist governor
in Massachusetts,

even when hcimpered by strained

legislative relations,
authority.

holds enormous formal and informal

When a governor applies the full measure of his

or her office to a cause,
armada.

he or she draws on a powerful

The capacity of a governor to set the tone of

public debate,

to play off the goals and needs of

individual legislators and to build key alliances in the
community is profound.

Only in rare cases does a governor

care so deeply as to employ the full force of his arsenal.
The Furcolo effort in support of community colleges offers
one such example.
Perhaps the most useful lesson of the Furcolo case for
today's governor is that provided by the care which he
brought to appointment of the MBRCC.

The power of

appointment is one of the most important which falls to any
chief executive.

Furcolo exercised this power with

restraint, vision and integrity.

The personal attention

which he applied to defining the Board in Chapter 605 as
well as the energy he applied to appointment of a Board
which shared his broad vision and his passion insured that
his influence would live long beyond his administration.
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This author believes that the definition which Furcolo
provided to the Board and the seriousness which he brought
to its appointment is his greatest legacy to the community
college movement in Massachusetts.

It offers a standard

which any governor could emulate.
The activism of the MBRCC in the years following its
creation also provides ample evidence of the potential
power which a governing body can employ.

The regional

community college board became in many ways a
"semi-hierarchy" of the sort described by Zusman,

dependant

on the governor and legislature for funding, but a driving
force in the pace of college development.
The Volpe case offers a somewhat different lesson for
today's governors.

When a chief executive assumes power

from a governor of another party,

there is an extraordinary

human temptation to cast aside fundamental elements of that
predecessor's program as inherently flawed.

Volpe chose,

for the strategic reasons enumerated above and because he
saw the worth in Furcolo's initiative,
college development.

to support community

Such choices deserve notice, both for

their strategic significance and for the policy openness
they represent.
This case study also reminds contemporary governors
that every strategic choice has policy implications which
extend beyond the moment of decision and beyond the narrow
issue at hand.

No decision is made in a vacuum or without

downside risk.

For example,

Furcolo's decision to pursue
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campuses before mission and Volpe's decision to endorse the
efforts of Furcolo's board each had long-term implications
for the system.

This study has concluded that the

long-term benefits of securing and sustaining a community
college system in the Commonwealth outweighed the downside
effects of limited substantive debate concerning mission.
For today's governor,

the

"lesson" may lie less in the

details of what Furcolo or Volpe did or did not do
concerning community colleges,

but in the reality that the

choices they made have affected the identity of community
colleges in Massachusetts to the present day.
Opportunities for Future Research
The Furcolo and Volpe case studies also provide the
foundation for further important research.

A number of

studies warrant particular attention.
First,

the present study offers only a first look at

gubernatorial policymaking concerning community colleges in
Massachusetts.

Eight administrations and six governors

have followed since

1962.

Each governor brought his own

set of priorities and goals to the corner office on Beacon
Hill.

Each also confronted opportunities,

challenges,

political realities unique to his time and place.

and

Each of

these administrations deserves analysis within its own
context so that eventually a holistic picture of governors
and community colleges in Massachusetts will develop.
Second,

this research should be extended to other

states where the mechanics of government and the community
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college identity are different.

Such research would

provide an interesting opportunity to add significantly to
both the literature concerning the American governorship
and the politics of community college development.
Third,

it is hoped that his research will inspire

others to use the case study method to examine how
governors have influenced policy development in a number of
areas beyond community colleges and higher education.
Chapter II notes that case studies have been used
successfully by Neustadt and others to examine politics and
policymaking.

These efforts should be extended and

contrasts between cases and contexts should be encouraged.
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APPENDIX A
INTERVIEWS
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Interviewee

Title/Affiliation

Date

Daniel Asqunio

President,

Mt.

10/20/90

David Bartley

President,

Holyoke Community

Wachusetts

11/26/90

College;
Former Speaker of Massachusetts
House of Representatives
Steven Brint

Author,

Theodore Chase

Former Chair of Massachusetts

The Diverted Dreeun

11/15/90

Board of Regional Community

07/20/90

Colleges
John Costello

Former member of the Massachusetts
Board of Regional Community

06/01/92

Colleges Staff
Maurice Donahue

Former President of Massachusetts

08/25/93

Senate
William Dwyer

Former Executive Director of
Massachusetts Board of Regional
Community Colleges

Foster Furcolo

Former Governor,

Commonwealth of

10/15/88

Massachusetts
Kevin Harrington

Consultant;

former President of

Massachusetts Senate
James Wattenbarger

08/18/93

Distinguished Professor Emeritus
at University of Florida

Thomas Wojtkowski

07/18/93

Counsel,

04/05/94

Massachusetts House of

Representatives;

former member of

Massachusetts House

265

05/10/91

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abolishment of Milk Commission urged.
Also asks new
approach to tax policies structure.
Partial text of
Governor Furcolo's second Inaugural Address.
(1/9/59).
Boston Globe, pp. 1 & 13.
Adler, M. W., & Lane, F. S.
(Summer, 1985).
Governors and
Higher Education: Politics, Budgeting and Policy
Leadership."
State Government. 58(2).
Advertisement.
All on the cuff.

.

(9/12/60).
(8/19/58).

Boston Globe,

p.

3.

Boston Herald-Traveler, p.

22

Asquino, D. M.
(1976).
Budgeting as a possible aid to
better policy: The community colleges in
Massachusetts.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation.
University of Massachusetts.
Bartley, D. M.
(1988).
The impact of the Board of
Regents^ mandated planning process on a sample of
Massachusetts community college long-range plans.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of
Massachusetts.
Berdahl, R. O.
education.
Education.

(1971).
Statewide coordination of higher
Washington:
American Council on

Beyle, T. L.
(Ed.).
Washington, DC:

(1992).
Governors and hard times.
Congressional Quarterly, 215 pgs.

Beyle, T. L., & Muchmore, L. R.
(1983).
Being governor:
The view from the office.
Dunhcim, NC:
Duke
University Press.
Beyle, T. L., & Williams, J. O.
(Ed).
(1972).
The
American governor in behavioral perspective.
New
York: Harper and Row.
Blocker, C. E., Plummer, R. H., & Richardson, R. C., Jr.
(1965).
The two-year college: A social synthesis.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 298 pgs.
Bogue, J. P.
(1950).
The community college.
McGraw-Hill, Inc.

New York:

Brint, S., & Karabel, J.
(1989).
The diverted dream:
Community colleges and the promise of educational
opportunity in America.
New York: Oxford University
Press, 312 pgs.

266

Capital outlay bill sent to house.
Globe, Evening Edition, p. 29.

(10/7/58).

Boston

Carnegie Commission on Higher Education.
(1970).
door college.
New York:
McGraw-Hill, Inc.

The open

Carnegie Commission on Higher Education.
(1971).
The
capitol and the campus: State responsibility for
postsecondary education.
A Report and Recommendations
by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education.
New
York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.
Clark, B.
(1960).
The open door college: A case study.
New York:
McGraw-Hill, Inc.
Cohen, A. M., & Brawer,
college (1st ed.).
pgs.

F. B.
(1982).
American community
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 445

Coles, A.
(1977).
The dynamics of non-planning in the
Massachusetts community college system. 1958-1972.
Unpublished paper. Graduate School of Education,
Harvard University.
Deegan, W. L., Tillery, D., et al.
(1985).
Renewing the
American community college: Priorities and strategies
for effective leadership.
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,
340 pgs.
Devin, E.
(1/15/57).
State audit plan stirs row: GOP
charges move to shift responsibility.
Boston HeraldTraveler. p. 1 & 8.
Devin, E.
(1/24/57).
Sales tax chances look good:
Furcolo's proposal wins wide support.
Boston HeraldTraveler. p. 1 & 3.
Devin, E.
(4/28/57).
Skerry turns on heat, house docket
shrinks.
Boston Herald-Traveler, p. V-6.
Devin, E.
(1/1/58).
Democrats plan House shift: Furcolo
to ask rigid economy.
Boston Herald-Traveler, p. 1 &
20

.

Devin, E.
(1/15/58).
Scene and Heard at the State House:
Governor seeks improved liaison with Legislature.
Boston Herald-Traveler, p. 24.
Devin, E.
(8/1/58).
Furcolo insights on port rain: Leaves
issue of the Board's rate to Legislature.
Boston
Herald-Traveler. pp. 1 & 9.

267

Devin, E.
(8/12/58).
House passes four Furcolo bills:
Withholding, Port Authority plans passed.
Boston
Herald-Traveler. pp. 1 & 4.
Devin, E.
(10/3/58).
Senate revives jobless aid bill:
Parties clash on need for fund.
Boston HeraldTraveler, pp. 1 & 5.
Devin, E.
(10/8/58).
House kills $43,475,000 job
projects: Furcolo bill lacks two-thirds vote after
acid debate.
Boston Herald-Traveler, pp. 1- & 4.
Devin, E.
(10/16/58).
Prorogation due today: House passes
capital outlay bill 151-58.
Boston Herald-Traveler,
pp. 1 & 22.
Devin, E.
(10/17/58).
408,180,000 session ends. State
debt reaches billion mark: Furcolo blasts senators.
Boston Herald-Traveler, pp. 1 & 17.
Deyo,

D. E.
(1967).
Access to quality community college
opportunity: A master plan for Massachusetts community
colleges through 1975.
A Summary Report.
Boston:
Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges.

Eaton, J.
(Ed.).
(1988).
Colleges of choice: The
enabling impact of the community college.
New York:
American Council on Education: Macmillan.
Eulau, H., & Quinley, H.
(1970).
State officials and
higher education: A survey of the opinions and
expectations of policy makers in nine states.
New
York: McGraw-Hill, 209 pgs.
Feinberg, M.
needs.

(11/7/56).
Furcolo asks full study of state
Boston Globe. Evening Edition, pp. 1 & 34.

Fields, R. R.
(1962).
The community college movement.
New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.
Florida State Board of Education.
(1957).
The community
college in Floridans future.
A Report to the State
Board of Education by the Community College Council.
Forgive clause may save tax.
Traveler. pp. 1 & 3.

(8/4/58).

Boston Herald-

Forman, I.
(10/17/61).
UMass President asks review of
education resources in Bay State.
Boston Globe, p.
Forman, I.
(10/18/61).
Globe, pp. 1 & 2.

Volpe maps school survey.

268

8.

Boston

Forman, I.
(4/8/62).
State education board under sharp
scrutiny.
Boston Globe, p. A-56.
Furcolo Audit,
12

.

The.

(1/15/57).

Boston Herald-Traveler, p.

Furcolo demands economy drive: Board says state finances
serious.
(1/15/57).
Boston Herald-Traveler, pp. 1 &
12

.

Furcolo meets a crisis.
Traveler. p. 28.
Furcolo—Mixed Reaction.
Traveler. p. 26.

(1/24/57).

(10/3/57).

Boston Herald-

Boston Herald-

Furcolo says state purse flat: Full text of inaugural
speech by Bay State's new leader.
Boston Globe, p.

5.

Gilley, J. W., & Fulmer, K. A.
(1986).
A question of
leadership: or to whom are the governors listening?
Report of The Center for Policy Studies in Education.
Virginia: George Mason University.
Glenny, L. A.
(1959).
Autonomy of public colleges: The
challenge of coordination.
New York: McGraw-Hill, 325
pgs.
Glenny, L. A., & Bowen, F. M.
(1977).
A state
intervention in higher education.
A paper prepared
for the Sloan Commission on Government and Higher
Education.
University of California at Berkeley.
Glenny, L. A., & Weathersby, G. B.
(1971).
Statewide
planning for postsecondary education: Issues and
design.
Boulder, Colorado: Western Interstate
Commission for Higher Education, 123 pgs.
Goodall, L. E.
(Ed.).
(1987).
When colleges lobby
states: The higher education/state government
connection.
American Association of State Colleges
and Universities, 264 pgs.
Governor Furcolo's surprise.
18.

(1/24/57).

Boston Globe, p.

Greer, C.
(1976).
The great school legend: A revisionist
interpretation of American public education.
New
York: Penguin Books, 206 pgs.
Hammond, J. H.
(6/1/61).
MDC reorganized: Murphy now
Czar.
Boston Globe, p. 4.

269

Harper, W. R.
(1905).
The trend in higher education.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Harrigan, J. J.
(1980).
Politics and policy in states and
communities.
Boston:
Little, Brown.
Harris, J.
(9/12/60).
Rebel Democrats enliven election.
Boston Globe, p. 26.
Harris, J.
(11/9/60).
Volpe, McCormack.

Bay State splits for Jack,
Boston Globe, pp. l & 15.

Salty,

Harris, J.
(11/10/60).
Volpe, Salty didn't squeak in...
They raced.
Boston Globe, pp. i & 13.
Harris, S.
means.

(8/28/58).
Junior college plan within state
Boston Herald-Traveler, p. 18.

Hartmark, L. S., & Hines, E. R. (19xx).
Politics and
policy in higher education: Reflections on the status
of the field.
In S. K. Gore & T. M. Stauffer (Eds.),
Policy controversies in higher education.
City?:
Publisher.
Healey, R.
(11/11/62).
State Democrats are back on the
reservation.
Boston Globe, p. A-6.
Herzik, E. B.
(1985, Summer).
The governors'
state-of-the-state addresses: A focus on higher
education.
State Government. 58(2).
Hines, E. R.
(1988).
Higher education and state
governments: Renewed partnership, cooperation or
competition?
College Station, PA: Association for the
Study of Education.
Hines, E. R., & Hartmark, L. S.
(1980).
Politics of
higher education.
(AAHE-ERIC Higher Education
Research Report, No. 7.)
Washington, DC: The George
Washington University, American Association for Higher
Education, 75 pgs.
House passes withholding tax again.
Globe, pp. 1 & 4.

(8/11/58).

House votes $250,000 for education survey.
Boston Globe, p. 4.

Boston

(7/13/62).

Jones, W. E.
(1/27/57).
Sales tax? Globe finds out what
other states are doing about it.
Boston Globe, p. 1.

270

Katsinas, S. G.
(1993).
George C. Wallace and the
founding of Alabama's public two-year colleges.
Unpublished paper prepared at Oklahoma State
University.
Kearney, R. C.
(1987).
How a "weak" governor can be
strong: Dick Riley and education reform in South
Carolina.
State Government. ^(2), 150-156.
Kerry, C.
(Summer 1985).
The states and higher education:
Changes ahead.
State Government, 58(2).
Lederle, J. W.
(1976).
Governors and higher education.
In L. E. Goodall (Ed.), State politics and higher
education.
Dearborn:
University of Michigan.
Lewis, W. J.
(1/4/57).
Must hike taxes-Furcolo. GOP
angered by his chargeof "financial mess": New governor
calls deficit staggering.
Boston Globe, pp. 1 & 8.
Lewis, W. J.
(1/24/57).
Sales tax chances look good:
Furcolo's proposal wins wide support.
Boston Globe,
pp. 1 & 9.
Lewis, W. J.
(8/12/58).
4 Furcolo bills passed:
Withholding tax voted; 9 colleges approved.
$30
million state office building OK'd.
Boston Globe, pp.
1 & 13.
Lewis, W. J.
on TV.

(8/13/58).
Pressure GOP Furcolo urges voters
Boston Globe, pp. 1 & 4.

Lewis, W. J.
(10/8/58).
House kills jobs bond issue: 11889 vote less than two-thirds.
Boston Globe, pp. 1 &
23.
Lewis, W. J.
million:
budget.

(10/11/58).
Senate cuts outlay bill $20
Education items slashed by half in state
Boston Globe, pp. 1 & 13.

Lewis, W. J.
(1/9/59).
Towns lose $23 million windfall in
new Furcolo withholding plan: Governor now wants state
to keep it all. Also plans to renew drive for 3% sales
Boston Globe. pp. 1 & 13.
levy.
Lewis, W. J.
drive.

Legislature fails in windup
(9/16/59).
Boston Globe , pp. 1 & 9.

Lawmakers quit after 8 months
(9/18/59).
Lewis, W. J.
Boston Globe, pp. 1 & 15.
Lewis, W. J.
(11/10/60).
Boston Globe, p. 12.

Slim pickin's for Bay State GOP.

271

Lewis, W. J.
(4/21/61).
Boston Globe, p. 17.

Little done

.

,

.

but done fast.

Lincoln, G.
(7/10/58).
Democrats making bid for full
state control.
Boston Globe, p. 23.
Lipson, L.
(1939).
The American governor from figurehead
tj3_.leader.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 282
pgs.
Lustberg, L. S.
(1979).
The founding of community
colleges in Massachusetts: A study of issues in
political sociology.
Undergraduate Thesis, Department
of Sociology, Harvard University.
Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges.
(1958-1962).
Minutes of board meetings.
Boston:
MBRCC.
Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges.
(1959).
A progress report to Governor Foster Furcolo.
Boston: MBRCC.
Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges.
(1967).
Access to quality community college
opportunity: A master plan for Massachusetts community
colleges through 1975.
Boston.
Massachusetts General Laws.

(1958).

Chapter 605 of 1958.

Massachusetts House of Representatives.
(1923).
Final
report of the Special Commission relative to
opportunities and methods for technical and higher
education in the Commonwealth.
Boston:
House 1700.
Massachusetts House of Representatives.
(1948).
Report of
the Special Commission established to investigate and
study certain problems of education in the
Commonwealth.
Boston:
House 2050.
Massachusetts House of Representatives.
(1956).
A
petition that the Trustees of the University of
Massachusetts be authorized to establish and maintain
community colleges.
Boston:
Source.
Massachusetts House of Representatives.
(1956).
Preliminary report of the Special Commission relative
to the operation and structure of junior colleges in
the Commonwealth.
Boston: House 2850.
Massachusetts House of Representatives.
(1957-1962).
Budget proposals of Governors Furcolo and Volpe.
Boston:
House I.

272

Massachusetts House of Representatives.
(1958).
Report of
the Commission on the audit of state needs (with
special reference to community colleges) under Chapter
38, Resolves of 1957 as amended.
Boston: House 3035.
Massachusetts House of Representatives.
(1958).
Final
report of the Special Commission relative to the
operation and structure of junior colleges in the
Commonwealth.
Boston:
House 2719.
Massachusetts Senate.
(1957-1961).
Senate I annual
message of the Governor.
Boston, MA.
Massachusetts Senate.
(1958).
Address by Governor Foster
Furcolo concerning the future of higher education in
the Commonwealth.
Boston: Senate 760.
Menzies, J., & Forman, I.
(9/19/62).
Who cares about
schools in Massachusetts?
Boston Globe, p. A-6.
Micciche, S. J.
(8/4/58).
The political circuit: Furcolo
starts sprint for legislative record.
Boston Globe.
Evening Edition, p. 17.
Micciche, S. J.
(3/7/61).
1.2 million "safe haven" bill
given legislature by Volpe today.
Boston Globe, pp. 1
& 7.
Micciche, S. J.
(4/21/61).
"era of good feeling."

Thompson hits Volpe Rule as
Boston Globe, pp. 1 & 8.

Micciche, S. J.
(1/3/62).
Legislature fretting about
public image.
Boston Globe, p. 1 & 3.
Micciche, S. J.
(1/4/62).
Democrats hoist storm flags as
Volpe launches progrcon.
Boston Globe, pp. 1 & 23.
Micciche, S. J.
(7/26/62).
House kills Volpe's rider:
Medical school in doubt.
Boston Globe, p. 1.
Millett, J. D.
(1975).
Politics and higher education.
Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
Monroe, C. R.
(1972).
Profile of the community college.
San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass.
Moos, M. C., & Rourke, F. E.
(1959).
The campus and the
state.
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 414 pgs.
Mullins, W. E.
(1/1/1957).
This is how I see it:
Attractive hopefuls lurk in Democratic party wings.
Boston Herald-Traveler, p. 92.

273

Mullins, W. E.
(5/8/57).
This is how I see it: Furcolo
rule so far devoid of anything hurtful to GOP.
Boston
Herald-Traveler. p. 44.
Mullins, W. E.
(10/3/57).
This is how I see it; Artesani
support aids Thompson for Speaker.
Boston HeraldTraveler. p. 26.
Mullins, W. E.
(12/25/57).
This is how I see it;
Furcolo survey cites his 3 key achievements.
Herald-Traveler. p. 48.

Governor
Boston

Mullins, W. E.
(12/30/57).
Sales tax "folly" for Governor
Furcolo; Powers gives views on session,
p. 1 & 10.
Mullins, W. E.
(1/3/58).
This is how I see it: Boston
Democrats facing liquidation as House chiefs,
p. 12.
Murphy, J. G.
(1974).
Reorganization of public higher
education in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of
Massachusetts.
Must raise $90 million, says Furcolo.
Globe. Evening Edition, p. 12.

(1/5/59).

Boston

Neustadt, R. E.
(1960).
Presidential power,
of leadership.
New York:
Wiley.

the politics

Neustadt, R. E.
(1970).
Alliance politics.
Columbia University Press, 167 pgs.

New York;

Neustadt, R. E.
(1990).
Presidential powers and the
modern presidents; The politics leadership from
Roosevelt to Reagan.
New York; MacMillan, 371 pgs.
Newman, F.
(1987).
Choosing quality; Reducing conflict
between the state and university.
Denver, CO:
Education Commission of the States.
Oates, S. B.
(1984).
Abraham Lincoln, the man behind the
myths.
New York:
Harper and Row.
Opponents blast sales tax plan.
Traveler. pp. 1 St 21.

(5/3/57).

Boston Herald-

Osborne, D. E.
(1988).
Laboratories of democracy.
Boston, MA:
Harvard Business School Press, 380 pgs.
Owens, C. R.
(11/9/60).
Volpe wins by 132,000,
Saltonstall margin 299,000.
Boston Globe. Evening
Edition, pp. 1 St 46.

274

Owens, C. R.
(1/5/61).
Volpe calls a halt: Plans changes
in DPW, MDC, MTA. Bars new spending with $1 billion
debt.
Boston Globe, pp. l & 25.
Owens, C. R.
(5/24/61).
Boston Globe, p. 17.

Deficit bound Volpe serene.

Owens, C. R.
(7/15/62).
Vote-the-party bill on skids.
Boston Globe, p. A-4.
Owens, C. R.
auditor.

(7/17/62).
Would keep financial records from
Boston Globe, p. A-4.

Paying for the HCG.
p. 44.
Photo caption.
Peabody).

(11/13/57).

Boston Herald-Traveler,

(6/17/62).
(under photo of Endicott
Boston Globe, p. 19.

Powers, Thompson clash on medical school bill.
Boston Globe, pp. 1 & 25.
Ransone, C. B.
Westport,

(7/25/62).

(1982).
The American governorship.
CT: Greenwood Press, 187 pgs.

Record state deficit forecast: Liquor, race, cigarette tax
boast eyed.
Boston Herald-Traveler, pp. 1 & 20.
Retailers to support sales tax, if . . . want relief
assured to cities and towns: State GOP wiling "to go
along" if Democrats agree to back levy.
Boston Globe,
pp. 1 & 2.
Sabato, L.
(1983).
Goodbye to good-time Charlie: The
American governorship transformed.
Washington, DC:
Press.

CQ

Sales tax chances look good: Civic leaders' opinions of
sales tax proposal.
(1/24/57).
Boston Globe, pp. 1 &
9.
Sales tax hit hard at labor forum.
Globe. pp. 1 & 4.

(1/25/57).

Boston

Senate 760.
(1958).
The responsibility of the
Commonwealth in higher education.
Message from His
Excellency Foster Furcolo.
Boston: Commonwealth of
Massachusetts.
Stafford, R., & Lustberg, L.
(1978).
Higher education in
Massachusetts: Issues in their context.
Report to The
Sloan Commission on Government and Higher Education.
City?: Source.

275

Stafford, R.
(1980).
Massachusetts higher education and
BPlitics of reorganization.
Unpublished doctoral
dissertation. Harvard University.
Time to deliberate.
4.

(8/16/58).

Boston Herald-Traveler, p.

Travers, R. M. W.
(19xx).
An introduction to educational
research (3rd ed.).
New York:
MacMillan.
Valenti, V., Anderson, J., & Hirons, F.
(Producers).
(cl980).
The Massachusetts community college story:
The early years.
Videotape.
Volpe urges $200,000 for education survey.
Boston Globe, p. 10.
Westin, A.
York:

(7/8/62).

F.
(Ed.).
(1962).
The uses of power.
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

What the Governor seeks.

(1/4/62).

New

Boston Globe, p.

20.

Whittaker, J.
(1989).
Selecting a permanent site and
planning an urban campus for the University of
Massachusetts - Boston 1964-1973: A case study of the
impact of state and local politics on policy
formulation and planning for an urban public
university doctoral dissertation at UMass Amherst
School of Education.
Witt, A. A.
(1988).
The junior college movement: An
historical review.
Unpublished essay prepared at the
University of Florida Institute of Higher Education.
Zwerling, L. S.
(1976).
McGraw-Hill.

Second best.

35 Democrats seek ouster of Thompson.
Globe. pp. 1 & 23.

276

New York:

(7/4/62).

Boston

